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Abstract 
The main aim of this thesis is to explore the operation of the ideological discourse 
in Turkey that 'liberalisation in economy brings liberalisation in politics'. This 
early claim of the modernization theorists has been renewed in the age of 
globalization with the assumption that the state is in decline; statism in the 
economy is corning to end and as a result of this, democracy, civil society and 
citizenship are flourishing. This ideological discourse, which appeared in the 
'liberal' environment of Turkey in the 1980s following the military coup, has been 
more visible in the 1990s with the added and emphasised elements of privatization 
and European integration. The critical period in recent Turkish history, in which 
the transfer of state economic enterprises to the private sector was legalised, is 
given particular attention as a case study in this management of political ideology. 
In exploring how this link between liberal economy, declining state and democracy 
has arisen, this thesis traces the existence of discourses other than liberalism. Since 
the media are the major arena in which these discourses are represented, the thesis 
investigates them in the contemporary Turkish press through an examination of the 
ideological management of economic change. 
The thesis traces the political and economic roots of these discourses on a national 
and global scale before analysing the operation of the ideology in the news, 
editorials and columns of the Turkish press. It investigates the structure of the 
media industries in which the meanings are produced, and explores the news 
production process by examining the daily practices of the media professionals. 
By investigating how capitalism as an ideology is communicated and by showing 
how the media limits the availability of information by privileging some choices in 
the public debate about political economy, this thesis attempts to make a 
contribution to the ideas which aim to develop democracy and citizenship in 
Turkey. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
INTRODUCTION 
This thesis arose from a discontent with some ideological assumptions about 
'globalization' and its application to the peculiar conditions of post-1980 Turkey. 
The modernization paradigm, which conceived underdeveloped countries as on an 
inevitable path to capitalism by promising democracy as a result of capitalist 
development, has been renewed and strengthened by the globalization paradigm 
and the other perspectives on transition, which aim to develop the old socialist 
countries and bring democracy. The modernist assumption that a liberal economy 
brings democracy is sustained in the globalization paradigm. As a different, but 
related assumption, we see the discrediting of the state which earlier had a role in 
the development of capitalism. 
Even though it is possible to trace these ideological assumptions in Turkey's 
history, they became overwhelming with the economic stabiIisation and 
liberalisation programmes in the 1980s, following a military coup. The political 
liberalism and democracy which were seen as natural outcomes of liberal 
economic policies, are echoed in the 1990s mainly with the privatization of the 
state economic enterprises, the Customs Union Agreement and membership of the 
European Union. The pluralism and democracy claims of the 'liberal' era have 
been strengthened further with the emergence of the private television channels. 
In Turkey, the lack of democracy has been explained as a result of the state's 
excessive role in national development, which prevented the bourgeoisie from 
developing democracy. This argument has always been prevalent. It has become 
more prominent and assertive with the appearance of the word 'globalization'. It is 
argued that the role of the state in the economy should be minimized after the 
'bankrnptcy' of the idea of national development, since capitalism now is not 
national but global. The state is declared to be less powerful in the current era, 
while integration with the global market is related to democracy (Keyder,1993: 
137-139). Similarly, the end of statism in the economy after the military coup in 
the 1980s, is associated with democracy and citizenship (Heper, 1985:151-152). 
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Some academics claim that as an extension of the liberal economy, strengthening 
of civil society, greater political opening, democratization (Sayan,1992: 29-34), 
and the rise of differences and 'autonomization' of civil society (GOle , 1994: 217-
218) have occurred. 
In this thesis, I challenge these ideas and argue that liberalism is not free from 
statism. On the contrary, it maintains statism with its understanding of a strong 
state in politics. It is proposed in the thesis that, even in the global era in which it is 
claimed that states are in decline and are becoming less powerful, the end of 
economic statism does not mean the end of political statism and the emergence of 
democracy. 
The media are the major arena in which ideologies are represented. The main 
purpose of this thesis is to find out how these ideologies are constructed, with 
which discourses, and what other views are represented in the Turkish press, by 
investigating in particular how economic change has been ideologically managed 
in the 1990s. The analysis of ideological formulations in public communication is 
of great importance, because these can themselves determine or affect some policy 
changes rather than simply being outcomes. For example, stating and convincing 
others that there is no alternative reduces the attempts and aspirations to search for 
those alternatives. Compared with earlier periods, capitalism is asserting itself even 
more strongly with the declaration that 'there is no alternative', even though the 
inequality of the capitalist system and its negative effects on humanity and nature 
continue. Thus, capitalism works not only at the level of the political economy, but 
also at the level of discourse, and presents itself as the only system in which 
plurality and freedom can be sustained. 
In looking at ideology, this thesis does not consider it as something false, and does 
not aim to expose the illusion or concealed ideology as opposed to the objective or 
correct one, but rather it aims to understand and explain how these discourses are 
structured in the current context. It also indicates the origins of these discourses 
and how they have been influenced through history. The main concerns of this 
thesis are examining 'communicating capitalism' (Golding, 1992); exploring the 
ways capitalism is being prioritised by privileging some meanings over others, and 
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by which mechanisms; analysing the representation and the construction of the 
discourses on the state, market and democracy during the enactment of the law on 
privatization in the Turkish newspapers; and searching for the existence of 
discourses other than the liberal one, and if they exist, examining how. However, 
this thesis is not simply a textual analysis, but an investigation of the mediation 
between meanings and structure, of 'the interplay between the symbolic and 
economic dimensions' in the media (Golding and Murdock, 1991: 15). Therefore, 
the thesis aims to trace both the mechanisms, which generate and spread these 
discourses, and the political economic developments and choices in the current 
global and national political economic situation. It also investigates the media 
industry, the practices of media professionals, and finally, the media texts. 
Initially there will be some discussion of globalization, state and capitalism, 
folIowed by an examination of the political history of Turkey, including some 
important turning points which will be used as a context for the later analysis. It 
was also considered essE;ntial to look at the structure of the media industry and its 
rapid development in Turkey, in order to provide an analysis of the framework 
within which the media texts are produced. An investigation into the work 
practices of the producers of media texts was also seen as important in order to 
understand the news production dynamics which are themselves complementary to 
these structural characteristics. The analysis of the interviews carried out with the 
media professionals aims to grasp those dynamics. Through the analysis of the 
news and the editorials and columns on privatization in the Turkish press, the 
ideological representation of capitalism, state and democracy will be explored 
further. 
The thesis has two parts and consists of eight chapters. 
Chapter Two introduces the discussions of capitalism, state and democracy. It 
begins with the modernization paradigm, and by pointing out the similarities and 
the differences between early modernization and current globalization theories, it 
turns to the approaches which advocate and criticise globalisation. One of the main 
assumptions of globalization theorists, which is the crisis of the nation-state, is then 
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dealt with by attempting to provide the responses against this claim from two main 
approaches. 
In Chapter Three, an attempt is made to explain the story of Turkey's 
modernization. This chapter does not provide a full account of modem Turkey; 
instead it prioritises the issues in relation to the problematic of the thesis. It starts 
with the official ideology of Turkey, Kemalism. It summarises the principles of 
Kemalism with a special focus on statism. This is followed by the so-called liberal 
period, with the DP government. The military coups-following the DP government, 
and the military, are evaluated in a general sense as the guardians of Kemalism and 
as responses to crises of capital accumulation and hegemony. After providing this 
background information, the chapter deals with the post-1980 claims of liberalism 
The general theoretical discussions, which are introduced in the second chapter, are 
applied to Turkey in this chapter and the general arguments of the thesis are 
established from the author's personal position. 
Chapter Four introduces the media in Turkey and looks in detail at the 
developments that have taken place over the last decade. It maps the media scene 
considering the concentration and conglomeration of the media, with a developing 
advertising industry, and increasing competition mainly through promotion 
campaigns. It also examines the coalition of the big media groups for financial 
profit, and their alliance for national interests is considered by giving examples 
from the news. The pluralism and democracy claims of the 1980s are reiterated, 
but here focusing on the issue of the media, with the emergence of the private 
channels in the technologically developed world without frontiers. The state and 
market dichotomy which is introduced in the second chapter and continued in the 
third chapter, is considered here in terms of the commercial media environment 
and the positioning of the media themselves as multiple and diverse alternatives. 
The close relationship between the state elite and the private sector is emphasised, 
and the common patterns and continuities of the Kemalists and the liberals, a 
theme introduced in an earlier chapter, are exemplified 
Chapter Five is based on the analysis of the interviews conducted with the 
journalists and editors of the Turkish press. After an exploration of their 
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description of the newspaper on which they work and their job in general, the 
chapter sununarises their daily working routines under the titles of editorial 
control, self-censorship and professional values, using their own words. In this 
chapter, the criticism and resistance of the media professionals are also presented, 
however limited they may be. 
Chapter Six presents the results of the empirical research into the news published 
in six Turkish newspapers six months before and after the enactment of the law on 
privatization. The data is organised by focusing on the actors and the themes of the 
news. 
Chapter Seven explores the ideological formulations in the columns and the 
editorials. It analyses the sample data by tracing the conunon and different themes 
and the ways in which they are constructed, and by giving quotations to illustrate 
the themes which appeared. The role of the media elites in politics and their 
relationship with the parliament before, during and after a legislative process is 
taken into account. 
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by bringing together the general arguments and 
the findings of the empirical research. It reflects on democracy in Turkey in 
general and on the democratic media environment. In conclusion, it offers 
suggestions for the development of democracy in Turkey and in the Turkish media 
environment, and for further research which needs to be carried out in the area. 
5 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Capitalism, State and Democracy in the Global Era 
The relationship between capitalism and democracy is of great importance to the 
issues in this thesis. The arguments which consider capitalism as a condition for 
democracy, will be traced, starting from the early modernization theories and 
following the ideas which celebrate the victory of capitalism and the end of the 
alternatives, leading to recent globalization theories. The relationship between 
market and state will also be focused upon in the current chapter. 
1. Capitalism and Democracy 
One of the classical studies in the vast amount of literature on capitalism and 
democracy is Friedman's book 'Capitalism and Freedom', which has become a 
source of influence not only for modernization theorists, but also, lately, for the 
transition theorists, who study the adaptation to 'democracy' in the former socialist 
countries. 
The 'freedom' referred to by Friedman is mainly economic and is regarded as an 
end in itself. In addition, it is an 'indispensable means toward the achievement of 
political freedom' (Friedman, 1967: 8). Political freedom, for Friedman, is the lack 
of 'concentration or dispersion of power'. The cause of this concentration of power 
is the central political authority, namely the state: 
"The importance of government as a buyer of so much of our output, and the sole 
buyer of the output of many firms and industries, already concentrates a dangerous 
amount of economic power in the hands of the political authorities"(Friedman, 1967: 
202). 
Although political freedom is seen as the final objective, no details are given as to 
its nature. It is merely repeated that it will come with 'the free market' and the 
'development of capitalist institutions' (Friedman, 1967: 9). 
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Friedman emphasises that history shows that capitalism is a necessity for economic 
and, thus political freedom. Only capitalism can guarantee these (Friedman, 1967: 
9-10). 
When it is explained how the market brings freedom, an idealised picture of 
capitalist societies is drawn. He calls it 'competitive capitalism', which is claimed 
to be free of coercion. By coercion, Friedman mainly means interference in the 
economic sphere: 
"By removing the organisation of economic activity from the control of political 
authority, the market eliminates this source of coercive power ... so in the complex 
enterprises and money exchange economy, co-operation is strictly individual and 
voluntary provided: (a) that enterprises are private, so that the ultimate contracting 
parties are individuals and (b) that individuals are effectively free to enter or not to 
enter into any particular exchange, so that every transaction is strictly voluntary .... the 
consumer is protected from coercion by the seller because of the presence of other 
sellers with whom he can deal The seller is protected from coercion by the consumer 
because of other consumers to whom he can sell. The employee is protected from 
coercion by the employer because of other employers or whom he can work, ad so on. 
and the market does this impersonally and without centralised authority" (Friedman, 
1967: 14-5). 
Many different issues surrounding this idealised picture of capitalist societies have 
been questioned or criticised. One of these is the separation of the economic from 
the political!. Another aspect open to criticism is the concept of freedom in its 
restricted meaning, and the lack of the concept of equality2. Further, it can be 
1 The separation of the economic and the political, or insulating the economic sphere from immediate control 
by the 'demos' is a characteristic of liberalism. It is done in order to "protect either 'the primacy of the 
political' or else 'the sanctity of private property rights' "(Pierson,1993: 179). For a detailed discussion. 
see E.M. Wood. "The Separation of the Economic and the Political in Capitalism", New Left Review. 
no.127, May-June, 1981, p.66-96. 
2 This kind of understanding of freedom is a negative one in tenns of its definition as the lack of force or 
interventions. There are two things that can be said in this context. First, freedom does not exist only with 
the lack of something. but also depends on the realisation or achievement of something. People can not be 
free when they are left alone; some material, social and inteIlectual necessities are required (Nonnan, 1982: 
86). Although it has been advocated by some other groups as well (Birch, 1993: 103-104), positive 
understanding of freedom is mainly common in Marxism. According to that, freedom means emancipation; 
'removal of obstacles to human emancipation' (Lukes, 1993:431). Equality in that sense cannot be 
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questioned whether a conceptualisation which does not contain equality can be 
democratic. There are also objections to Friedman regarding the merit of market. 3 
In addition, there is a lack of interest in the state as a political pressure mechanism, 
while the role of the state in the economy is criticised. In fact, states can be strong 
and can use violence against their Citizens, even in the advanced capitalist 
countries. 
In the next two sections the relationship between capitalism and democracy will be 
discussed; firstly with its emergence in Western societies and secondly in the 
context of modernization in peripheral countries. 
1.1. The rise of capitalism in the West: 
It is possible to find a parallel between the development of capitalism and the 
extension of some of the civil rights in the western societies. This extension was 
appropriate, to a certain extent, for the aims of the bourgeoisie, according to which, 
the equality of people was important in order to guarantee selling their labour. 
However, these rights were very restricted. The state was liberal, but not 
democratic. Democratisation, namely expansion of civil, political, and social 
rights,4 came to the agenda after this development. The democratisation of the 
separated from freedom since one of the impediments to freedom is waged labour and the lack of control 
by proletarians over their conditions and the supercession of capitalism (Marx as cited by Lukes. 1994). 
Secondly. even this understanding is not a completely negative freedom. since it does not object to all 
kinds of interferences that can come from the state. The state having secret agencies, working in a hidden 
way, killing citizens, are not the issues in this liberal understanding at all. Thus, in that case, state 
interference and force is objected to only when it is against the market. 
3 Barber gives a critical account of market and democracy relationship: ..... markets are simply not designed to 
do the things democratic polities do. Markets give us private rather than public modes of discourse, 
allowing us as consumers to speak via our currencies of consumption to producers of material goods, but 
preventing us from speaking as citizens to one another about the social consequences of our private market 
choices ... Markets preclude 'we' thinking and 'we' action of any kind at all. trusting in the power of 
aggregated individual choices (the invisible hand) to somehow secure the common good ..... (Barber. 1996: 
154). See also C.B. MacPherson. Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, 1973, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
p.143·157. 
4 As Held mentions, 'civil rights' are the ones which are necessary for the establishment of individual 
autonomy. including liherty of the person. freedom of speech, thought and faith, the right to be treated 
equally with other> hefore the law ... etc. 
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liberal state was 'not a benevolent concession from above', The driving force for 
democracy was not the bourgeoisie, it was mainly the product of the political 
mobilisation of the 'working class-sometimes in conjunction with the peasantry, 
the petite bourgeoisie, or section of the middle classes' (Boron, 1995: 9-11, 
Therbom, 1997), 
The sanction of 'the bourgeoisie and its allied classes and fractions' of democratic 
reforms was subsequent to the mobilisation of these subordinate classes (Boron, 
1995: 9-11), 
Therborn further emphasises the allies of the working class by mentioning that the 
working class was not sufficient alone, These allies appeared as a result of the 
'imperialist rivalry, national conflicts, the contradiction of competition and 
monopolisation, and clashes between different fractions of capital', namely the 
'contradictions of capitalism', (Therborn, 1997: 34): "Democracy developed 
neither out of the positive tendencies of capitalism, nor as a historical accident, but 
out of the contradictions of capitalism .. ," (Therborn, 1997:35i, 
1.2. The penetration of capitalism in the peripheral countries: 
Modernization 
The story of democracy in the peripheral countries is different from that described 
above, Capitalism has penetrated from the West as a form of modernization in 
By quoting from Marshall, Held mentions that although the civil rights 'threatened many traditional forms 
of power and inequality, they did not strain the new forms of inequalities created by the emergence of the 
competitive capitalist market; on the contrary, they were essential to it' (Marshall cited by Held, 1995: 65-
68), Having said that, according to Held. civil rights are considered very important in the development of 
political rights which 'create the possibility of participation in the exercise of political power as a member 
of a political association, or as an elector of the members of such an association ... ·. The struggle for 
political citizenship, Held states. was maintained by the trade~union movement and the labour movement 
in alliance with sectors of the middle classes, women's suffrage also contained 'social rights' which 
targeted a struggle against 'social inequalities'(Held, 1995: 65-68), 
5 Therborn explains national mobilisation against external threat as a factor in the history of democratisation. 
According to his study, in eight out of twenty~one countries, 'the outcome of the world wars was causally 
decisive in the instalment of bourgeois democracy' (Therborn. 1997; 21~23). Also, national unification and 
liberation have been seen by the bourgeoisie as 'a strategic necessity for the development and protection of 
trade and industry and the brealting offeudal dynastic power' (Therbom, 1997: 29), 
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these countries. This 'external inducement' of capitalism has three effects, 
Therborn argues: firstly, the internal differentiation of the capitalist class is very 
restricted, and depends on one external centre; secondly, the externally dependent 
economic structure is so fragile and vulnerable to international crises that it can 
decrease the interventions of the national bourgeoisie against the exploited classes; 
thirdly, the existence of pre-capitalist modes has negative effects on the 
development of the impersonal rule of capital, by limiting the growth of the labour 
movement and of petite bourgeoisie (Therborn, 1997: 32-33). 
Although the peripheral countries have their peculiar conditions as Therborn 
shows, modernization theories focus on the establishment of capitalism and 
democracy in these countries by reducing the issues to development and ignoring 
their differences. According to modernization theories, democratisation is the 
culmination of a process which inhabits the 'sequences of industrialisation, 
urbanisation, education, communication, mobilisation and political incorporation' 
(przeworski et al.,1997:157-158). As Cammack critically recognises, democracy in 
the 'less developed countries', according to modemization theory, is postponed 
until capitalism is 'firmly established' (Cammack, 1996: 47). 
Lipset's 'Political Man', which is a classical study of modernization theory, relates 
democracy to the level of economic development: 'The more well -to -do a nation, 
the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy' , he argues. 
He states that 'the average wealth, degree of industrialisation and urbanisation, and 
level of education is much higher for the more democratic countries,6 (Lipset, 
1971:48-50). He argues that education is more significant than income or 
occupation at the individual level. The same is true at the national level. If the level 
of education of a nation's population is higher, according to Lipset, it is more 
likely to support democracy. (Lipset, 1971: 54-56). 
6 The indicators of wealth in his analysis are, for example. 'per capita income, number of persons per motor 
vehicle and thousands of persons per physician and the number of radios, telephones. and newspapers per 
thousands persons ... •. He measures industrialisation by 'the percentage of employed males in agriculture 
and the per capita commercial produced 'energy' being used in the country' (Lipset, 1971: 54·56). 
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Scholars like Pye and Lemer similarly7 focus on transition from traditional to 
modem societies, and argue that the conditions for democracy occur a generation 
later with mobilisation, education and socialisation which can be facilitated by 
communication (Lemer, 1963: 350). According to that, with communication, the 
gap between 'westernised, more urbanised leaders' and 'the more tradition-bound, 
village based masses' can be reduced by changing the attitudes of those 'masses'( 
Pye, 1963: 8, 13). 
Modernization theory, with its linear understanding of development, capitalism and 
democracy, has been challenged8 for several reasons. Although it was originally 
the extension of the study of comparative politics, it has been criticised by those 
involved in comparative studies. For example, przeworski and Limongi, in their 
comparative study, argue that dictatorship may die for many different reasons and 
development plays no privileged role (przeworski et al., 1997: 157-8). They test 
the main assumption of modemization theory which makes a connection between 
development and democracy, suggesting that a transition to democracy should take 
place when authoritarian regimes have a higher economic development level. 
However, they found that above the income level of $ 6,000 per capita per annum, 
dictatorships became more stable (przeworski et al., 1997: 159). Thus, they 
disproved the link between democracy and wealth by showing empirically that 
dictatorships survived for years in countries that were wealthy. They state that only 
19 dictatorships out of 123 developed and 'reached modernity' (przeworski et al., 
1997: 160). So, in fact, the opposite is the case: '".dictatorships are needed to 
generate development...the probability of transitions to democracy declines as new 
countries develop under authoritarian rule' (przeworski et al., 1997: 176). 
7 Although all these are broadly considered as modernization theorists Cammack considers these political 
development theorists separately from modernization theorists. According to him, political development 
theory drew upon modernization theory. but they reviewed it. For Cammack, they did not argue for 
modernization and westernisation in all aspects. Political development theorists rejected the polarisation of 
tradition and modernity. Instead they realised that modernization can be successful by retaining traditional 
elements. (Cammack. 1997:45-49). 
8 For 'dependency school' see Andre G. Frank. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, 1967, 
Monthly Review Press, New York and Femando H. Cardoso, Enzo Faletto. Dependency and Development 
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Similarly, Boron argues that the development of capitalism did not create the 
conditions which lead to democratic achievements as happened in the West. On the 
contrary, it 'reduced the few possibilities that might have existed for bourgeois 
democratic developments' (Boron, 1995: 14-15). 
It is true that the examples found in history lead researchers to question the 
relationship between capitalism and democracy. Not all capitalist countries are 
democratic. Capitalism is very flexible and adaptable, and can be mixed with 
. alternative forms of political domination, including bourgeois democracy, fascism, 
dictatorship, and the Latin American military state of the 1970s (Boron, 1995:11). 
Munck states that the case of South Africa showed that the relationship between 
democracy and development is not necessary or permanent. Instead 'that 
relationship is necessarily contingent and historically bound' (Munck, 1994: 29). 
Barber gives the example of Russia and its former republics which show that ' 
"wild" capitalism can exist perfectly well not only without democracy, but as 
democracy's nemesis' (Barber, 1996: 153). 
The converse is also true. Not all democratic countries are capitalist: Jessop, 
quoting Rosa Luxemburg, argues that 'democracy has been found in the most 
dissimilar social formations: in primitive communist groups, in the slave states of 
antiquity, and in mediaeval communes' and 'no absolute and general relation can 
be constructed between capitalist development and democracy' (Jessop, 1978:20). 
in Latin America. 1979, University of California Press, Berkeley, for 'World system approach' see 
Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modem World System, 1974, Academic Press, New York. 
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2. The end of history and the triumph of capitalism? 
The idealisations of capitalism in the West and recipes for 'underdeveloped' 
countries did not end, despite the crisis of capitalism in the West and the 
challenges in the peripheral countries. On the contrary, capitalism has been 
celebrated more assertively in the last decade. The dissolution of the socialist 
systems and the rising neo-liberal governments strengthened this tendency. 
Capitalism this time asserted itself not only as something desirable and something 
which would bring democracy, but as the only alternative. Democracy did not 
disappear as a concept though, and it has been described almost as a synonym for 
capitalism. The old socialist countries' transition to capitalism has been used 
interchangeably as the transition to democracy. 
Fukuyama's thesis of the end of history is a good example of this current 
environment. Fukuyama, like Friedman, praises capitalism. However, in contrast to 
Friedman, Fukuyama does not take the issue of democracy as the outcome of 
capitalist development, but instead argues that the desirability of democracy -
which everyone agrees about- itself brings capitalism: 
'It is not economics, then, but ideology that constitutes the second, and more 
important explanation for the recent wave of democratizations ... politics has its own 
specific dignity that is never simply reducible to subpolitical factors like economics 
or social structure. That is, democracy is impossible without people who believe in 
the legitimacy of democracy, and conversely in the illegitimacy of dictatorship .... 
Thus economic development is neither a sufficient or necessary cause of democracy; 
while democracy can best arise under certain economic conditions, it must be desired 
for essentially non-economic reasons' (Fukuyama, 1991: 661). 
Modernization, capitalism and freedom have a causal interrelationship in 
Fukuyama's book, similar to Friedman's theory: 'Societies have a degree of 
freedom in the extent to which they regulate and plan capitalist economies'. 
However. for Fukuyama, it is more a natural process, The only viable way is 
capitalism (Fukuyama, 1992: 96-7). For most of the world, he claims, there is now 
no ideology which can challenge liberal democracy (Fukuyama, 1992: 45). In a 
way, he develops Bell's argument of 'the end of ideology' which declares the 
exhaustion of ideologies and the end of utopias in the West (Bell, 1960: 373). In 
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contrast, Fukuyama puts the argument more assertively and globally. While the 
focus of modernization theorists before was 'underdeveloped' countries, 
Fukuyama's inspiration has been the 'collapse of communism worId-
wide'(Fukuyama, 1992: 292-3). In relation to democracy, the difference between 
them is that in the former there is a 'development' from authoritarian dictatorships 
mainly in Latin America, whereas in the latter the 'transition' is from socialism to 
capitalism in the Soviet Union and the Eastern block. 
Fukuyama perceives liberal democracy as the upper stage in the evolution of the 
'Universal History of Mankind' (Fukuyama, 1992: 48). As an extension of this 
comment, he suggests 'the end of history': 
' ... if we are now at the point where we cannot imagine a world substantially different 
from our own, in which there is no apparent or obvious way in which the future will 
represent a fundamental improvement over our current order, then we must also take 
into consideration the possibility that History itself might be at an end' (Fukuyama, 
1992:51 ). 
The emphasis on freedom, similar to the work of Friedman, is very dominant in 
Fukuyama's book. Even when he considers equality, it is non-material and is 
considered to have negative effects on freedom: 'Every effort to give the 
disadvantaged "equal dignity" will mean the abridgement of the freedom or rights 
of other people' (Fukuyama, 1992:292-293). 
Fukuyama's ideas have been criticised9 mainly because of his idealisation of the 
liberal democracies. One of his critics, Youngs, argues that Fukuyama's ideas are 
West centric and do not discuss the issues of power dynamics in general. Young 
criticises the way liberal economics and politics are presented as mutually 
supportive in a positive, unproblematic and cohesive way (Youngs, 1996: 65). 
Fukuyama's 'end of history' has been followed by the other 'end' declarations. 
O'Brien declared the end of geography by claiming 'the end or diminution of 
sovereignty' of the nation-state and governments as the embodiments of 
geography. There are similar arguments around this theme which will be discussed 
in detail later in relation to globalization and the nation-state. If there is an end to 
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these, there is a start, more properly restart, of something which is for O'Brien 'the 
freedom-of-money force' (O'Brien, 1992: 100). 'The emergence of a seamless 
global financial market', O'Brien argues, is 
"bringing back memories ( for those with long memories) of the free-capital era of 
the late nineteenth century. Barriers will be gone, service will be global, the world 
economy will benefit and so too, presumably, will the customer, being offered 
"global choice'" (O'Brien, 1992: 99-100). 
In some sense, O'Brien celebrates the return of laissez-faire liberalism with his 
declaration of the end of geography. 
In 'The End of Politics', Naisbitt claims the end of 'representative democracy' and 
the emergence of 'direct democracy'. He uses the terms 'free market democracy' 
and 'consumer-driven democracy' instead of direct democracy. According to him, 
there is no longer need to have representatives because 'people are given an 
opportunity to vote on the things that directly impact on their lives' (Naisbitt, 1995: 
42-3). 
In a similar way to the authors previously mentioned, Naisbitt claims that as a 
result of the 'global shift' 'the idea that the central government... is the most 
important part of governance is obsolete' Instead, 'politics will re-emerge as the 
engine of individualism' (Naisbittt, 1995: 50-51). Despite critics10 who warn 
against concentration in the contemporary economic structure, he argues that the 
bigger the world economy is, the smaller the players are (Naisbitt, 1995: 50). He 
explains the 'global paradox': 
'This zeroing in on the individual as the locus of this new telecommunications 
revolution is a metaphor for the global paradox: the larger system in service to the 
smallest player' (Naisbitt, 1995: 271). 
All of these have been made possible 'by the revolution in telecommunications' 
according to Naisbitt (1995: 42-3). 'As we move toward linking up millions of host 
9 see Timothy Bums (ed.), After History? Francis Fukuyama and His Critics, 1994. London:Littlefield 
\0 For example Scholte states that in the world of globalizing capitalism, large strategic alliances and mergers 
intensified the concentration of ownership and power in many areas of production (Scholte. 1997: 438), 
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computer networks, countries will become irrelevant and begin to fade away' 
(Naisbitt, 1995: 51). 
Morse also emphasizes the importance of technology by stating that modern 
communications and technological innovations have changed the geographic 
conceptualisation of international politics and have revolutionised the concept of 
distance (Morse, 1976: 18). Thus, he argues, modernization, with technology, has 
contributed to the development of a global international system (Morse,1976: 14). 
Technological determinism, idealisation of capitalism and the declaration of the 
end of the nation-state, are common characteristics among the supporters of 
modernization, as seen above. Currently, they are also very important elements for 
globalization theorists. 
As these theorists themselves state, globalization today has its roots in early 
modernization. Modernization is the central catalyst and driving force in 
globalization with technology (Smith, 1993: 258). 
In the next section, the assumptions of globalization theorists will be examined and 
then the state will be discussed in relation to globalization. 
3. Globalization and its critiques: 
There are a wide range of publications which consider many dimensions of 
globalization in different disciplines such as sociology, politics, media studies, 
women's studies, international relations, economics, business and banking. Waters 
states that globalization is an economic phenomenon with the issues of world trade, 
multinational enterprises, and floating finance; a political phenomenon with the 
crisis of the state, planetary problems, and international organisations; and a 
cultural phenomenon which raises issues like consumer sovereignty, 
cosmopolitanism, and global culture (Waters, 1995). 
Scholte groups the manifestations of globalization in terms of the rise of 
supraterritoriality under six headings: The first is, not surprisingly, the sphere of 
communications, such as air travel, telephone, computer networks, and the media; 
the second is the area of organisations, business enterprises, civic associations and 
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regulatory agencies that work as transborder operations; the third is trade of goods 
and services; the fourth is finance that circulates across the world; the fifth, 
according to Scholte, is ecology, which can no longer be constrained by national 
borders; the sixth relates to the level of consciousness, that is people's conception 
of the world as a single place, their affiliation with communities beyond national 
orders (Scholte, 1997: 432) 
Globalization here will be taken with the economic, political and ideological 
dimensions 11, with a special focus on the relationship between capitalism, state 
and democracy. 
It is possible to list the characteristics of the 'global' world: 
• The globalization of money and finance: Their detachment from territorial 
spaces. 
• The integration of economies through cross-border integration: For example, the 
regional economic integration in Europe. 
• Global markets: The merging of national capitals into a global market, the 
growth of transborder marketing of firms. 
• Global production: Growing international ownership and production of 
companies. 
• The diffusion of technology: Its use, especially in finance, beyond national 
borders. 
• The declining nation state: The decreased role of national governments in 
global governance (Petrella, 1996: 64, O'Brien, 1992: 95-97, Kobrin, 
1997:153, Schoolmate, 1997: 433-439, Palan et al., 1996: 20). 
11 for the culhlra1 aspects of globalization see M. Featherstone's Global Culhlre: Nationalism, Globalization 
and Modernity, 1990, London: Sage, or see the journal Theory, Culhlre, Society special issue-Global 
Culture, vol.7, no.2-3, June, 1990. 
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More can be added to the list by including the indicators of globalizaton from the 
different disciplines mentioned. Although, especially in business textbooks, these 
are taken for granted, they are not objective evaluations which are exempted from 
value. In fact, there are very critical views about globalization. 
In the next three sections, these views will be outlined. 
3.1. Globalization is not so global: 
The global character of globalization is questioned in two aspects: 
Firstly, it is argued that globalization has not expanded to include the whole world. 
It is more 'triad' (Hirst, 1995: 424-425) or 'trilateral' (Mann, 1997: 480) than 
global. Capitalism is dominated by the economies of the advanced nation-states. 
The three most developed regions of the world, North America, Western Europe 
and Japan, together with the new industrialised countries of South-East Asia, 
account for more than 85 per cent of world trade (Mann, 1997:480). They have a 
stronger relationship with each other than with the rest of the world (Petrella, 
1996:77, Tooze, 1997: 223). They can co-ordinate policy, and exert pressures over 
financial markets (Hirst, 1996: 2-3). 
Therefore, despite the advocates of globalization, capital is not evenly expanded 
throughout the world, capital mobility has not brought a shift of investment and 
employment from advanced to developing countries (Hirst et al., 1996: 424-425). 
The north is still rich, the south is still poor (Mann, 1997:480). It can even be 
asserted that the 'subordination of the South' has been 'reinforced' (Scholte, 
1997:450-451). 
Secondly, it is argued that the number of transnational companies is very small, and 
they still have strong ties with the nation-state (Axford, 1995:97). Hirst and 
Thompson argue that an economy with a high and growing degree of international 
trade and investment is not necessarily a global economy. It is more a highly 
internationalised economy than a truly globalized one (Hirst et al., 1995: 424-425). 
Many of the transnationals operate from their national bases and wish to maintain 
their national identity (Hirst et al., 1995: 424-425). They are 'embedded, 
economically, politically and socially, within nation-states' (Sally, 1996:71). The 
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transnational companies are particularly sensitive to nation state politics and shifts 
in policy (Axford, 1995:97) because it is the nation-state which decides to make 
the international regulations and pursue them (Hirst, 1995: 424) as will be seen 
later. 
3.2. Globalization is not new: 
Marshall claims that the term 'globalization' may be an 'aesthetically elegant' 
'appropriate buzzword' for 'this high-tech age', but it is not explanatory. 
Furthermore it is misleading (Marshall, 1996: 214). Some scholars prefer using the 
word capitalism by arguing that it is arbitrary to describe late-twentieth-century 
capitalist transnational as globalized since capital accumulation was always 
globalist12• 
Although recent technological changes increase the movement of transnationals 
globally, foreigu ownership, exports and investments are not new (Laxer, 1995: 
290, Boyer et al. 1996: 13, Krasner, 1994:13). 
Pieterse argues that globalization 'is no more than a fashionable code word for 
advance capitalism' (Pieterse, 1996:555). Instead of globalization, Wood uses the 
phrase the 'universalization of capitalism' which means an 'increasing imposition 
of capitalist imperatives, a capitalist 'logic of process', on all aspects of social life' 
(Wood,1997:553-554). 
3.3. Globalization is the ideology of neo-liberalism: 
Criticising globalization because it is a neo-liberal ideology is actually closely 
related with questioning it as a completely new development, as explained above. 
According to Piven, the difference between globalization and nineteenth-century 
laissez-faire is that 'market law now operated on an international scale .. .in search 
12 In fact, Marx and Engels mentioned in the Communist Manifesto 'The need of a constantly expanding 
market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle 
everywhere, settle everywhere. establish connexions everywhere. The bourgeoisie has through its 
exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character of production and consumption in every 
country'. (Marx et.a1., 1967: 83) 
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of local markets where cost were lowest, and profits were highest' (Piven, 
1995:112), 
Neo-liberalism first started in the Vnited States during the Reagan period and 
spread beyond the V,S, with the emphasis on 'tax-cuts, the deregulation of 
industry, the liberalisation of foreign exchange and capital markets, an attack on 
union power' (Gill,1993:253-254 ). It is possible to explain this by the dominance 
of the V.S. in the world, although it is often said that this prominence has now 
decreased, as proved by the regionalization tendencies mainly in Europe, and the 
rising Asian Tigers. However, one should be very careful in claiming that the 
power of the V.S. is decreasing. Even though the relative strength of the V.S. 
productive capacity has declined (Cox, 1994: 55), the dollar is still the medium of 
trade at the global level (Hirst et al., 1995: 419). The V.S. has a great deal of power 
in world politics not only through its economic influence, but also through its 
military power, since it can intervene in political disorders which might affect 
world trade (Cox, 1994: 55, Hirst et al., 1996: 14). 
Besides Reaganism in the V.S., Thatcherism in Britain 'provided both a political 
rationale and power base' for neo-liberalism (Cerny, 1997:265). Its main target, for 
Gamble, was social democracy, in another words, the welfare settlements of the 
1940s. Its main policy was privatization in parallel with the neo-liberal strand of 
'new right'. New right as a synthesis has neo-liberal and neo-conservative strands 
which promote free economy and a strong state in national security and law 
(Gamble, 1989:4-5, 15-16, Levitas, 1986: 5_6)13. In addition to privatization, neo-
13 The polemics of Hall and Jessop on the analysis of Thatcherism should be mentioned briefly here. Hall 
develops a concept called 'authoritarian populism' with inspiration from Poulantzas. For Hall. the 
'unstable equilibrum' between coercion and consent is the starting point. He analyses Thatcherism by 
looking at the combinations of these two poles. He shows the contradictory nature of Thatcherism which 
includes 'organic Toryism, family, duty, authority, standards, traditionalism, patriarchialism with the 
aggressive themes of a revived neo-liberalism -self-interest. competitive individualism. anti-statism' (Hall, 
1985:116,122). However. Jessop accuses Hall of ignoring 'some political sources of contradiction and 
tension within Thatcherism'. His main criticism is the 'ideologism' of Hall's approach (Jessop. 1984: 33). 
He argues that Hall analysed the discursive strategies. but ignored the 'material conditions of transmission 
and reception of ideologies' (Jessop. 1985: 95). Hall replies to this criticism by accepting that he works on 
the political and ideological dimension, but he argues that this is because it is neglected by the left (Hall. 
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liberalism gives priority to reducing inflation over unemployment, cutting public 
expenditure, reducing welfare provision, obstructing the power of trade unions 
anti- collectivism, competitive individualism (Hall, 1984: 13, Cox, 1997: 59). 
Neo-liberal policies have also been exercised in the Third World countries, 
especially with privatization. The state running of the industrialization process and 
national development have been discredited (Harris, 1986: 160-167). 
Although the heavy industrialization programmes of nation states have been 
abandoned in this discredited environment of national development, the debt owed 
to international finance institutions is not decreasing, it is, in fact, increasing. Cox 
argues that the more the debt increases, the more governments become accountable 
to external markets rather than to their own pUblics. The options of states in areas 
such as exchange rate policy, fiscal policy, and trade policy are restricted by global 
finance, which works 24 hours a day as an unregulated network and makes 
decisions in several cities like New York, Tokyo, London, Paris and Frankfurt that 
can effect the whole world (Cox, 1994: 47-48, Cox, 1997: 59). Similarly Axtmann 
states that the global economy is beyond the control of the states by stressing that 
the decisions of 'multi- and transnational corporations, stock brokers and 
international money and securities dealers ... affect the economic well being of 
states and people without being accountable to them'. He argues that these global 
forces threaten democracy since they can impose constraints and limits on 
'democratically constituted political agency', namely the state, and the citizens of 
the states can not control these forces (Axtmann, 1996: 131). The lack of 
mechanisms between the states and 'supraterritorial constituents' for 'transparency, 
open debate and accountability' (Scholte, 1997:450-451) inspire the theorists of 
democracy to develop global democracy models. 14 
1985: 121). Still, for Jessop. ·the political and institutional context of Thatcherism' and 'the structural 
determination of hegemony' are very important (Jessop, 1985: 96-97). He also differently considers the 
contradictory character of the 'Keynesian Welfare System' (Jessop, 1984: 39). 
14 Some of the criticisms of globalization lead to alternative conceptions of globalization. For example, 
Pieterse criticises globalization being identified with neo-liberalism. For him, it is a coincidence (Pieterse 
et.al., 1996: 555). As a result of the critical look to the current neo-liberal globalization, he develops 
'critical globalizm' (pieterse et.al., 1996: 556). Critical globalizm includes not only 'market forces but also 
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As an effect of neo liberalism via global finance, the economic sovereignty of 
states is questioned, (Gill, 1994: 80). The governments are believed to be limited to 
applying welfare policies in order to reduce the social disparities (Cox, 1997: 58). 
States are seen as no longer being able to follow an autonomous path driven by 
domestic economic goals (Cemy, 1994: 226). The range of state strategies, it is 
argued, has been narrowed (Marshall, 1996: 208), and thus the state has to 
compromise (Kobrin, 1997: 157) or develop alternative strategies, as will be seen 
below. 
Although it is true that the role of the state is changing in the global era, the 
question arises as to whether this will lead to the eclipse of the nation-state and if 
so, in what ways the power of the state is declining as a result. 
4. The crisis of the nation-state 
The crisis of the nation-state was first brought to the agenda by the international 
relations theorists, and has subsequently been taken up by the economists and the 
business scholars. Morse, from the sphere of international relations, mentions that 
national actors and their autonomy have been undermined as a result of the spread 
of industrialization and international interdependence (Morse, 1976: 3). 
The developments in world politics since 1945 are seen as a challenge to 
understanding of the nation-state as the sole actor, and to some scholars, to the 
sovereignty of nation states (Mansbach et al., 1976: 25). The end of the Cold War 
is considered as another important factor which has contributed to an increase in 
the interdependency of nations and a weakening of the nation-state (Brown, 1995: 
interstate relations, international agencies and civil society in its domestic as well as transnational 
manifestations'. Non-governmental organisations are seen as having a great potential in this kind of 
globalization understanding (Pieterse et.al., 1996: 560). 
Held's cosmopolitan democracy can be thought of as another attempt to coincide democracy and 
globalization. Held argues that democracy has to become a transnational affair which contains both a 
restricted geographic domain and the wider international community. According to him. democracy, 
democratic institutions and agencies should be expanded into what he called 'the cosmopolitan model of 
democracy' (Held, 1993:39). 
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2-3). In parallel with these ideas, the 'world politics paradigm' that includes 
'transnational', 'transgovernmental', and 'interstate' interactions is proposed by 
researchers in international politics (Keohane et al.,1973:386-398). Because of the 
growing diversification of the international arena, that is, because of the 
proliferation of international actors, it is argued that the state can no longer assert 
exclusive status and monopoly offorce (Badie et al., 1994: 164). 
Beyond the recognition of the other actors in the international arena, the nation-
state in the 'present-day world' is declared 'inadequate' by arguing that it is not 
even possible to protect the lives of citizens (Deutsch,1981: 331). The changes in 
world ecology, and problems which derive from an increasing world population, 
such as shortage of raw materials, energy or food, and large-scale violence, are 
shown as evidence of the weakening of the nation-state (Deutsch, 1981: 331, 
Mansbach et al., 1976: 298). 
Here, it can be questioned whether the economic and political power of the state is 
declining because of globalization or not. The responses to this can be divided 
roughly into two groups. The first group emphasises the adaptable or competitive 
character of the state in globalization, mainly with an emphasis on economics, 
whereas the second group emphasises the capitalist character of the state from a 
broader perspective. 
4.1. Competitive statel state strategies: 
Some theorists mention that the states can adapt to the conditions. For Krasner, the 
constraints of economic interdependence as opposed to sovereignty is an issue for 
'smaller' and 'less developed' states. In general, the states can overcome the 
problems created by interdependence by responding to new circumstances 
(Krasner, 1995: 319). 
Similarly Weiss argues that 'strong' states adapt and facilitate internationalisation 
rather than becoming a victim of it. These states can be 'catalytic' in consolidating 
national and regional networks of trade and investment (Weiss, 1997: 17). 
In contrast, Porter argues that although companies seem to have transcended 
countries, few nations have the leadership in particular industries. National 
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differences, he argues, constitute the key element in the competitive advantage of 
some nations over many decades. Porter claims that, 'differences in national 
economic structures, values, cultures, institutions, and histories contribute 
profoundly to competitive success'. These characteristics, according to him, also 
make the role of the home nation strong in international companies (Porter, 1990: 
18-9). 
Evans challenges the idea of the eclipse of the state and claims that in fact the 
opposite is true: He gives 'East Asian success' as an example by stressing that 
competitive advantage in global markets may be best achieved through more 
intense state development (Evans, 1997: 67-70). Thus, rather than adaptation, 
Evans considers the state as an important constitutive element in globalization. 
Cerny is one of the leading scholars who argue that the process of globalization 
does not cause the withering away of the states. Instead, states are the critical 
agents in the process of globalization (Cerny, 1997: 257-258, Cerny, 1996: 133). 
What Cemy means here is that in order for states to continue to exist they need to 
do more than just adapt. He develops the concept of 'competitive state' by relying 
on the observations that the state makes firms which are located within its territory 
competitive in international markets. Furthermore, the state as an institution and set 
of practices reorganises itself like a private industry, becoming more 'marketized' 
in order to compete in the global financial marketplace (Cemy, 1994: 231, Cerny, 
1997: 264, 269-270, Cemy, 1996: 124). 
Palan et al. develop the idea of competitive state as competitive strategies. They 
argue that there is no such thing as a competitive state as a single universal model 
on the global scale. Instead, there are many different competitive strategies which 
are pursued by states. They suggest that, states have seven policy options or 
competitive strategies 15 available to them in order to 'cope with' the changing 
environment in the global economy (Palan et al., 1996: 5, 12-13). 
15 Four of these are mainly valid for 'the group of states represented in the DEeD' and three others are open 
to the 'less developed countries': 'States may wish to join together in large regional blocks. they may adopt 
the "developmental state" model. they may embrace the "social democratic" mode of selective integration 
into the world economy, or a selected number of states may seek to dominate their regional economy or 
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The aim of these strategies is to increase the competition of countries in the global 
economy (Palan et al., 1996: 6, 12-13). Thus, the basis of their ideas is the 
existence of states and national businesses. They imply that everything has to be 
adapted according to global conditions, while they do not discuss globalization to 
any great extent. 
The weakness of these ideas is their acceptance of globalization and the necessity 
of the state to respond to its reality. However, some scholars make broader 
analyses and put globalization discourse in context by evaluating it critically. They 
do not seek ways to guarantee the existence of the state against the global market 
because they do not see the market and the state as binary oppositions. For them, 
the capitalist character of the state, and the economic and political outcomes of it 
are all important. 
4.2. Capitalist state 
As seen above in the critiques of globalization, some emphasise the ideological 
character of globalization and argue that the 'withering' or the 'hollowing out of 
the state' thesis is based on the neo liberal rejection of the Keynesian state. The 
'erosion of the state', they argue, is 'the ideological armoury of an emergent 
transnational coalition of classes dominated by financial interests' (Overbeek et al., 
1993). 
The issue of greatest concern for the Marxist scholars is dealing with the capitalist 
nature of the state and showing the links between nation-states and globalization. 
For example, Wood favours the term universalised capitalism or the global reach 
of capitalism instead of globalization because the former does not necessarily 
imply the dissolution or the decline of the nation-state: 
even the world economy or even the world economy to achieve hegemony. On the other hand, poorer and 
weaker states are likely to opt for one of the following strategies: they may try to exploit their cheap and 
abundant labour to attract foreign capital; they may seek to exploit a parasitical niche in the world market 
such as tax havens, or they may be structurally impeded from joining the competitive game at all' ( Palan 
et al., 1996: 5). 
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'If anything, the new global order is more than ever a world of nation-states; and if 
these states are permeable to movements of capital, that permeability has as its 
coroIlary, indeed as its condition, the existence of national boundaries and state 
jurisdictions ... today, transnational capital is even more effective than was the old-
style military imperialism in penetrating every corner of the world; but it tends to 
accomplish this through the medium of local capital and national states, and it 
depends on local political jurisdictions to maintain the conditions of economic 
. stability and labour discipline ... ' (Wood, 1997: 553-554). 
Indeed, the private sector asks the state for privileged access to the internal market, 
and support and assistance in order to compete in international markets. It requires 
state 'covering the cost of basic 'infrastructures", 'providing the tax incentives 
needed for investment in industrial R&D and technological innovations' (Petrella, 
1996:75). 
Another important point which is not addressed by the statist critics of 'the end of 
the state' thesis, is that of states remaining strong in the political sense. Although 
economic liberalism makes the minimal state its motto, states remain strong and at 
the same time 'serve to enforce the rules of market society' as mentioned above in 
the discussions on Thatcherism (Gill, 1994: 79). 
Hirst and Thompson label it as 'the new globalist rhetoric' which is 
'based on an anti-political liberalism. Set free from politics, the new globalized 
economy aIlows companies and markets to aIlocate the factors of production to 
greatest advantage, without the distortions of state intervention' (Hirst et aI., 1995: 
414). 
As Petrella argues, even though the economy is globalised, there is no parallel 
decline in the power of the nation -state in 'military and security matters' (Petrella, 
1996:67). 
The nation-state is the primary source of law within a territory, it polices the 
borders of a territory. 'Populations remain territorial and subject to the citizenship 
of a national state' (Hirst et al., 1995: 431-434). This is mainly because of the 
state's 'monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory'. 
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This right is only recognised for the state (Weber, 1983: 111-112). This force can 
be extended to the international level as well. The state's right of going to war even 
determines people's life-chances (Hinsley as cited by Held, 1995: 95). 
Similarly, Scholte discusses that in the era of globalization, democracy is very 
restricted. Firstly, popular participation is not sufficient to control the state. The 
existence of mUltiparty competition is not a guarantee of democracy. Governments 
still violate human rights. Secondly, marketization of governance brings concerns 
over democracy (Scholte, 1997: 27). 
The marketization of states is presented by the statist critiques of 'the end of the 
state' thesis as the success of states in competing with globalization. However, as 
Scholte states, this should be considered in association with the negative effects on 
democracy. The issue of state power in politics is completely ignored. In fact, all 
these stem from the approaches to state and market. These two are seen as binary 
oppositions by both the liberal globalization advocates and statists. Marxism, on 
the other hand, does not consider state and market separately, which does not mean 
that the state is only the instrument of the bourgeoisie. In fact, the early Marxist 
idea of the state as the apparatus of the bourgeois class has been developed through 
the recognition of the contradictory nature of the state and through the inclusion of 
the concept of hegemony. 
Hall, with the influence of Gramsci, argues that force is not the only means of 
ensuring state power. He accepts that 'the state is physically capable of doing many 
things, including torturing prisoners, making troublesome citizens disappear, or 
even the wiping-out of whole ethnic groups'. In addition to that, he stresses the use 
of consent by the state in order to legitimise the use of violence (Hall, 1984: 16). 
Jessop, a state theorist, again with the influence of Gramsci, emphasises hegemony 
to elaborate the idea of the state. In contrast to accumulation strategies, which 
mainly concern 'the relations of production' and 'balance of class forces', 
hegemonic projects are not only concerned with economic relations, Jessop argues, 
but also with non-economic issues (Jessop, 1991: 172). In fact, 'hegemonic 
projects' can work against the 'contradiction between accumulation and 
legitimation' by claiming a 'general interest in accumulation' (Jessop, 1991: 181). 
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Offe develops the debate between Poulantzas and Miliband16 by rejecting the state 
as an instrument of the ruling class or the state apparatus, which is not allied with 
certain classes, but has an autonomy from class interests in capitalist society. He 
conceives of the state as having contradictory tasks. As Jessop also implies, state in 
Offe's theory must regulate the process of accumulation since the state itself 
'depends on' 'guaranteeing and safeguarding a 'healthy' accumulation process' 
'for the sake of its own power'. On the other hand, the state must present itself as 
the impartial arbiter of class interests in order to legitimate its power (Offe et al., 
1982: 249-250, also Offe 1972, 1974 quoted in Held et al., 1983: 487). 
To sum up, in contrast to the competitive state or state strategies approaches which 
consider competition and commercialisation of the state uncritically, the alternative 
approaches view the state in capitalist countries as having a violent and forceful 
character and they do not put state and market as binary oppositions. 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of spreading capitalism to peripheral countries around the world was 
constructed through the paradigm of national development in modernization. Now, 
it is being done by globalization discourse in which it is argued that there is no 
altemative to capitalism. These ideological formulations receive their strength from 
the decline of the welfare state and socialism, and at the same time, contribute to 
that decline by not considering them as alternatives, so the process works 
dialectically. The end declarations such as the end of history, end of geography and 
end of politics, together all serve to idealise capitalism. 
In contrast to the early emphasis on modernization for development and democracy 
as an output, and capitalism as something desirable to achieve better things, 
globalization theorists present capitalism as being inevitable, and almost obligatory 
for the survival of the state. 
16 for the approach which considers the state as the instrument of capitalist class see N.Poulantzas, 'The 
Problem of Capitalist State', New Left Review. no:58. 1969, for the criticism of this approach see 
R.Miliband, 'The Capitalist State', New Left Review, 00:59, 1970, and 'Poulantzas and the Capitalist 
State', New Left Review, 00:82, 1973. 
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Instead of national development, the states, it is now argued, are required to obey 
the rules of globalization by gaining a commercial mentality. Although the global 
understanding which discredits the nation-state and supports the neo-liberal 
policies is criticised, and internal contradictions are shown in this chapter, state-
centric understandings are also objected to. In fact, the main emphasis in this 
chapter is to reject the binary oppositions such as state and market, nation-state and 
globalization, and at the same time to challenge some parallels such as capitalism 
and democracy. States can be commercial and integrated to the global economy, 
and at the same time can be strong politically. Even when the states are declared to 
be weak in the economy, they can remain strong in politics. This contradictory 
character of the state matters more for this study, as will become clearer in the next 
chapter, which provides a concrete case for these discussions by examining the 
state, capitalism and democracy in Turkey's own historical context and peculiar 
conditions. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Capitalism, State and Democracy in Turkey 
A study of the state, politics and the media in Turkey can not be complete without 
considering the official ideology, Kemalism, which takes its name from the 
founder of the Turkish Republic (1923), Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk. Kemalism, as the 
founding ideology of Turkey, has been criticised and challenged by those people 
whose aspirations it does not meet. When the lack of correspondence between 
Kemalism and the diversity of the people living in Turkey is considered, the rising 
discontent is very understandable. Although these complaints, reactions and 
resistance to Kemalism have always existed, after the 1980s critiques of statism 
were added. Kemalism, with its principle of statism, was seen as an obstacle to the 
liberalisation of the regime in the 1980s. 
In this chapter, I will examine the so-called liberalisation process by trying to show 
its idiosyncracies in Turkey and address questions such as whether the 
liberalization process is a challenge for Kemalism, and if so, in what ways. The big 
question is whether, as many argue, economic liberalism brings political liberalism 
in Turkey. In other words, does restricting the role of the state in the economy have 
the natural outcome of restricting the political power? 
Firstly, I will consider Kemalism and its principles, with a special focus on statism. 
Evaluations of the Democrat Party (DP) government will follow. The DP period is 
important since it is claimed that it was a breaking point for statism, and is 
important for understanding the liberalisation process after the 1980s. In fact, as 
many argue, The DP period and the 1980s, as liberalisation attempts, have some 
similarities. So, this part, as the 'introduction' to liberalism, will form a 
background to understanding the 1980s' claim of 'more comprehensive and 
successful' liberalism (Sezer, 1992:6). 
This chapter does not aim to give a complete history of Turkey, but rather to 
highlight some turning points. In order to understand the liberal discourse of 
contemporary Turkey, the principles in Kemalism, especially that of statism and its 
development, should be reviewed. The military coups deserve special attention in 
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this context since they were carried out to protect Kemalism or Atatiirkism as the 
state's response to the crisis of capital accumulation and hegemony. In particular, 
the 1980 military coup is important since the liberalisation process of the 1980s 
emerged from it. At the end of the chapter, this liberalisation process will be linked 
with the privatization of the state economic enterprises and the attempts to be part 
of Europe through the Customs Union. This will be done by evaluating recent 
tendencies in the light of Turkey's aim of Westernization. 
1. Kemalism, The Official Ideology of Turkey 
Kemalism has unique characteristics and provides very rich and complex material 
for studies on ideology. It is not simply an ideology of national independence and 
sovereignty, but is also a backbone of social change in an enlightening, 
modernizing and Westernising way. It does not remain in the past as the founding 
ideology of Turkey, but maintains its dominance even today with different 
variations. There are many different perceptions and applications of Kemalism 
including the military one. 
There is debate as to Kemalism's status as an ideology though here it is considered 
as such. Some argue that Kemalism is not even a system of ideas, but a political 
practice aimed at reform and progress (Dumont, 1984: 25). According to some, 
although it presents a 'guiding vision', it is limited and therefore is not an ideology 
(Akural,1984:146). 
A deeper discussion would evaluate Kemalism within the context of its change 
over time. Heper suggests that' Atatiirkist thought' initially was not 'a quality or 
type of thought but a technique for discovering truth and dissolving illusions', and 
adds that the charismatic rule of Atatiirk and also Atatiirkist thought were 
'routinized' and 'supplemented' by the bureaucracy: "What must be an example of 
a Weltanschaung par excellence, was gradually transformed into an ideology" 
(Heper, 1985: 70-71). 
Although Kemalism has been re-invented and re-interpreted many times during the 
history of Turkey, the principles of Atatiirk remain a major source for 
understanding Kemalism. These six principles were formulated as the six 'arrows' 
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of the Republican People's Party (RPP), which was founded in 1923 and remained 
as the ruling party until the advent of the multi-party system in 1946. 
They were included in the RPP Party Programme for the Third Party Congress in 
1931. In the constitutional amendment of 1937, the principles were also 
incorporated into the Turkish Constitution (Ozbudun, 1981:88-9). They are - with 
the order rearranged according to the priorities of this study- republicanism, 
revolutionism, nationalism, secularism, populism and statism. 
These principles shed light on the Turkish state's concepts of the ideal state and 
ideal society in the frame of ideal economic and political relations. They present a 
radical departure from the Ottoman pastl7• As a result of these principles and their 
applications, some issues arose which are discussed even today, such as the fact 
that Turkey is the only secular state in the Middle East, and integration with the 
West. Some of the principles constitute issues of major political conflicts such as 
nationalism (mainly with regard to the Kurdish question) and secularism (with the 
rise of radical Islam). The principle of statism, is currently undergoing the biggest 
transformation of all. This will be discussed in greater detail below. Whether or not 
this is a development contradictory to Kemalism is an important question which 
should be addressed. A starting point for that discussion might be to say that all 
these principles are key elements for the main objective of modernization and 
Westernization. It is rather difficult to summarise Kemalism in terms of attitudes 
towards Westernisation. Since the war of independence established the Republic of 
Turkey, naturally the Kemalists did not want Turkey to be a colony of the West, 
and were, therefore, anti-imperialist. Before the war, the free trade policy of the 
Ottoman Empire had ended in economic ruin and bankruptcy, and a foreign take-
over of the economy (Ozay, 1983:54). At one and the same time, therefore, Turkey 
was to travel down the paths of anti-imperialism and capitalism (Ahmad, 
1981:150). For example, almost one-third of the corporations established between 
17 Ahmad considers Kemalism to be the extension of the developments which started in the Ottoman Empire 
period. He mainly emphasises the Young Turk era (1908·18) by arguing that some ideas refined by 
Mustafa Kemal were first discussed then. He states that Mustafa Kemal was involved in the discussions 
with the prominent intellectuals during the period when the Ottoman empire was undergoing a radical 
transformation (Abmad, 1981: 145), See also DumoDt (1984) for a similar discussion. 
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1920 and 1930 were partnerships with foreign capital. (Boratav, 1981:168). 
Foreign capital was 'welcome so long as it did not come with political or economic 
strings' (Ahrnad,1981:150). During the 1930s the policy regarding foreign capital 
changed for many reasons as will be explained in the section on statism. Foreign 
investment and trade were discouraged, economic policy was determined as a 
"closed-economy" framework (6zay, 1983: 54). However, even at that time, and 
subsequently, the main motive for Westernisation did not change. 
As Keyman states: "(the) ... making of Turkey was based upon both a war of 
independence against Western imperialism and acceptance of its epistemic and 
moral dominance" (Keyman, 1995:96-97). These principles to implement the 
target, or in Atatiirk's own words, to "reach a contemporary level of civilization", 
will be summarised in the next few paragraphs. 
Republicanism replaced the personal rule of the Sultan in 1923. Monarchism was 
outlawed, and the Ottoman Empire period ended. According to the RPP Party 
Programme, "the Republic is the form of government, which represents and 
realises most safely the ideal of national sovereignty. With this unshakeable 
conviction, the party defends, with all its means, the republic against all danger" 
(Landen, 1970:238-39) 
According to the principle of revolutionism, all changes toward Westernization 
have been seen as revolutions. Revolutionism is a principle which has been 
interpreted in different ways. Some declare it to be a 'reformism' (lnkilap), others a 
'revolutionism'. Most of the leftist Kemalists use the word 'revolution', but 
generally the former is the one that has been used; this version is also the military's 
choice. 
The first Regulation the RPP adopted in 1923 stated that the organisation was "not 
a party of revolution but of reform" (Akural, 1984:141). However, the 1935 RPP 
Programme, stated that ''The party does not consider itself bound by progressive 
and evolutionary principles in finding measures in the State administration. The 
Party holds it essential to remain faithful to the principles born of revolutions 
which our nation has made with great sacrifices, and to defend these principles 
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which have since been elaborated". (Landen,1970: 238-39). In 1937, revolutionism 
was incorporated into the constitution as an official policy (Akural, 1984:141). 
Whereas religion was the bonding element during the Ottoman Empire period, 
Nationalism became the new bond of the repUblic. The principles of nationalism 
and secularism have overlapping elements as will be seen in the paragraphs on 
secularism. ~ addition to replacing religion, the principle of nationalism, which 
also means 'Turkishness', is recognised over differences of ethnic groups. 
Turkishness is created as a national identity by Kemalism. The constitution of the 
Turkish Language Institution (TU) and Turkish History Institution (THI) can be 
seen as attempts to create Turkishness. After the Latin alphabet had been adopted 
and taught, the TU worked to replace Arabic words with Turkish words. This 
nationalist attempt reached its most extreme point in 1935 when the Sun Language 
Theory was developed, which claimed that in Central Asia all languages were 
derived from a common origin and Turkish was its closest modern expression. The 
Turkish Historical Thesis also claimed that Turks had lived in Central Asia, but 
because of hunger and drought, had been forced to migrate to other areas and in so 
doing had created the world's great civilizations. Zurcher states that the theory 
aimed to give Turks a sense of pride and national identity, separate from the recent 
Ottoman past (Zurcher,1993:193-200). However, it is more than establishing the 
identity of 'we' as opposed to the Ottoman identity, especially when the Turkish 
state's approach to the largest ethnic group, the Kurds, is considered. Be~ikyi 
argues that these theories were aimed at assimilating the Kurds as Turks 
(Be~ikyi, 1991: 167). Indeed, the existence of the Kurdish people was denied; until 
recently they were called 'mountain Turkish'. Furthermore, after recognition of 
their difference, they became the responsibility of the military in its brief to end 
'terrorism' rather than being viewed as a political or cultural issue. 18 
Secularism, like nationalism, aims to cut the ties of the new Turkish Republic with 
the Ottoman past by ending religion as a base for society. This principle, more 
obviously than the others, was designed as a constituting part of the modernization 
18 For different views and discussions on the Kurdish issue see Metin Sever, Kurt Sorunu. Aydinlarimiz Ne 
Dusunuyor?, Cern: Istanbul, 1992 and Sor Publishing. Kurd Sorusturmasi, Ankara, 1992. 
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and Westernisation processes. In accordance with this principle, in addition to the 
introduction of the new alphabet, the legal system was changed: the Swiss civil 
code was adopted; the political rights of women were recognised; the caliphate and 
Islamic law and courts were abolished; religious shrines, convents, religious 
education centres were closed down; the weekend holiday was changed from 
Friday to Sunday; the calendar and measures were adapted according to the 
Western model (Toprak, 1992:244, Akural, 1984 :127) 
All these have been implemented "in conformity with the needs of the world and 
on the basis of the fundamentals and the methods provided for modern civilisation 
by the Science and Technique", as the principle of secularism expresses 
(Landen,1970: 238-39). 
The understanding of secularism is not pure and singular. In fact, over the years, 
what has been observed is not simply 'to separate ideas of religion from politics 
and from the affairs of the world and of the State' (Landen,1970:238-39) as is 
generally accepted and as is included in the RPP Programme. Religion is not 
removed from public life, on the contrary, religion is used by politicians and by 
'Atatiirkist' military practitioners. 
As Mete Tun~ay states, secularism in Turkey means the organisation of religion by 
the state. More specifically, it means 'the state's control of religious practices, 
restricting the activities of Islamic ruhban by including them in the state, and some 
of the religious principles directing public life according to the needs of state's 
political legitimacy' (quoted in insel, 1995c:I13). 
Populism (Halkcilik) was derived from Ziya GOkalp'sl9 idea of corporatism, which 
is, according to Beige, the dominant ideology in Turkey, and can be traced in the 
different political formations with the motto of 'national unity' (BeIge, 1989: 129-
133). 
19 For a more detailed article which contains an exlensive bibliography of Ziya Gokalp see Andrew Danison, 
"Secularization and Modernization in Turkey: The Ideas of Ziya Gokalp", Economy and Society, vo1.24, 
no.2, 1995. pp. 189-224 
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" .. .It is one of our main principles to consider the people of the Turkish Republic not 
as composed of different classes, but as a community divided into various professions 
according to the requirements of the division of the labour for the individual and 
social life of the Turkish people. 
The farmers, handicraftsmen, labourers and workmen, people exercising free 
profession, industrialist, merchants and public servants are the main groups of work 
constituting the Turkish Community. The functioning of each of these groups is 
essential to the life and happiness of the others and of the community. 
The aims of our Party, with this pri nciple, are to secure social order and solidarity 
instead of class conflict, and to establish harmony of interests. The benefits are to be 
proportionate to the aptitude to the amount of work" (Landen,1970: 238-39). 
Populism may have functioned during the national struggle against the imperialist 
powers and old order since it provided solidarity (Ahmad,1981: 156). However, it 
has been maintained even after the national struggle ended. 
During the one-party period, populism was a justification of the single party 
system. Since Turkish society was 'classless', there were no differing interests, 
therefore, there was no necessity to have parties advocating them (Dumont, 1984: 
33). 
Despite the principle of a classless society, in fact there are classes and Kemalism 
does not abolish class differences and inequalities. The existence of classes and 
inequality is, in fact, not surprising as the capitalist mode of production was chosen 
as a way from the beginning. What this principle does, as will be very clear with 
the future applications, is to create an illusion of sameness in order to establish 
consent, prevent conflicts, and 'secure social order'. 
2. Statism for Capitalist Development 
"Although considering private work and activity a basic idea, it is one of our main 
principles to interest the State actively in matters where the general and vital interest 
of the nation are in question, especially in the economic field, in order to lead the 
nation and the country to prosperity in as short a time as possible. 
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The interest of the State in economic matters is to be an actual builder, as well as to 
encourage private enterprises, and also to regulate and control the work that is being 
done. 
The determination of the economic matters to be undertaken by the State depends 
upon the requirements of the greatest public interest of the nation. If the enterprise, 
which the state itself decides to undertake actively as a result of this necessity, is in 
the hands of private entrepreneurs, its appropriation shall, each time, depend upon the 
enactment of the law, which will indicate the way in which the State shall indemnify 
the loss the possibility of future earnings shall not be taken into consideration" 
(Landen,1970: 238-39). 
As seen in the RPP Programme, statism is essentially a step to strengthen free 
enterprise and to participate in the Western capitalist world, but there are 
differences in the understanding of statism in relation to the developments 
experienced. 
Kiiker divides (Kiiker, 1990: 104-105) the different perceptions of statism under 
two titles: 
1.Statism as a pragmatic solution for economic development: Mixed economy 
2.Statism as a special way of capital accumulation/strategy of capitalist 
development. 
The first approach explains the emergence of statism with the desire for fast 
economic development in general, and the problems which the world crisis created 
in the country in particular. Statism is evaluated as an authentic, different system 
which is peculiar to Turkey, neither capitalist, nor socialist. Both public and private 
enterprises exist together (Kiiker, 1990: 105)20 . Statism, as insel states, defmed in 
the 1961 Constitution, is an example of the kind of statism which advocates that 
the state should arrange the economy and control and protect the private sector. 
20 There was an anti~westem group called the Kadro movement that can be included in this first approach as 
well. They were inspired by the anti-imperialist theories (Koker, 1990: 100-101). For the detailed 
discussion of the Kadro group see Haldun Gillalp, "Ulusculuk, Devletcilik ve Turk Devrimi: Bir Erken 
'Bagimlilik' Teorisi", Nevin Cosar (ed.), Tiirkiye'de Devletcilik, Baglam:lstanbul, 1995, pp.l73-l88 
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This system, insel argues, unifies the principles of the market economy and social 
state 21 (insel, 1995a:189-192). 
According to the second approach, it is incorrect to evaluate statism as a different 
system from capitalism and socialism. Instead, statism is a capitalist development 
strategy (Koker, 1990:106). For insel, political statism as an authoritarian, 
centralist and elitist conception provides the basic motivation and legitimisation of 
economic statism (lnsel, 1995a:188). Since political statism is expansive, its 
existence is not only restricted to the political area, but is also in the cultural and 
economic areas. As insel suggests, this 'holistic statism' is the most appropriate 
concept to explain the Turkish state's intervention in politics, economy, culture, 
public and private life (insel, 1995a: 189-190). 
The discussions on the state in Turkey should be expanded to include the internal 
and external factors in order to understand statism as an economic policy for 
fostering capitalist accumulation in the country, and to place Turkey in the global 
capitalist system. 
The 1920s can be summarised as 'the period of creating an enterprise class' : 
"Where Turkish merchants or industrialists were lacking, it was necessary to create 
them via the enrichment of particular individuals through state resources and support, 
and the natural candidates for this role were to be found within the ranks of the 
leading cadres and politicians" (Boratav, 1981: 169-170). 
There are many examples that show the free enterprise orientation of the 1920s: 
Kemalist development strategy such as the establishment of the Is Bank in 1924, 
the law for The Encouragement of Industry in 1927 and the Foreign Trade 
Regulation Law of 1929. According to Ozay, the establishment of the banks, credit 
institutions and industry was neither at the expense of agricultural development, 
nor state enterprises. They all existed together (Ozay, 1983: 50-52). 
21 There are differences in the priorities of these two. The people who see the market economy as a target 
argue that the role of the state should decrease after the development is realised and sufficient capital is 
accumulated. Others consider the intervention and protection should he permanent since they believe 
statism is vital for a socially distributive system (Insel, 1995a: 189·192). 
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Ahmad calls this phase the 'laissez-faire,22 period. He states that the Law for the 
Encouragement of Industry, passed in 1927, provided the conditions for local 
capitalists to encourage private enterprise. Furthermore, he argues that the 
government went so far that the state support was implemented through politicians 
against the state (Ahmad, 1993:96-97): 
'"The government's policy worked all too well and local businessmen made huge 
fortunes during this period. With inside information available to them, thanks to their 
sources in the government, they knew all about the new tariffs that would be imposed 
on imports in 1929. Consequently, they imported and hoarded foreign goods before 
the tariffs went up. That led to a sharp deterioration in the balance of trade and a 
decline in the value of the lira aggravated by the world depression. This may have 
been good for business but it was disastrous for the national economy. The cost of 
paying the public debt rose sharply and the government was forced to suspend 
payments to its foreign creditors in 1930. Turkey's credit abroad was seriously 
damaged, making it even more difficult to borrow money or attract investment 
(Ahmad,1993:96-97). 
The economic policies changed as a result of the world crisis (Birtek, 1995:143) 23, 
which brought the fall of external and internal prices for agricultural products, and 
caused Turkey to limit its imports (Gi.ilalp,1985:333-335). Thus, a closed, 
protectionist economic policy and industrialisation were embraced by the state. 
According to Boratav, this protectionism, was the 'correct defence mechanism' 
against the world crisis: " it enabled the partial 'delinking' of the Turkish economy 
from the imperialist system when the latter was in a depression" (Boratav, 1981: 
188-189). In accordance with protective measures and restrictions on foreign trade, 
the nationalisation of foreign investments was implemented. Industrialisation and 
capital accumulation were realised by the state (Boratav, 1981:174-175). 
22 for the criticism of this idea, see Finefrock. 1981 :384 
23 Besides the world crisis there were other reasons which brought about the consideration of the 'open door' 
policy (Boratav, 1981:174). 1929 was the year the first instalment of the OUoman debt was to be paid. It 
was also the year Ottoman tariffs expired, therefore a new scale of import duties needed to be implemented 
(Boratav, 1981:169-170), 
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At a local level, the state intervened directly in the economy through state 
economic enterprises. (Ozbudun, 1981:89). SUmerbank was established in 1933 as 
a combined state bank and holding company (Ozay, 1983: 52). The state controlled 
the agricultural, industrial, financial and banking activities by becoming the 'major 
productive and investing agent' (Boratav, 1981:175). However, even then it was 
not in total control in all these areas, and this did not constitute direct intervention 
of the state in all of the economy (Boratav, 1981:178, Ahmad 1993:96-97). The 
private sector participated in some sectors with the state. There were also some 
areas in industry without any state intervention (Boratav, 1981:178). 
Although the state carried out industrialisation itself, this was due to the 
insufficient supply of capital. Otherwise, there was no change in the state's role of 
helping the private sector to 'grow and mature' (Ahmad, 1993:96-97) . 
If the 1920s was the period of 'creating' an enterprise class, the 1930s was the 
period of 'supporting' it (Boratav, 1981:169-170). Thus, Boratav argues, statism in 
Turkey "did not obstruct the development of the bourgeoisie" (Boratav, 1981:169-
170). 
The opposite view sees the change of policy towards statism in the 1930s as a 
destructive step against free enterprise, and considers it to be one of the indicators 
of the state's major influence and the weaker power of the bourgeoisie in Turkey. 
The Great Crisis was seen as a justification for statists to apply their policies 
(Ozay, 1983:52-63). It is argued that the temporary measures became permanent 
'because of the strong state tradition' of Turkey (Saracoglu, 1994: 63-64, Heper, 
1985). 
3. The End of Statism and The Beginning of Democracy?: 
The DP Government's 'Liberal Statism': 
The view which considers the 19305 as the period in which private enterprise was 
discouraged, has parallels with the view which evaluates the DP government as the 
end of statism. The DP government is important in terms of ending the one-party 
regime of the RPP and starting the multi-party democracy, as the party which 
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gained popular support. However, the question arises as to whether the end of the 
one-party rule of the RPP meant the end of statism. 
There are two opposing comments about this period. The one, which does not view 
statism as being separate from capitalism, argues that the OP government was the 
'decisive shift' in this process "from elite rule to full class rule", but this shift was 
"from one pattern of capitalist development to another" (Keyder, 1979: 19). For the 
second approach, the period which starts with the OP government is viewed as a 
challenge to the statist policies of the bureaucratic elite (Heper, 1985:19), as being 
the liberal economic transformation, and as a new period in which closer relations 
were established with the West (Ozay, 1983: 54). 
If the questions of whether and how liberalism was realised are left aside for now, 
what remains is whether the OP period was as radical a rupture as claimed. In 
answer to this, it should be considered whether the liberal economy and 
relationships with the West were started during the I?P period. In fact, there are 
many indications that these two developments started before that. The explanations 
of Kemalist principles previously given show that Kemalism was a project which 
aimed to incorporate Turkey into the capitalist western world. Statism, in that 
sense, aims to encourage the private sector. In fact, before the OP govemment, in 
the 1947 RPP Party Congress, this became more obvious, statism was clearly 
described as a principle to help the private sector (Boratav, 1993:77-78). 
Giilalp argues that before the Second World War in 1939, Turkey was already 
preparing to implement some changes in economic policy. This included the 
transfer of some of the established industries to the private sector, and a relaxation 
of the restrictions on foreign trade in accordance with the relatively recovered 
world economy. However, the outbreak of the war caused the abandonment of 
these plans and the government had to apply emergency measures (Giilalp,1985: 
335). The end of the Second World War meant the end of statism, though the 
changes did not take place immediately (Giilalp, 1985:333). 
In terms of establishing relations with the West, it is known that the RPP was also 
applying liberal policies for Turkey's IMF membership, such as devaluation and 
some measures for foreign trade liberalisation, from 1946 (Giilalp, 1985:336). IMF 
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membership was realised in 1947 (Boratav, 1993:79) and at the same time the RPP 
was seeking foreign aid (Giilalp, 1985: 336). In fact, it was after Marshall aid that 
the government allowed the foundation of an opposition party, which was the OP 
(Keyder, 1979: 16). 
The developments in favour of a liberal economy and close relationships with the 
West were not contradictory to Kemalism and the RPP, and they did not start with 
the OP. However, it is true that these tendencies to draw closer to the West 
increased during the OP government to the extent of dependency (Boratav, 
1993:74), especially with the flow of aid from the United States and Europe (Ozay, 
1983:54). The relationship between Turkey and the USA increased following 
Turkey's decision to take part in the Korean War and join NATO in 1952; the 
same was not true of the relationship with Europe (Ozay, 1983:54, Boratav, 1993: 
79). 
The OP period was 'the culmination of this liberalisation process' (Giilalp, 1985: 
336) and this was in parallel with the developments in the world economy. As a 
result of the boom in the world market created by the Korean War, Turkey's 
eamings from agricultural production and exports increased (Keyder, 1979: 21). 
These earnings were very effective in allowing the lifting of almost all restrictions 
on imports (Giilalp, 1985: 336). 
Here the DP's liberalism can be questioned by asking whether the OP was anti-
statist, and more broadly anti-Kemalist. Before being elected, the OP promised the 
transfer of state economic enterprises (SEE) to private ownership (Keyder, 
1979: 18). However, this was not realised. The economic logic of the OP was not so 
different from the Kemalists', and although statism was criticised (Keyman, 
1995:110), it remained at the level of discourse 24 
When the OP's perception of liberalism is examined, it is seen that "the liberal 
critique" was only used to secure the representation of the private sector as the 
precondition of the modernisation of Turkish society (Abmad 1993: 103-120). 
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()~ argues that, compared to the left, the Turkish right is more indirectly statist 
in a liberal make-up «()~,1995:101-102). Similarly tnsel calls this period liberal 
statism by considering it as an important step in establishing capitalism with state 
interference (tnse1, 1995a: 209). According to him, the interventionism was not 
decreased, but increased both in the qualitative and quantitative senses. However, 
the type of the intervention changed. While the earlier 'traditional' statism 
functioned to preserve the state against the changing conditions in society and in 
the world, he argues, 'liberal statism', which replaced traditional statism, focused 
on enterprise. New and more profitable ways opened up for private enterprises as a 
result of state support and protection. The OP government did not privatise SEE's, 
but established new ones (tnsel, 1995a:204-205). 
It seems, therefore, that the OP period was not far removed from Kemalism in 
terms of maintaining a statist economic policy. When the political dimensions of 
liberalisation are considered, it might seem that there was more freedom in terms 
of religion, but this is an illusion. Religion was used by the OP for its own interests 
to manipulate the reactions to the RPP. In that specific situation, it was perceived 
as the way of being popular. The OP took a very tough stance against the 
oppositional press (Tun~ay, 1995:183), as will be considered in the chapter on the 
Turkish media. As hysterically anticommunist, the OP could not tolerate any leftist 
voice, whereas it was very flexible towards the right (Erogul, 1992:121). There 
was no improvement in civil citizenship rights (Keyder, 1993b: 149). This was 
particularly true after the crisis conditions occurred, and the OP's political 
oppression increased. 
The economic boom came to an end and conditions changed in 1953. Following 
the decline of the prices of primary goods, large trade deficits developed 
(Keyder,1979:21). After 1955, the foreigu aid received by Turkey became 
insufficient to cover the current account deficit. As a result, the government 
applied short term borrowing, which later created a repayment problem. This led to 
a crisis and a 300 percent devaluation in 1958 (Keyder, 1979:22). 
24 For a contrasting view which argues that the DP was successful in economic liberalisation. but because of 
the statism of Kemalism the DP was not able to end the dominant role of the public sector in the economy, 
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The crisis was not only a crisis of capital accumulation, but also a crisis of the 
DP's hegemony. Peasants were the main supporters of the DP, because it had 
gained victory by using the opposition of the peasants to the RPP, through 
emphasising the RPP's 'religious oppression' (Keyder,1979:18). The government 
supported the rich peasantry by paying high prices to the farmers, even during the 
crisis, by printing money for agricultural subsidies. This contributed to the rise of 
inflation, which reached 40 percent in 1958. As a result, even the liberal factions of 
the intelligentsia who supported the DP, started to complain. These were added to 
the complaints of the bureaucracy, business circles in tstanbul, and the military 
who complained not only about the decline in their real income (Keyder, 1979:22), 
but also about the DP's violation of the Kemalist principle, secularism 
(Gillalp,1985: 338). This, in addition to the government's having an anti-
democratic stance, culminated in the crisis which caused the military coup on the 
27th May, 1960 (Keyder, 1979:22). 
4. The Military as the Guardian of Kemalism, and The 
Military Coups as a Solution to Crisis 
Turkish history witnessed military coups three times: 27 May, 1960, 12 March, 
1971 and 12 September, 1980. 
It is not only in these extraordinary conditions that the military in Turkey has an 
important role; this role exists even during the civilian periods with the continuing 
impact of the military on political and economic life. 
As Sakalhoglu states, the military has an 'indirect influence' on the government by 
making 'demands, policy suggestions, and wamings on political matters'. 
(Sakalhoglu, 1997:153). This interference is realised at a non-official level 
between the politicians and army officers in an unquestioning manner, as can be 
seen in the frequent examples in Turkey in the 1990s in the case of the Welfare 
Party. In addition to this, the close relationship has been established on a legal 
basis. Since the Constitution changed following each of the military coups, military 
power has been of influence during the civilian periods as well. There are two key 
see Sezer.1992:6 
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mechanisms which were created by the military following the coups, which were 
incorporated in the Constitution. These mechanisms produce a 'double~headed 
political system' in Turkey. The fIrst one is the creation of the state security courts 
which led to the operation of military justice alongside the civilian justice system. 
(Sakalhoglu, 1997:157). The second mechanism is the National Security Council 
(MGK), which made it possible for the military to partiCipate in the decision-
making process of the civilian authorities. Having been introduced as a 'platform 
for the military to voice its opinion on matters of national security' by the 1961 
constitution (Sakalhoglu, 1997:157), it was extended with the 1973 amendments, 
which included making recommendations to the government, and further 
empowered with the 1982 constitution with the statement that the military's 
'recommendations would be given priority consideration by the council of 
ministers' (Sakalhoglu, 1997: 157). 
Initially, the military was allowed to voice its ideas about national security, but it 
has subsequently reached the point that the military's voice has become almost 
more important than the civilians. This is not surprising since national security is 
viewed as a sacred concept which includes all 'internal' and 'external enemies' of 
Turkey. The more surprising thing here is the existence and even strengthening of 
the military which continued even after the 'democratic' Turkey of the 1980s. 
The military's links are not restricted to the government, or the parliament. It also 
has links with business and industry. The establishment of the Army Mutual 
Assistance Association (OYAK) in 1961 made this relationship 'direct'. With the 
advantages provided by the government, OYAK has become 'an integral part of 
the economy' (Berberoglu, 1981: 280) 25 by being 'one of the largest and most 
profItable conglomerates in the country', and providing high profIts to the military 
investors (Ahmad, 1993: 11). 
25 "By the early 1970s. OY AK had acquired controlling interests in the Turkish Automotive Industry (which 
assembles International Harvester trucks and tractors), an insurance company, a food-canning firm and a 
cement plant. It also held 42 per cent of the shares of Renault's Turkish subsidiary OY AK·Renault. 20 per 
cent of the Petkim Petrochemical plant, 8 per cent of the state-owned Turkish Petroleum corporation and 7 
per cent of the Turkish subsidiary of the Goodyear Tyre Company, among others. Thus, while it had 
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When the military which carried out the coups are examined, some common points 
emerge. Firstly, the coups were carried out with the claims of saving the state and 
democracy, and protecting Kemalism. There were IMF measures before the coups 
in 1958, in 1970 and in January 19~0 (GUlalp, 1985:331-332). Although all of 
them brought pressures against people, it was to differing extents (Timur, 
1992:31). The post-coup environment in 1960, brought the period in which many 
basic democratic rights were recognised and extended to a 'wide-ranging set of 
groups and institutions in society' (GUlalp, 1985:329). Even though the military 
coups were realised with the same justification of saving Kemalism, and were 
preceded by the IMF measures, the outcomes were different not only in terms of 
'political regime', but also in terms of 'economic policy' (Giilalp,1985:332). In 
fact 1960 changed the accumulation pattem from agrarian and merchant capital to 
industrial capital (Giilalp, 1985: 336-337), and brought import-substituting-
industrialisation, whereas 1980, as will be seen in detail more later, changed these 
policies completely, and promoted export (Eralp,1990:220). 
In considering the nature of the three military coups, some Turkish scholars are 
influenced by theories of the crisis of the capitalist state. According to this, the 
crisis situation arises as a result of the intemal class structure and the effects of 
world capitalism in which the society aims to participate (Giilalp, 1985:331, 
Keyder, 1979:31). 
When there are transitions between the phases of development following crises, the 
capital accumulation process needs to be restructured. Giilalp argues: "Military 
interventions coincide with these periods of crisis and transition between phases" 
(Giilalp, 1985: 333). 
The state always plays a role in the capital accumulation process. As Giilalp 
indicates, this continuity itself brings variation. 
" ... the variations in political regime do not disrupt the continuity in economic policies 
introduced by the previous government. On the contrary. they proceed to the 
started with an initial investment of 8.6 million T. L .• by 1970 this had grown to 502 million T. L. and in 
1972 its assets totalled $300 million" (Berberoglu. 1981 :281·282). 
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completion of the transition started by the previous government and provide the 
means for their continued implementation" (Gtilalp. 1985: 344). 
It may then be asked why military coups are not applied as a solution everywhere 
in crisis conditions even though the state is doing the same everywhere in the 
process of accumulating capital. Here. the role of the state in gaining the consent 
from citizens plays an important part in sustaining the system in crisis conditions. 
The 'representation crisis' of the government following the economic crisis and the 
already initiated transition (Giilalp,1985:344) is exhibited in the 1980 coup. The 
concept of 'hegemony' (Keyder, 1979:28-29) on the other hand, seems broader and 
more explanatory because, in contrast to the implication of the concept of 
representation, it includes not only a representation crisis of the government, 
parties or the parliament, but also more complex processes of the conflicts between 
classes and inter-class fractions. In some crises, one type of conflict can be more 
dominant than another. Before the second military coup, the inter-class conflicts, 
even inter-bourgeois conflicts became dominant because 'the new phase required a 
different composition of the market' and 'changed the pattern of relationship with 
the world economy'. Keyder explains the reason for the 1971 military coup on the 
basis of 'the inability of anyone fraction within the bourgeoisie to establish 
hegemonic rule'. The banking and commercial bourgeoisie and the industrial 
bourgeoisie were in conflict. The complaints of the industrialists were that the 
commercial bourgeoisie benefited from bank credits whereas the manufacturing 
sector was deprived of them. The commercial sector was also more advantaged 
because of the protective trade regime and the other state interventions in the 
economy (Keyder, 1979:28-31). 
In the 1970s, the bourgeois class complained about the 196 I Constitution which 
extended political freedoms, as mentioned above. According to them, ''Turkish 
society was not yet ready for a such a lUXUry and therefore the Constitution should 
be changed to limit some of the freedorns enjoyed by those who disturbed the 
social order". The military in fact followed this suggestion and intervened in 
March,1971. According to the military, this was done because the parliament was 
unable to cope with 'anarchy, internecine strife, social and economic discontent' 
(Keyder, 1979: 30-31). The same reason was given for the coup of 12 September, 
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1980. Although there were violent movements in both cases, especially before 
1980, there was 'a radicalisation of the political struggle' (Giilalp, 1985:344). 
These were the outcomes of a crisis, not the reasons for it. It is true that hegemony 
is always a continuing struggle, and can not be established completely at any time 
in any society. However, in Turkey's case, hegemony is far from being established 
since the constitution of the Republic. Since the Republic was constituted by 
excluding Kurdish, Islamic and other elements, but created a Turkishness by 
relying on the principle of populism, there is a question of insecurity about the 
maintenance of the regime against those who want to 'breakdown' the system and 
create another one. So it can be argued that as a result of the weakness of the 
regime, the equilibrium of hegemony in Turkey relies on the strong state more than 
on consent. 
After the 1971 intervention during the two years when the military was in power, 
wages which had risen in the 1960s, dropped again. The resources were transferred 
from agriculture to heavy industry through, amongst other ways, credits (Giilalp, 
1985:340). The environment of freedom of the 1960s ended. Strikes and 
demonstrations were outlawed, all students' and teachers' unions and left wing 
political organisations were banned, and their leaders were imprisoned 
(Berberoglu,1981 :280). At the end of the 1970s, the economic situation of the 
country worsened. The annual inflation rate reached 100 percent (which was 14 
percent between 1970 and 1972) (Ozay, 1983: 54_55)26. 
After less than a decade, another coup was experienced on the 12 September, 1980: 
" ... Turkish bourgeoisie has once again turned to the military for 'a way out' of the 
current crisis ... Under the guise of containing 'extremism' from the left and right, 
this is once again attacking the left". (Berberoglu, 1981 :290). Here, it should be 
emphasised that different business groups had put pressure on the government to 
control the working class before the coup. For example, TDstAD, the leading 
business group, announced their ideas about the 1979 environment with an 
advertisement entitled 'A Realistic Way Out', which was published in the 
newspapers. They mentioned that they were 'anxious about the inability of the 
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government to manage Turkey's foreign debt or to control trade union militancy'. 
The solution according to them was free enterprise. A similar complaint was made 
by TISK (Turkish Confederation of Employers' Union) which was discontented 
about the 'unreasonable wage demands' and 'the growing power of trade unions'. 
According to TISK, workers with increased power were responsible for inflation 
and the other economic problems (Eralp, 1990:233-234). What followed as a result 
were Ecevit's resignation from the government; seeking help from the international 
finance organisations27; and Demirel's appointment of Ozal to the economic 
stabilisation prograrnrne. 
The political environment was so active, organised and strong that it would not 
have been easy to apply the Stabilisation Prograrnrne under these conditions. It was 
not 'the severity of the economic crisis which rendered the Prograrnrne inadequate' 
(Saracoglu, 1994:64), but the lack of suitable conditions28 to apply such a 
Programme. In fact, the implementation of the prograrnrne was started as soon as 
the military coup created a suitable environment, as will be seen below (Boratav, 
1993:122, Giilalp, 1985:344). 
Despite the fact that the 1980 coup produced a reduction of freedom, as mentioned 
above, Heper makes a very optimistic evaluation. For him, the military's system of 
ethics created 'a new kind of Turk' who plays the role of 'citizen' in the political 
26 Also, following the foreign exchange crisis, the foreign debt rose to $13.8 billion in 1978 from $4.7 billion 
in 1975 (Kazgan, 1993:70-71). 
27 The Turkish government negotiated 'debt rescheduling with external creditors' which included international 
financial agencies and more than 250 private western baoks in 1978 (Berberoglu, 1981: 282·283). After 
negotiations a Standby Agreement was reached with the IMF in July 1979 (Ozay,1983:54-55). In order to 
extend credits further, conditions were imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
Some of them were: " .. deceleration of economic growth (which had already fallen from 7 percent year 
prior to 1976 to about 2 percent in 1978); a wage freeze; 20·30 percent devaluation of the Turkish lira 
(already devalued fifteen times between 1972 and 1977); a further increase in consumer prices; and large 
allocations to the private sector from the state budget - a budget already running a deficit of several billion 
dollars". (Berberoglu, 1981 :282·283). 
28 for the strong leftist movement in the 1970s, see Ahmet Samim, "The Tragedy of the Turkish Left", New 
Left Review, no.126, 1981, pp.60-85. 
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system, not the role of 'subject'. In addition, this new system is based on 
'participation, and tolerance towards others' opinions' (Heper, 1985: 147). 
Furthermore, in a rather mystical way, he states: 
...... post-1980 military in Turkey did not wish to impose upon society a closed 
system of thought and believed in the inherent capacity of the people" (Heper, 1985: 
152). 
Moreover, Heper claims that the military had been trying "to create a political 
environment in which, through multiple confrontations of civil societal groups, a 
dynamic consensus may be possible" (Heper,1985:151). Therefore, the military in 
Turkey 'has aimed at a democratic reconsolidation rather than a regime 
breakdown' with the interventions (Heper, 1985:151). 
It is difficult to understand how citizenship, political participation and democracy 
can be spoken of in relation to the 'post-1980 military regime' which removed the 
channels of representation (Sayan, 1992:32), ended all political activities and 
organisations, and brought severe restrictions on the freedom of expression. 
Executions of prisoners under 18 years of age were carried out. The human rights 
violations record reached its peak in the history of the country. As Giilalp states, 
the 1980 coup was the worst one in terms of destruction of freedoms. It brought a 
'complete breakdown of all fonns of democracy' (Giilalp, 1985:329). 
Most of Heper's ideas derived from his comparison ofthe 1960 coup with the 1980 
coup. He states that the 1980 coup, 'unlike the post- Atatiirk bureaucratic 
intelligentsia' (he means the military in 1960) trusted in the 'common sense' of the 
people. Although it is not clear what is meant by common sense here, he might be 
implying the use of religion by the military. In fact, he mentions that ...... they have 
even resorted to religion to speed up the process of the inculcation of new 
norms"(Heper,1985: 152). Obviously, the use of Islam by the military as an 
antidote to leftism is not something that can be advocated in the name of 
democracy. The situation of 'inculcation' is certainly in contradiction with the 
claimed functions of the military, such as consolidating democracy, creation of 
citizenship and participation. His second point is clearer. In his comparison, he 
arrives at the conclusion that in the 1960 coup they tried to impose 'the 
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bureaucratised version of Atatiirkist thought', but after the 1980 one 'they have not 
insisted on statism'(Heper, 1985: 151-152). This second point is crucial in terms of 
understanding the basis of his optimism felt about the 1980 military coup and the 
following 'civilian' regime. 
In contrast, I argue that, the abandoning of statism in economy is far from 
guaranteeing democracy in itself, firstly because of the maintenance of state power 
with the use of legal and non-legal repression and violence against the citizens29• In 
. addition, the policies that led to the abandonment of statism should be considered. 
Thus, in the next section the liberal policies will be elaborated on with the 
conditions of post-1980 Turkey. 
5. Liberalism and Democracy in the 1980s: Economic 
Stabilisation and Political Liberalism 
In November 1983, the military government ended with the general elections. The 
MP (Motherland Party- ANAP) won the election, and influenced the decade. There 
are differing views about the MP government. In fact, this difference originally 
emerges from the different perceptions of the military coup, as explained above. 
Ayata classifies these views into two different groups. According to the first view, 
the MP is the extension of the military in integrating the Turkish economy into 
world markets. From this perspective, the MP is seen as "essentially conservative 
and supported by the religious and nationalist groups, an executive committee of 
the Turkish bourgeoisie, and a reflection of the rise of the new right in Turkey" 
(Ayata, 1993:33). There is strong evidence to evaluate the situation from the first 
perspective. For example, the stabilisation programme, which will be discussed 
29 Article 120 of the Constitution which allows the declaration of a state of emergency brings restrictions to 
basic human rights and freedoms. The newspaper OzgOr Gtindem is one of the publications which had its 
distribution stopped and has been banned. It has also had its distribution prevented by other means. The 
journalists were harassed, some 'disappeared' or were killed. It has been confirmed that the state was 
involved in and responsible for some of the murders, such as that of the Kurdish writer and founder 
member of the HEP party, and the bombings of the Ozgilr GOndem offices (for more detailed and recent 
infonnation on the legal provisions. human rights' violations and media repression in Turkey see" State 
Before Freedom, Media Repression in Turkey" written by Hugh Poulton, and published in co-operation by 
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below, was actually brought before the MP government, but could not be applied 
until it was guaranteed by the military (Boratav, 1993: 120-122). Ozal, the leader of 
the MP, was the ex-chairman of one of the leading employers' unions, The Union 
of Metal Goods Industrialist (MESS), top level manager of Sabancl Holding and 
the designer of the stabilisation programme in the State Central Planning (DPT) 
(Eralp, 1990:235). This background information is important to understand the 
relationship between business groups, military and government. As seen above, the 
business groups complained about high wages and this was another issue addressed 
in the Stabilisation Programme. It was also included by General Kenan Evren in 
his first speech to the public following the military coup in 1980 (Boratav, 
1993: 120-122). 
The second group considers the MP as the only party which was 'opposed to the 
military' (GOle, 1994:217), or more cautiously as the party which 'had distanced 
itself from the military more than had the other parties that competed in the 1983 
general elections' (Heper, 1994:197). It should be mentioned here that the general 
elections were very restrictive; as a result of the bans on some politicians, the range 
of parties was not wide. As Ayata states, this group evaluates the MP as 'the 
"initiator" of liberal revolutions. According to this perspective, the MP is 
considered to be 'antibureaucratic, pluralist, modem and able to bring together a 
coalition including a wide range of ideological groups' (Ayata, 1993:33). 
Although it contains people who have different interests with changing emphases 
and priorities, the second group draws a parallel between economic liberalism and 
political liberalism. Those who focus on the economy prioritise the successes of 
the liberal economic policies, mainly the Stabilisation Programme, while those 
who are more interested in the political dimensions celebrate the differences in the 
'strengthening civil society' of post-1980 Turkey as an extension of the liberal 
economy. 
The MP was a synthesis of the four ideological strands of liberalism, social 
democracy, nationalism, and conservatism. These four articulated views were in 
the Article 19, International Centre Against Censorship, and Kurdish Human Rights Project in London in 
July 1998 
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accordance with the 'harmony', 'peace and order', of the post-coup conditions. 
Despite the four different elements, market-oriented policy became dominant in the 
economic strategy. 
Ozal liberalised foreign exchange and trade regimes (Kazgan, 1993:74-75). The 
economic Programme's so called 'adjustment' or 'stabilisation' was the 
embodiment of the tendency towards a 'free' market economy. The stabilisation 
programme was prepared at the end of 1970s, but it could not be put into effect at 
that time mainly because of the strong leftist movement and resistance, as 
mentioned before. At that time, it consisted of 'short term measures' for inflation 
and balance of payments difficulties, but later in the 1980s it was extended to the 
liberalisation of the foreign trade regime, export orientation, and finally, 
privatization (~enses, 1993 :97). 
The main logic of the programme was to create an exportable surplus beyond 
domestic requirements, and to restrain domestic demand, in other words, wages. 
Wage restraint was considered vital to 'combat' rising inflation and to achieve 
international competitiveness under an export-oriented strategy with reduced cost 
(~enses, 1993: 99). 
Both the IMF and the World Bank co-operated to support the stabilisation 
programme financially30 (Saracoglu, 1994: 69). Turkey obtained five structural 
adjustment loans. The World Bank regarded Turkey as 'a test case for a new type 
of adjustment programme, which combined short term stabilisation with medium 
term structural change' (Oni~, 1991: 165). 
As a reinforcing effect of these international finance measures, Ozal employed 
technocrats who had been educated in American universities, and worked in 
international finance centres such as the IMF and the World Bank. They had 
influential roles in the economic policy process (Sayan, 1992:32). 
30 "The IMF approved a three year standby arrangement on the amount of SDR (Special Drawing Rights): 
1,250 million in June 1980, followed in 1983 and 1984 by two one year arrangements, both of SDR 225 
million. The World Bank provided US $1.600 million through five structural adjustment loans between 
1980 and 1985" (Saracoglu,1994:69). 
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As a result of the programme, almost all controls on various commodity prices 
were ended by removing the Price Control Commission. State economic 
enterprises (SEE) were put in competition. It was decided that the prices of the 
products of those SEEs which produce non basic commodities would be set by 
commercial principles (Saracoglu,1994: 70). 
Most of the relevant literature advocates this programme and endorses these 
developments. The result of the programme is welcomed since it is believed that it 
created a 'remarkable improvement in Turkey's economic situation' in terms of 
'dramatic growth in exports of goods and services' (Saracoglu, 1994:75). The 
results are interpreted as indications of the Turkey's 'liberal revolution' (Rustow, 
1985:5)31 
In fact, these evaluations are not at all appropriate. Firstly, the conditions of the 
past are ignored by making a comparison with the crisis conditions of the 1980s, 
and secondly these had already been falsified by the end of the 1980s. Thus, the 
inflation rate reached around 80 percent in 1988. This rate was coupled with rising 
unemployment figures and affected mostly workers, government employees and 
retired people. With inflation, the value of their wages in real terms and their 
standard of living decreased. These conditions were the major reason for the MP's 
later loss of support. This policy aggravated income distribution (Sayan, 1992:38-
39), and increased the foreign debt to a record level of $38 billion (Eralp, 
2990:242)n 
After the 1980 coup, taxes taken from capital were reduced, business activities 
were supported with the changes in the tax system at the expense of labour and 
agriculture (Kazgan, 1993:75). Although exporters were given tax rebates, and 
credits through the Central Bank were evaluated as a performance success story 
(Saracoglu 1994: 71), the exports were, in fact, mythical. The 'advantageous' 
31 According to that, as a result of export -led growth, inflation fen to 25% by mid-1984 (from around 100% 
in 1980); exports doubled by 1982; and by 1984, 'the country was wide open to foreign investment' 
(Rustow, 1985:5). 
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situation created 'illusionary export' which not only caused economic damage, but 
also became one of the influential events which contributed to the shifting values 
of society33. These illusionary exports were in fact very consistent with Ozal's 
concepts which reflected the new understanding of life in this 'liberal' period, 
which included the ideas of 'turning the corner' and 'making it'. As interrelated 
concepts, they imply that all means towards achieving liberalism should be 
regarded as legitimate. This new era is one of opportunities. Wages and salaries 
can be low, but these are not the only sources of subsistence; if someone 'uses 
his/her mind', there are plenty of ways. In free market conditions, every effort of 
the individual would be rewarded (Eralp, 1990:239). In the Ozal era, 'making it', 
getting results by whatever means, rather than labour itself, had merit. Mutlu states 
that the rhetoric of 'making it' was produced against the pre-1980 political 
environment by OZal. According to Ozal, the politicians had previously only 
produced talk. The pre-1980 environment was characterised by disorder, unrest, 
division, false economic policies and unskilful management. Ozal's period 
represented "thinking big", "extending to the world" and "globalization"(MutIu, 
1995:58-61). 
Finally, 'ortadirek' (which directly translated is the central pole of the nomad's 
tent) was formulated as a vague and elastic concept to dissolve the class concept 
(Tiinay, 1993:20). The concept of 'ortadirek' can be thought of as very consistent 
with the Kemalist idea of 'populism'. By addressing people as 'ortadirek', Ozal 
tried to unify the people from different sections. It came to a point that both a 
worker and a boss defined themselves as 'ortadirek' (Mutlu, 1995:60). 
The 'liberal' government did not bring liberalism in the political arena. On the 
contrary, the aim was to create a socially disciplined and politically depoliticized 
society with the support of legal instruments (Sakalhoglu, 1996: 143) around the 
old familiar concepts of 'national unity, ideological uniformity, and political 
32 Also the government expenditures for health and education fell from 16.5 percent to 12.4 percent between 
1980 and 1985. Education expenditures fell more dramatically compared to 1970 falling from 3.6 billion 
TL in 1970. to 2.4 billion TL in 1985 (ToksOz. 1988:47-48). 
33 For another scandal which arose as the outcome of bankers' fixing high interest rates. collecting savings of 
many people and collapsing. see Eralp. 1990:240. 
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stability' (Birtek et.al 1993:195-6). What has been experienced in the post-1980 
era is the synthesis of liberal economy and authoritarian political structure 
(tnsel,1995a: 210-211, Sakalhoglu, 1996:143). 
However, 1983 is seen by many as being the beginning of political liberalisation in 
Turkey. Some argue that, even 'under the generals' supervision', a political 
liberalisation phase started in 1983. This can be understood when these ideas are 
seen as the product of a comparison between the military regime and the elected 
government, in which case there is no doubt that military is more authoritarian. 
Evaluations of this type need to be treated with caution since democracy is not 
simply the lack of military in a direct sense, nor the existence of elections. 
However, there are some arguments of 'political liberalism' which go beyond these 
by including a further factor. Civil society, it is argued, is strengthened and this 
leads to 'greater political opening and redemocratization' not only by the 
replacement of the elected government, but also as a result of the economic 
liberalisation policy (Sayan,1992: 29-34). 
GOle, similarly to Heper, whose ideas have been mentioned above, celebrates the 
'autonomization' of civil society after the coup in the 1980s: "the liberal discourse, 
which was rediscovered and became fashionable after 1983, developed 
simultaneously with market economy" (GOle, 1994:217-218). 
"Women, ecologists, veiled students, and homosexuals and transsexuals appeared on 
the political scene and brought to the agenda themes such as environmental 
protection, female identity, and individual freedom .... ". 
GOle also notes 'the development of liberal, Muslim and leftist movements' in the 
autonomised civil society ofpost-1983 (Gale, 1994:215). 
First of all, there are many omissions from this list. The Kurds, as the largest ethnic 
group of Turkey, is one of these. Their absence prevents us making such optimistic 
evaluations. 
GOle's claim that the leftist movements developed is very inappropriate after the 
1980 coup which paralysed the left. In fact, all the elements mentioned here should 
56 
CHAPTER 3 CAPITALISM STATE AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 
be put in context and understood within that environment rather than putting them 
in a list in order to demonstrate the evidence for the civil society. 
Religion in Turkey can not be understood only as 'the return of the repressed,34 
(Robins, 1996: 72) from Kemalist secularism, which was seen at the beginning of 
this chapter. Islam was used by the 1980 military as the Turkish-Islamic synthesis 
which had been created by a group of intellectuals in the 1970s (Birtek et al., 
1993:195-196) in order to 'create a secure ground for the liberal restructuring of 
economic life' (Keyman, 1995:111-112), more particularly, as an antidote to the 
left. This is not to argue that all Islamic movements are the outcome of that, nor is 
it to ignore the differences in islamic movements. However, the impact of the coup 
on the development of Islam should not be underestimated. Currently the situation 
is changing with differing hegemonic struggles. In the 1980s the domestic market 
was opened up to Islamic capital (Birtek et al.1993: 197). Nevertheless, recently, 
the development of Islam, the rising Welfare Party and the growing Islamic capital 
have been seen as threats to the secular Kemalist establishment. The party was 
closed down, the military expressed worries about the Islamic capital ... etc. 
Although Islam was supported as an antidote to the anti-system elements after the 
coup, it is regarded as being 'dangerous' for the system at the moment. This issue 
is very broad and complex, and is beyond the scope of the present section. The 
main emphasis here is that the context should be considered and examined when 
the autonomy or the simultaneity of the differences are declared. In addition, it 
should be considered that the elements of the civil society are also tools for the 
dominant block to maintain their hegemony against the existing 'enemy' in 
differing conditions. This is important not only to explain Islam, but the Islamic 
sect Alawites as well. It is true that there is an Alawite identity which is protected, 
changed and re-shaped according to the differing conditions by Alawites 
themselves. This identity was visible in the 1980s. However, at the same time, it is 
true that Alawite culture as a moderate and more secular one is emphasised against 
34 His view of the situation as 'the return of the repressed' is the outcome of his challenge against some West-
centric simplifications of Turkey, for example as expressed with 'the rise of Islamic fundamentalism'. 
Emphasising the changes in society itself. on the other hand, has the danger of narrowing the complexity of 
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the radical Islam as a guarantee of secularism by Kemalists or as the guaranteed 
voter for the social democrat parties. 
The issue of prime importance is that there has been no policy change for the 
benefit of Alawites, such as their representation in the public religious bodies or 
the use of the state budget for the needs of Alawite communities. Despite the claim 
that the Alawite culture has appeared, Sunni Islam is still the one which is taught in 
schools, Sunni festivals are celebrated on public TV, mosques for Sunni Muslims 
are built with the taxes from all citizens. 
When all the groups in Gole's list are examined, it is clear that not only Alawites, 
but also the others have brought no policy change. Besides that, homosexuals and 
transsexuals are still subject to ongoing police violence and abuse. Ecologists are 
welcomed as long as they do not go beyond certain limits and become a potential 
to harm economic interests. Women's marches or demonstrations are stopped 
when they are considered to be a threat whereas more Kemalist dominated 
women's movements are encouraged to protect the system against enemies such as 
the Islamists. This is not meant to deny their struggles, or the potential for change, 
but to draw attention to the need to be aware of the strong state, and of the 
strategies of the dominant block before they are evaluated as the sign of the active 
civil society. If we do not do this, we may end up celebrating the appearance of 
these different social and political groups and their manipulation by the dominant 
groups for their own interests, rather than changes brought about for their benefit. 
6. Liberalism and Democracy in the 1990s: Privatization and 
European Integration 
The Ozal government introduced some measures, as mentioned above, to reduce 
inflation, but in the end this was a failure, and Ozal's popularity decreased, in a 
very similar way to Thatcher'S (TUnay,1993: 23-24). 
The "Grand Coalition" of the right and the left, the TPP (True Path Party) and the 
SDP (Social Democratic Populist Party) replaced the MP (Motherland Party) in 
issues again. of separating the society and the state from each other and of neglecting their interaction and 
articulation. 
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November, 1991. The coalition leaders, Siileyman Demirel (now President) and 
Erdal tnilnil emphasised civil rights and liberties in the different areas of life. They 
went to the South-eastern Anatolia Region and declared that the Kurdish reality 
was recognised. Some democratic changes related to Kurdish rights were expected, 
but did not happen. On the contrary, the role of the SDP in the coalition decreased. 
This situation continued until Demirel became the President in 1991. Then, Tansu 
~i11er became the party leader in 1993 and continued the coalition with the leader 
of the SDP, Murat Karayal9tn, with a stronger impact from the TPP. The SDP was 
unable to bring to fruition its democratising vision due to the party's subordinated 
position in the coalition. Just how democratising was the SDP's vision is debatable. 
The leftism of the SDP is not a certainty either, although there is no doubt about its 
Kemalism. It is true that the social democrat or labour parties in general are 
undergoing a transformation, but in the Turkish case there is an additional element 
to explain: social democracy has not developed from the working class and the 
unions, but more from Kemalism with the corporatist tendencies in Turkey (Beige, 
1989:136-137) 35. 
The 1980s formulation of a strong state in politics and a weak state in economics 
was sustained with the coalition of the TPP and the SDP. Since Tansu ~iller had an 
impact with her stronger position, the remainder of this section will focus on her 
understanding of economics and politics, and the two key issues of the I 990s, 
privatization and European integration, will be examined. 
If the 1980s are the period that will be remembered for Turgut Ozal, the 1990s will 
be mainly the period of Tansu ~iller, the leader of the TPP (True Path Party, DYP). 
Both, Ozal and ~iller started their political life with Demirel's Justice Party (which 
was the extension of the Democrat Party and later named as the True Path Party). 
Both of them completed their higher education in the USA. Both were proud of 
their close relationships with the USA and its President. Their economic policies, 
which were outward looking and based on export promotion, were supported by 
3S According to 6gnn, this coalition showed the sameness of the historical and cultural essence of the parties. 
We can not talk about left or right Kemalisms since 1980, Kemalism is now monistic (6gnn,199S: 
102,108-109). 
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the USA. The dependency on the USA was not an issue for either of them. The 
economy was considered in a technical sense in Ozal's government, as something 
which has its own laws, and was unrelated to issues like welfare, egalitarianism, 
income distribution or poverty. Similar to Thatcher, Ozal emphasised that they 
only obeyed the dictates of economics (Tiinay, 1993:22-23). 
t;i11er's discourse was similar despite the balanced discourse of 'father' state and 
free market in the TPP tradition embodied by SUleyman Demirel. As Sakalhoglu 
also argues, because of her strong commitment to the free market, and to an anti 
populist and anti-welfare platform, t;i11er resembled Ozal more than Demirel 
(Sakalhoglu, 1996:156). 
Ozal was more technical, he explained the economic situation with numbers and 
statistics. t;i11er's approach was very different from this in the way she addressed 
the people about the economy with her nationalist and populist discourse 36, 
Both Ozal and t;i11er drew an ideal future, but in order to achieve this future, all 
citizens had to be patient and make sacrifices. Similar to Ozal's Stabilization 
Programme of 24 January, 1980, the application of which was made possible later 
with the military coup, t;iI1er applied the Stabilization Programme of 5 April, 
1995, which was again determined by the IMF. Both reinforced the privileged 
minority at the expense of the majority. Both were opposed to trade unions. t;iI1er 
created a division between workers and government employees by claiming that 
since the workers unions' demands were too high, the government could not pay a 
sufficiently high salary to government employees for whom unionisation has 
always been hampered. 
t;i11er was sympathetic to the military. She also increasingly used nationalist and 
religious elements like 'patriotism', 'flag', 'blood' and 'sacrifice', 'Allah' and 
'being a Muslim' (Sakalhoglu, 1996:152-3), especially when she gave speeches 
against 'terrorism'. 
36 «;i11cr: 'In the past our ancestors shed their blood, now we expect the same patriotism from our citizens in a 
different way ... This is a social war ... Patriotism is not just shown on the battlefield .. We have to do the 
same in the economy' (Sakalhoglu, 1996:154), 
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Sakalhoglu's comment on what is missing in <;i1ler's liberalisation experiment in 
the 19905 is very similar to that which was missing from the one in the 1980s. In 
the 1990s, again: 
..... there is an absence of a 'civil philosophy' for a limited state; no western -type 
liberal democracy; and a lack of fundamental concern for the rule of law, democratic 
legitimacy, human freedom with dignity and civil associations". (Sakalhoglu, 1996: 
156) 
In the remainder of the chapter, two key issues of the 19905, privatization and 
European integration, will be examined. 
6.1. Privatization 
As stated before, privatization was, for the fIrst time in Turkish history, brought to 
the agenda by the DP government, but as an issue it remained at the level of 
discourse. It was an overwhelming issue in the MP government of the 1980s when 
it began to be applied and was later fully applied within a new legal arrangement 
with the TPP-SDP government in the 1990s. 
Kazgan states that privatization was originally a way of converting some of the 
foreign debt with a debt/equity swap operation, but it remained even after Turkey 
arrived at a point of starting to pay the debts back regularly. Privatization then was 
used to reduce fIscal defIcits and inflationary pressures (Kazgan,1993:91-92). 
Boratav argues that there are two reasons for the tendency towards privatization in 
Turkey. Firstly, it can be understood as the outcome of the MP government's 
efforts to be in harmony with international capital. Secondly, the Turkish 
bourgeoisie realised that the problems of the fInancial burden would be solved with 
the increases in the taxes on capital if they were not solved through privatization. 
While the bourgeoisie were not enthusiastic supporters in the 1980s37• Boratav 
37 Cni~ explains the initial reaction of business groups against privatization as being a result of the Ozal 
government's emphasis of foreign capital. This led business groups to feel that they were being excluded 
from privatization or they thought that they would make a better deal without foreign capital (l>nij, 
1991a:250). 
61 
CHAPTER 3 CAPITALISM STATE AND DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY 
argues, they supported militantly in the 1990s because of their fear of tax reforms 
(Boratav et al., 1993:268-269). 
The international finance organisations, the World Bank and the IMF, played 
important roles in privatization by including it in the stabilization measures which 
were prepared as a response to the credit demand (Kepenek,1993:149). The 
institution responsible for privatization, the DPT (State Central Planning), 
appointed the Morgan Bank to prepare a master plan for privatization, in 1986. The 
report emphasised the need for foreign investors rather than domestic ones by 
stating that they would be the 'principal participants in the privatisation process'. 
Foreign investment was evaluated positively in terms of 'managerial and technical 
know-how' and 'enhancing the competitiveness' (Oni~, 1991a:165-166). 
The Board of The Mass Housing and Public Participation Fund replaced the State 
Planning Organisation in 1984 in order to 'allow the central government to bypass 
both the traditional bureaucracy and the Parliament and to enhance its own 
autonomy'. This bypassing was effected by empowering the Public Participation 
Fund through directing the extra -budgetary funds which were established after 
1983. Thus, expenditures could be directed into specific uses by the government 
without parliamentary approval (Oni~, 1991a:166-167). In 1988, the Mass Housing 
and Public Participation Agency, an agency under the Prime Ministry, was created 
by an Act of Parliament (ilkin,1994:79). After the law was passed in November, 
1994, this body was transformed into an institution called the Privatization 
Administration, chaired by the Prime Minister38 
The objectives of privatization have always shifted. In the beginning, the main 
emphasis was 'on the sale to the general public', then 'the development of a free 
market economy and increased efficiency' became dominant, and finally 'to 
alleviate public sector deficits' (ilkin, 1994:85). 
A speech made by Ozal in 1986 is an example of the early 'popular capitalism' 
discourse: 
38 For the legal aspects of privatization in Turkey see Bulent Serim, Anayasa ve Anayasa Mahkemesi 
Kararlari Isiginda Ozellestirme. Izgi: Ankara. 1996 
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'In the model we adopt. the worker is the owner of the company; he also shares in the 
profits ... Thus the company would operate more efficiently, and both the enterprise 
and employees would benefit from it. .. Another advantage of this practice is that it 
would spread the ownership of capital to wide segments of society, and in the process 
would enhance general welfare ... the general public's participation in ownership will 
strengthen democracy; this is econontic democracy; it will be the greatest economic 
reform in Turkey' (quoted from Ilkin,1994: 80-81). 
In the 1990s, Tansu yiller used the discourse of popular capitalism with the words 
of 'extending capital' to the masses. She also claimed that privatization would 'end 
the state's being a burden on people', 'transform the big losses to profits,39. She 
emphasised inappropriately many times that with privatization 'the last socialist 
country in the region', Turkey, will end its socialism. "Not only as an economic 
reform, but also as a political reform". Privatization, according to yiller, would 
lead to power passing from 'state to public,40. 
Privatization was put in the sixth five year plan (1990-94), as "a key instrument in 
reforming the economy". The primary aims of privatizing the SEEs in the plan 
were to increase effectiveness and to disperse ownership (Shaker, 1995: 34). 
6ni~ argues that the result of the liberalisation and privatization 'is not a retreat of 
the state, but rather its reorganisation or reconstitution' (6ni~, 1991a: 167). In a 
similar way, Shaker describes it as 'a reordering and reorganisation of the role of 
the state in public sector' (Shaker, 1995: 41). Large public sector and rent seeking 
behaviour remained as they were before the 1980s (Shaker, 1995: 41), and 
privatization caused a reduction in employment. These increased the already 
existing problems of unemployment, high inflation and the unequal distribution of 
income. (Shaker, 1995:63). 
The 1990s saw an intensification of the process of privatization with the passing of 
the privatization law41 and the approaching membership of the Customs Union and 
39 Sabah, 3.2.1995. 
40 Milliyet, 27. 11. 1994. 
41 For an evaluation of the new law on the 27th November 1994, see Fikret $enses, "Ozellestirme Yasasi 
Isiginda Ozellestirme, Kamu Girisimciligi ve Sanayilesme", Birikim, vo1.70, February 1995, p.28-36. For 
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the subsequent discussions about membership of the European Union. <;:iller was 
easily able to invite foreign capital to buy SEEs by giving an increased emphasis to 
the integration with Europe, and it did not bring as much reaction as it had done 
previously. 
I argue that integration with Europe and the Customs Union Agreement were the 
most influential discursive elements in the 1990s privatization discourse. The fact 
that the Customs Union Agreement was soon to be signed contributed to 
establishing the discourse, as the Customs Union agreement was regarded as the 
first vital step on the road to integration with Europe through gaining membership 
of the EU 42. It is not an accident considering the fact that the eventual target of the 
official Kemalist ideology is Westernisation. Thus, the way to convince people on 
the debatable issue of privatization was to use familiar and accepted elements, such 
as being Westernised. 
<;:iller's discourse, which considered privatization as a necessary step for the 
Customs Union and European integration,43 was taken up by the officers 
responsible for the privatization administrative bodies and ministers44, some major 
business groups4S. academics46. and as we can see later, the mainstream media. 
the description and evaluation of this law see IjID <;elebi. Yeni Bir Duzen Anlayisi. Ozellestirme.lstanbul. 
Milliyet. 1995. p.65·91. For the earlier legal arrangements see also Yakup Kepenek. Gelisimi. Sorunlari ve 
Ozellestirilmeleriyle TIlrkiye'de Kamu Iktisadi Tesebbusleri. Istanbul. Gercek. 1993. 2nd ed. p.15B.159. 
42 It should be mentioned here that the EU has a neutral stance on ownership, and accepts the current situation 
which is a mix of state and private sector ownership in differing levels in different countries across Europe 
(parker. 199B: 20). 
43 She described her mission mainly as privatization and the formation of Customs Union. and put these as the 
condition of the existence of the coalition government (Sabah. lB. 9.1994) by stating that these two had to 
be realised by the end ofl995 (Sabah. 29.10.1994. Miliyet. 27.11.1994). Privatization was considered as a 
preparation for Customs Union (Sabah. 3.2.1995) which would mean 'enlightment' and a 'contemporary 
world' according to her (Humyet. 22.5.1995). 
44 see HUmyet. 2B.4.1995. and 13.3.1995. also see ijID <;elebi. Yeni Bir Duzen Anlayisi Ozellestirme. 
Milliyet pub .• Istanbul. 1995. 2.ed .• p.52 
45 "Ifthis bill is enacted by the Parliament and applied properly. our country will get out of difficulties. But. if 
we can not succeed. then neither can we enter the Customs Union, or the European Union which we will 
have to enter in the near future" head of Adana Trade Organization Had Sabancl. Zarnan. 10.11.1994. It 
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6.2. To Be Part of Europe 
As seen above, the target of the country as determined by Kemalism is 
westernisation. Westernisation and development are 'inseparable from one 
another' because "for nearly a century, 'Westem-ness' has served both as a frame 
of reference and also as an image of future for generations of the Turkish elite, 
coupled and identified with progress and development" (Dncti, 1993:258). 
As explained before, Turkey has linked itself with the Western world more since 
the 1950s. The 'Truman Doctrine' and the subsequent economic and military 
alliances intensified this process. After the 'Truman Doctrine' (1947) the earlier 
$100 million of military 'aid' to Turkey in 1948 reached an annual total of $687 
million in 1952. NATO (1952) and Cento (1955) memberships were important in 
reinforcing Turkey's ties with the US (Berberoglu, 1981: 278). 
President Johnson's letter on 5 June, 1964 shows that this tie reached a state of 
Turkish dependency on the USA: 
"NATO allies have not had chance to consider whether they have an obligation to 
protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet 
Intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO 
allies"(Steinbach. 1994: 104). 
According to calculations made for the period between the mid-1980s and mid-
1990s, Turkey is the third largest recipient of American military assistance, 
amounting to $7.8 billion. and the United States' fifth largest client for arms 
purchases, almost $7 billion (Roulaeu, 1996: 83). As an extension of this close 
military relationship, Turkey allowed the USA to make 'use of its territory for 
military/ strategic purposes' (Berberoglu, 1981 :278) even when it is, as seen during 
the Gulf war, at the expense of Turkey's own economic interests. 
According to Berberoglu, the fact that the influence and control of Europe over 
Turkey was weakened during and after the war was also effective for the US 
should be mentioned here that the Customs Union and integration with Europe are not considered good for 
the rival business group Ko,. 
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penetration and control of Turkey (Berberoglu, 1981:278). The military coups have 
been effective in weakening relationship with Europe, since Europe, in contrast to 
the USA, emphasises human rights (Eralp, 1990:248). 
Despite this, Turkey's intention is to integrate with Europe and become a full 
member of the European Union. Europe is an issue upon which the majority of 
people in Turkey, including the military, agree. The Prime Minister of the military 
regime, Biilent Ulusu said in 1980, that ties with NATO and its member countries, 
particularly the United States, would be expanded, as well as the attainment of 
Turkey's aim of 'taking its place in the European Community' (Kushner, 1984: 
236). 
There have been many agreements and protocols with the Community since 1960. 
In 1963, an Association Agreement was signed which started a relationship with 
Europe. The decision following Turkey's application for membership on 14 May, 
1987, was to postpone the review of Turkey's membership until at least 1993 
(Kushner, 1994: 685). In November, 1992, Turkey joined the European Union as 
an associate member (Shaker,1995: 66), but is still striving for full membership 47 
It would seem that Turkish membership of the EU would result in an economic 
advantage for the other EU countries (Denton, 1990: 195-196). It would mean that 
foreign investments could expand without any restrictions and capture a larger 
share of the local market; there would also be direct access to abundant cheap 
labour, oil and other raw materials (Berberoglu,1981:283-4). The geographical 
strategical place of Turkey in terms of being 'between Europe and Asia' 
(Spencer,1993) is also considered as an element which increases the importance of 
Turkey. According to Cremasco, Turkey has a 'barrier function' geographically 
between Russia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East: 'European security 
requirements cannot, in fact, be completely and credibly satisfied without Turkey's 
participation and contribution ... "(Cremasco, 1990: 137). 
46 ..... privatization and Customs Unions actually are the two sides of a coin" Eser Karakas. "Ozellestinnede 
Nicin Zorlaniyoruzr'. TOrkiye'de Ozellestirme, Arzu Imren (ed), Alfa, Istanbul, 1996, p.59 (p.59-64). 
47 For the whole story of Turkey's applications to be full member of EU see Ilhan Tekeli and Selim l!kin, 
TUrkiye ve Avrupa Toplulugu, Umit, Ankara. 1993 
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Despite the advantages the EU could accrue, it is also argued that, Turkey's 
membership of the EU is seen as being rather difficult: firstly because of the 
economic differences such as low GDP per capita, unemployment, rapidly 
increasing population (Denton, 1990: 198-200), differences between the levels of 
industrialisation, economic development, and inflation (6ni~, 1995:53-54). In 
addition, the free movement of Turkish workers is seen as a problem. In the case of 
Germany, it is argued that it has 'reached its absorption capacity limit as far as 
foreiguers are concerned' (Ergun, 1990:193). This is not at all surprising since 
globalization is mainly realised on the level of business interests for multi-national 
companies whereas globalization of labour creates a 'problem'. This simple fact 
should bring about a discussion on the genuineness of liberalism and freedom in 
the developed countries. 
Furthermore, many Europeans believe that Turks do not 'share European culture 
and would not fit into the Community' and 'cultural differences between Europe 
and Turkey are such that they would constitute an insurmountable obstacle for 
Turkey's accession to the Community' (Evin, 1990:31). Evin states that cultural 
uniformity can not be the criterion as there are already differences between EU 
countries. However, it is not that simple, culture here means religion, and Islam 
specifically. As Heper mentions, Europeans "worry about the 'compatibility' of 
Muslim 'values, attitudes and behaviour patterns" with the West48 (Heper, 1993: 
4). Another element which obstructs Turkey's full membership is human rights 
violations in Turkey (Ba11ar et aI., 1993:37).49 
48 For a critical evaluation of 'the closure of European culture'. see Kevin Robins, "Interrupting Identities: 
Turkey/Europe", (eds.) Stuart Hall. Paul de Gay, Questions of Cultural Identity, Sage, 1996, pp. 61·86. For 
a study which traces 'the other' of Europe, 'the Turk', in the Ottoman Empire period, see Iver B. 
Neumann, Jennifer M, Welsh, "The Other in European Self· Definition: An Addendum to the Literature on 
International Society", Review ofInternational Studies, v01.17, no.4, 1991, p. 327·348 
49 Military government and Ozal government evaluated the reports of EU on human rights violations as 
'interference in sovereign country's internal affairs' in the 1980s (Ballar et al. 1993:32), Although it is a 
reaction that can be seen in the 1990s as well, there is a moderation in the reactions. Even, there are 
explanations made by politicians and business groups in the direction of democratisation in order to end 
the obstacle for the integration with Europe. 
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It has been argued that the economic changes of the 1980s prepared Turkey for EU 
membership, In that sense, the StabiIisation Programme is regarded as the 
minimum requirement for participating in the EU in terms of bringing Turkey'S 
economic policies closer to those of the EU (Korner et.al, 1990, Balkrr, 1993: 1 0 1, 
Kazgan, 1993:93), In fact, OZal himself declared that the motives of the 1980s 
liberal economic reforms were to adapt to Europe as weII as being a solution for 
inflation and the payment crisis (Miiftiiler, 1995: 85-93), As mentioned previously, 
the reforms were not imposed by the EU, and Miiftiiler is aware of that. However, 
she insists that 'these reforms enabled Turkish governments to pursue their desire 
to be accepted as the13th member of the EU and to prepare for the customs union', 
Thus, the EU is seen a motive for the liberalisation policies which include import 
liberalisation (Miiftiiler, 1995: 92_93),50 
Miiftiiler also evaluates the 5 April, 1994 StabiIisation Programme, which included 
privatisation of the SEEs for the purpose of European integration, According to 
her, Turkey had to make readjustments in its economy firstly in order to survive in 
the post 1992 European economic order, and secondly to adjust to the customs 
union and to fuII membership in the EU 51 (Miiftiiler, 1995:97), 
Shaker similarly makes a parallel between liberalization, privatization and 
European integration and argues that these are appropriate strategies for the 
economic development of Turkey since she expects to become a member of the 
European Community, He considers free market economy and trade liberalisation, 
and more specifically, privatization as a necessity for the forthcoming Customs 
50 Turkey's adoption of value added tax ('I AT) is evaluated in this perspective as the EC's impact on Turkish 
economic policies. MilftUler states: "According to Ozal. this was a measure taken in reference to the EC 
since the Turkish VAT legislation was prepared with respect to the laws and practice of the EC. even 
though Turkey was not a full member"(MUftiiler, p.92-93). 
51 For 6ni~. the changes in the fonner Soviet Union and Eastern Europe provide 'important opportunities' for 
Turkey in tenns of establishing a relationship with Central Asian republics on the base of trade expansion. 
He also argues that membership of the European Union is 'neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for 
achieving rapid economic development'(p.48). Furthennore. he argues that 'expanding relations in several 
directions through loose agreements with several "clubs" or regional arrangements is probably more 
conducive to Turkey's economic interest than a strategy dictated by the interests of the larger community" 
(Oni~ 1995: 56-57) 
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Union agreement. He states that, 'privatization in this context means self-imposed 
reforms and not a set of deregulations or a prescription from any of the multilateral 
organisations'(Shaker, 1995: 66). 
The latest development in EU-Turkish relations in the 1990s is the Customs Union 
agreement, which was signed on 6 March, 1995. This signing was presented as the 
success of Tansu <;iller, and used to increase her prestige before the elections in 
December, 1995, against the rising 'Islamist' Welfare Party. <;iller herself used the 
threat of Islam, and the West symphatised with that. The agreement signed against 
the threat of Islam as a guarantee of a secular country in Europe, was presented as 
a success story by the press as if it were full integration with Europe. Even the 
cautious described it as an important step on the path towards EU membership. 
It is argued that the mentality of being part of an agreement with the Customs 
Union is of vital importance for trade, because trade between the members of the 
union will grow; whereas there will be a decrease in trade between the members of 
the union and non members (MUftiiler, 1995: 87). Nevertheless, the advantages of 
the Customs Union for Turkey are considered 'rather slim and uncertain' by some 
(Rouleau, 1996:82). It may have a widening effect on Turkey'S trade deficit. In 
fact, according to a calculation made in 1995, 'European exports to Turkey were 
nearly 50 per cent higher than imports from Turkey' (Roulaeu, 1996: 81-82). 
According to Manisah, the decision to sign the Customs Union Agreement without 
a guarantee of full membership of the EU was wrong. Turkey's status in the 
Customs Union as the only country which is not the member of the EU is unlike 
the other countries, since Turkey can not participate in the decision making bodies. 
According to Manisah, this leads to a situation where Turkey has to obey the 
decisions against its own national interests, and where Turkey's imports and 
foreign relations are prejudiced (Manisah,1996:51-58). It is argued that the 
Customs Union agreement will have a negative effect not only on 'national 
interests', but also on small and medium size companies, (Roulaeu, 1996: 82). 
Berberoglu suggests that possible EU membership in the future, would bring 
negative effects for small farmers, businesses and workers. It would worsen the 
country's balance of trade and payments, and increase foreign debt 
(Berberoglu, 1981: 283-4). 
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7. Conclusion 
This chapter examined the recent claim that 'liberalization in economy brings 
liberalisation in politics' by returning to the origin of this discourse, Kemalism and 
the DP period. It argued that this claim was strengthened in the 1980s after the 
liberal economic policies following the coup. This discourse has been traced in the 
1990s as privatization and European integration. 
Despite the claims, liberalisation in the economy does not bring, as a natural 
outcome, liberalisation in politics. Nor has it brought democracy for Turkey. The 
lack of democracy is explained with the particular position of the bourgeoisie in 
Turkey. It is true that the bourgeoisie was weak when the Republic was 
established, and it has been developed by the state. The bourgeoisie gained its 
power from the state. Thus, the bourgeoisie did not have the democratising mission 
that those in Western countries had, instead it acted as an obstacle (Boratav, 
1993: 149-150). Although in the West there were other democratising forces as 
mentioned in the second chapter. The idea of liberalism as a different experience in 
Turkey, is maintained by Keyder, who argues that the liberalism of the peripheral 
countries does not have the political extensions that it has in countries at the centre, 
such as the idea of citizens rights and freedoms (Keyder, 1993b:47-49). It is true 
that civil rights are considered as a threat to national unity and security, and to the 
state in Turkey (Keyder, 1993b: 139). However, Keyder's ideas can lead to an 
idealisation of liberalism in the centre countries. I would argue that the nature of 
liberalism itself, the view of the bourgeoisie as bringing freedom, and the limits of 
the rights and freedoms of the citizens in the centre countries, should be 
questioned. 
The detractors of the role of the state in economy failed to criticise political statism 
in Turkey. In contemporary Turkey, Kemalism still gives priority to economic 
development, empowering the nation state, and gives a secondary position to the 
ideals of democratization and individual freedom (Koker, 1990: 121). The strong 
state tradition in politics has been reinforced more by the military, and will not 
disappear with a reduction of the power of the state in the economy. The efforts to 
reduce statism may seem contradictory to Kemalism when the principle of statism 
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is recalled. However, in the end, it is not contradictory to the whole structure of 
Kemalism, since Kemalism is mainly aimed at developing Turkey, like the 
Westem countries, in the direction of capitalism and away from the Ottoman 
Empire or Islam. In contemporary Turkey, rather than state dominating through the 
state economic enterprises, it is intended that market should become dominant in 
economy. 
The business groups recently started to advocate democracy, and human rights. 
TOsiAD, mentioned above conceming the advertisement that complained about 
wages and the militancy of the workers before the 1980 coup, announced a 
'democracy' project including advice on the revision of the electoral system, 
civilisation, the Kurdish issue and human rights. TOsiAD explained the reason for 
preparing this: 'Since the things reached the point that if we do not make any 
improvement to human rights, we will lose both our social and commercial 
relationship with Europe. It would be awful for Turkey to lose such a market'. 52 As 
seen here, the discourse of political liberalism in Turkey is being used mostly by 
politicians and businessmen when the issue is European integration, namely 
articulation with global capitalism. It would be a mistake to rely on this 
democratization discourse for extending citizens' rights, since it is not genuine, is 
unclear and it may not persist. 
European integration has been used as a strategic discursive tool in order to 
implement privatization which would be objected to by many people. Privatization 
has been advocated as the necessary condition for becoming a part of Europe. 
Since there has been an enormous consensus about EU membership at a 
parliamentary level, excluding a small minority of Islamic radicals (6ni~, 
1995:53), and in the military, this discourse has been very effective. Also, 
integration with Europe was already a very consistent theme with Kemalism. 
European integration has been a hegemonic tool to unite people in the path of the 
development of capitalism in Turkey in harmony with the old discourses such as 
populism, Turkish-Islam synthesis, and secularism. EU membership is a new target 
for the people who do not have hopes that the current system will bring about 
52 Milliyet.20.1.1997 
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positive changes in their lives, thus enabling them to accept the current situation so 
that they can reach to the 'bright future'. It may also soften the tensions of cultural 
identities by providing an extra or upper identity as Europeanness since 
Turkishness is not working to unite the different people. It is the guarantee of the 
negation of what Turkey should not be, such as statist, socialist or Islamist. The 
persistence of this discourse depends on the balances of local capital. In another 
words, continuity of this discourse will be affected by the differing interests of the 
business groups in Turkey. Also, it depends on the responses given by the EU in 
terms of maintaining the possibility of full membership. Neither economic 
liberalisation and privatisation of the SEEs, nor the ideal of European integration 
mean that Turkey is democratising. However, these are considered to be the parts 
of the same process, as will be seen in detail in the analysis of the Turkish press in 
the later chapters. 
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PARTll 
CHAPTER FOUR 
The Media in Modern Turkey 
The media were used in establishing and then modernizing the Republic of Turkey 
by the Kemalist elite. Mustafa Kemal Atatiirk, the founder of the Republic of 
Turkey, published the newspaper Hakimiyet-i MiIliye and established a news 
agency called Anadolu Ajansl in 1920. These media were used in the independence 
movement against the Empire and occupier states through the control of the news 
networks. After the establishment of the Republic, the media worked for 
modernization and for the establishment of the Kemalist ideology by disseminating 
Western values and ways of life (Karpat, 1964:282, Oktay, 1987: 46, Heper et.al., 
1997: 109-110). Radio, which commenced in 1927, had a very important function 
in the process of modernization and nationalist doctrination. Radio broadcasts not 
only spread the political principles of the new regime, but also encouraged 
modernization in general through cultural expression in music, drama and other 
forms53 (Karpat, 1964:275). 
After 1922, the minority press, such as Armenian and Greek, and Turkish 
newspapers, which were against the Republic or were supporters of the Caliphate 
and socialism, disappeared. Some opponents were sent into exile abroad, some 
were imprisoned (Kologlu, 1994: 61-65). Until 1945, the press was controlled by 
the one party government, the RPP (Republican People's Party) and became its 
instrument as a 'government-sponsored organization' (Karpat, 1964:272). One 
striking feature of this period is that some of the newspaper owners were members 
53 In the mid 19305 Turkish music was banned on the radio. The ban lasted almost two years. At the same 
time education on classical Turkish music was also banned. 6zbek suggests that since the tradition was 
considered as backward in accordance with the ideology of modernization, the new Republic wanted to 
disassociate itself from the Ottoman culture completely. She argues that this ban was an indicator of the 
preference of a new path which is based on Western (Ozbek. 1991:146). 
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of the parliament, including Yunus Nadi, the owner of Cumhuriyet54• They were 
used by the government to legitimise the one-party regime with the public 
(Giivenir, 1991: 69-70). There were 40 journalists, media owners or senior 
columnists who worked as members of parliament in different periods until the 
death of Atatiirk. After Atatiirk, the largest number of members of the parliament 
was related to the military, and then journalism until 1957 (Kocab~oglu, 1984:62). 
Besides this close relationship between the press and the government, there were 
some mechanisms which made the press dependent on the government such as the 
distribution of official advertisements and paper supply. At that time, there was a 
fall in circulation as a result of the adaptation to the Latin alphabet from Arabic in 
1928. It is argued that this led the government to help the press financially 
(Kocab~oglu, 1984:47, Kologlu, 1994: 61-65). However, after a few years, the 
negative effect of the change of alphabet on press circulation diminished, and the 
circulation rose again to a large extent (Kocab~oglu, 1984:48). 
The newspapers started to gain a 'mass' character after the multi-party system, by 
increasing their circulation (Karpat, 1964: 277). They became popular in the 1950s 
and 1960s. This was compatible with the economic and cultural anticipation of the 
people in a 'free' environment (Oktay, 1987:49-51). The first examples of this 
period are: Hiirriyet, which was established by the Simavi fami1y55 in 1948, and 
Milliyet, which was established by the Karacan family 56 in 1950. 
54 Yunus Nadi, MP and businessman. established Cumhuriyet in 1924 to struggle against the Caliphate 
supporters and Republic enemies (Cumhuriyet means Republic in Turkish). Kemalism, especially with the 
principle of secularism, gives Cumhuriyet its character (for the details on Cumhuriyet see Karaca, 1994). 
55 The HOrriyet was founded by Sedat Simavi in 1948, and after his death in 1953, it was continued by Haldun 
Simavi. In 1968 he sold his shares to his brother and left because of a disagreement. He then established 
GUnaydm. In 1988 he sold GUnaydm to Asil Nadir. His brother Erol Simavi sold HOrriyet to the Dogan 
group on 9 August 1994.Until then, it was the biggest newspaper, but in 1994, Sabah had the greatest 
circulation, and HUrriyet became the second largest (Sabah, 10.8.1994. ZincirIaran, 1994). 
S6 After the death of the founder of Milliyet. Ali Naci Karacan, the new owner, Ercument Karacan appointed 
Abdi Ipekci to write the editorials from 1957. Abdi Ipekci was known for ideas which advocated the 
independency of the editorial board from the ownership mechanisms. In an editorial dated 6.4.1964 he 
gave the list of the principles of Milliyet: AtatUrkist, nationalist, communitarian, independent, and a belief 
in the freedom of religion, democracy and mixed economy (Karaca. 1995: \02). After the murder of Abdi 
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In the beginning, the new DP (Democratic Party) government seemed democratic. 
It enacted a new press law which extended the limits of press freedom. However, 
the freedom and optimistic environment did not last long. Although it ended the 
one-party rule of the RPP, the 1950-1960 period of the DP was not so different 
from the period of the RPP in terms of democracy. Since the government was not 
very successful in economic policy, discontents arose, as seen in the earlier chapter 
on Turkey. The DP government did not tolerate the existence of criticism. Thus, 
new legal arrangements were brought in, in order to restrict press freedom. 
Furthermore, a committee of inquiry was authorised to suppress publications and 
arrest journalists who were 'dangerous to national security' (Karpat, 1964:280). 
During the 1955-1960 period, 867 journalists were imprisoned. Both parties, the 
RPP and the DP used radio and news agencies as tools of their parties during their 
rule. Both of them also established economic control. In addition to legal pressures, 
the operation of an oppositional press was inhibited through the distribution of 
official advertisements. Some newspapers were rewarded with official 
advertisements57 while others were punished (Kologlu, 1994: 69-70, Oktay, 1987: 
49-51, Tun~ay, 1995: 179). 
As explained in an earlier chapter, the DP government ended with the military 
coup on 27 May, 1960. Kologlu argues that the dictatorial pressures of the DP on 
the press and the DP's attitudes towards religion were not in accordance with the 
principle of secularism in Kemalisrn and so played important roles in leading the 
press to sympathise with the military. In fact, after the 1960 military coup, the 
MBK (National Unity Committee) members declared that they were influenced by 
the ideas in the press (Kologlu, 1994: 77-79). In the editorial dated 28 May, 1960, 
one day after the military coup, Nadir Nadi, the owner of Curnhuriyet and an ex-
MP, welcomed the army by criticising the corrupted multi-party democratic 
Ipekci. Ali Gevgilili. and later Altan Oymen wrote the editorials. In October 1980 Aydm Dogan became 
the owner. in June 1981 the name of Ercumen Karacan disappeared from the newspaper and Aydm Dogan 
became the sole owner (Karaca, 1995: 236·240). 
57 The official advertisements started to be distributed by the Press Advertisement Institution (Basin Han 
Kurumu) after the 27 .05. 1960 (see Topuz, 1996:122·123 for the details). At least, some criteria such as 
circulation. were considered in the distribution of the official advertisements, although it may not be 
maintained as the main criterion in practice. 
75 
CHAPTER 4 THE MEDIA IN MODERN TURKEY 
system. He described the army as the brave army which had an extraordinary 
responsibility to prevent the fratricidal quarrel which was going to explode 
(Kahraman, 1996: 82-83). 
It is quite interesting that similar words were used by the press for the 1980 
military coup. On the 14 September, 1980, two days after the military coup, the 
editorial in MiIIiyet was entitled 'the success of 12 September is a requirement' 
(Karaca, 1995: 236-240). During the 1980s military government, the press was 
given directives by the military officers on how to write the news. The control 
continued using various methods such as legal restrictions, written or oral requests 
and personal meetings. The self-censorship of the press was also a much greater 
issue. On the fIrst anniversary of the military coup, there were headlines which 
described the environment as peaceful and happy days of unity, and which thanked 
the army because of their liberation of the state (Tartanoglu, 1994: 124-126). 
1. The Changing Media Scene in the 1990s 
In the 1990s, some important changes have been witnessed in the media scene. The 
biggest change is the end of the state monopoly of TRT (Turkish Radio-
Television). TRT started television broadcasting in 1968. The state control ofTRT 
broadcasts has always been an issue, with the government applying a variety of 
control mechanisms. After autonomy ended with a legal change following the 
military intervention in 1971, TRT became more open to government intervention. 
The council of ministers appoints the director general and the members of the 
administrative council ofTRT (<;aph, 1994:135). Following the 1980 military coup 
TRT had its third director general, who was a former military officer (Aziz, 1993: 
55). 
The outcome of this central structure was not public service broadcasting but state 
broadcasting. The comment of Aksoy and Robins on TRT is true: "TRT has 
operated according to an authoritarian state broadcasting model rather than a public 
service model" (Aksoy et.al., 1997:81). It is 'the voice of the state', 'the medium 
for the official definition and interpretation of the central Kemalist bureaucracy' 
($ahin et aI., 1993: 32). 
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TRT news is an indicator of the statist structure, with the order of the news like a 
state protocol: firstly the prime minister, the government, then the main opposition 
party and then others. It is hard to say that the TRT news covers parliament 
properly; it is the government which takes the prime place in the news. This 
situation has been a source of criticism by the opposition parties in all periods. 
Thus, TRT is not even a voice of the state, but the voice of the government, in 
terms of the news (Aziz, 1993:59). 
The TRT monopoly was broken by using satellite from abroad in 1990. In contrast 
to many countries, it was not deregulation, rather " .. Turkey took a short cut 
through what might be called delegalization" (~ahin et.a!., 1993:34i8. 
~ahin and Aksoy explain this transformation by the technological change and 
globalization. The effects of which, according to them, are the expansion of the 
range of the ideological debate, dissolution of the official dogmas and the 
relativization of Turkish culture (~ahin et.a!., 1993: 34-35). 
It is certainly impossible to ignore the changes that the private media has brought 
about. The range of the ideological debate has been widened and, different forms 
of popular culture, which are not contained in TRT59, have been included in the 
58 The new legal arrangement which allows private TV stations was enacted in 1994, four years after 
commercial broadcasting started. The fact that the regulation was so late is worth considering. The close 
relationship between the media bosses and the government and the political parties might have played a 
role in this long delay. As Aksoy states, this four year period without rules was sufficient for the private 
media companies to gain time to settle down. The new Radio and TV Law brought a condition for the 
private channels which take national allowance from RTUK (High Board of Radio· Television). to extend 
their transmissions to at least 70% of the country. If it had taken place in 1990, the channels would have 
needed to develop their infrastructure. They were mainly Istanbul·based. In 1993, Starl could be watched 
in Istanbul by 86% of the population and by 55% in Turkey as a whole. The percentage for Show was 82% 
in Istanbul and 50% in Turkey as a whole(Aksoy, 1995:18). 
59 The effects of the private media on TRT have not led TRT to broaden its perspective, but instead 
'commercialising the public sector' (Murdock, 1990: 11) by 'making the success in the market place the 
major criterion for judging the perfonnance of all communications' (Murdock and Golding, 1989: 180). As 
the TRT director general states. TRT aims to increase its rating and advertising income in order to compete 
with the private channels. and plans to rent some hours of the TRT channels to companies. He mentions 
that TRT news should contain all ideas and parties equally, but adds that they have a responsibility to work 
on behalf of the state. The problems with TRT news, according to him, are that it is too long, and the 
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private media. In the news on private television channels audiences have seen 
crowds in the streets taking part in demonstrations. 
However, these comparisons with the state channel, TRT, should not lead us to 
ignore the following: 
-the limits, shortcomings and dangers of commercial, concentrated and 
conglomerated structures for democracy. 
-the private media's close relationship with the state, and the continuation of the 
statist tradition, and private media incorporating elements from the official 
ideology. 
In this chapter, ftrstly the structure of the private media industries will be examined 
by underlining the dominance of the two groups, and by showing the media 
owners' business involvements in the other sectors, namely conglomeration, with 
the resultant negative implications. Secondly, the close relationship between the 
state and the private media will be traced by the use of examples. 
1.1. Concentration and conglomeration of the media 
There are two tendencies in the media environment of contemporary Turkey. 
Firstly, the media institutions, which were initially press institutions, have 
expanded to cover all spheres of the media sector and enlarged their activities 
further by becoming involved in other businesses. Secondly, the holdings have 
started to enter the media sector. 
The media were on a smaller scale in the earlier periods. The newspapers were 
principally family owned. Although they also had other businesses outside the 
media sector, these were far more limited in scale and range compared to the 
current situation. The Simavi family owned the newspapers Hiirriyet and 
Giinaydm; the Karacan family owned Milliyet; the Ihcaks owned Terciiman; and 
the Nadi family owned Cumhuriyet. Now, with the exception of Cumhuriyet, all 
presenters are too serious (see Ekonomist. 7 .6. 1998, p. 74-76). It seems TRT is comparing itself with the 
private media. but what has been arrived at as a conclusion is not a need to transfonn the state channel into 
a public service channel, but rather to commercialise it with some changes in appearance. 
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these have changed. Terciiman disappeared, as will be explained later; the Do~an 
group purchased Milliyet, and recently Hilrriyet60; a new newspaper called Sabah, 
which is owned by Din~ Bilgin, emerged. 
The Do~an and Bilgin groups which own the largest newspapers, expanded into 
the other media by setting up TV channels. They increased their power by 
establishing shares with the holdings (Do~an with Do~~ Holding, Bilgin with 
C;:ukurova Holding). The most striking thing in these alliances is that these two 
holdings own large financial institutions and banks. The tables61 show that all 
media institutions are backed by the banks and other fmancial institutions. ihlas, 
Aksoy and Uzan, which entered the media sector by extending their holdings, also 
own banks. These holdings have companies which extend beyond the national 
boundaries. All of these groups have tended to expand to different sections of the 
media industry including newspaper, television, publishing, news agencies, 
distribution and marketing. The Bilgin and Do~an group seem already to have 
succeeded in doing that. These two are especially powerful in the printed media. 
They own more than half of the press sector on a national scale. In addition to the 
many newspapers, they also own magazines which are the extensions of foreign 
magazines on fashion, sport, travel, cookery, health etc. 
The biggest media groups, Do~an and Bilgin and their relationship in terms of 
ownership with other businesses are listed below62: 
60 This is a turning point in the concentration of the two groups. The owner of Hurriyet. EraI Simavi. 
explained the decision as a result of his old age and health problems and of his son's lack of interest 
(10.8.1994, Sabah). According to one explanation, the Simavis were deeply in debt because of promotion 
campaigns (Otan, 1995: 49). 
61 see Appendix 1. 
62 These tables and the tables in the Appendix concerning the smaller groups, were formulated using 
information collected from different sources in the summer of 1996 in Ankara and Istanbul. Although 
attempts have been made to upd.te the inform.tion by trying to follow the Turkish media mainly from the 
Internet. the industry is changing very quickly and sometimes it is difficult to find every change reported. 
Therefore, the infonnation given here might not be completely up to date. 
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In addition to those shown below, there are other private media institutions, but 
these are smaller and not completely independent from the large ones. In fact, the 
small and medium size media institutions have been used as a balance between the 
big groups. The two groups have attempted to persuade the small and medium ones 
to support them in order to strengthen their position in competition (Yurtsever, 
1995: 10). These small and medium sized media institutions are as follows: 
i I 
Table 5 SmaU and Medium Sized Media Institutions (Source: Up-dated information from 
Yurtsever, 1995: 10-12). 
63 DUnya was established in 1981 as an economics newspaper to 'reflect the developments in the business 
world' (Demirkent. 1995: 282-283). Its circulation is around twenty thousand. The DUnya group has 
Dilnya Super Distribution .(it distributes 1200 foreign publications with the network which consists of 800 
retailers. 20 DUnya AktUel Bookstores). Pres (imports best sellers. publishes books on Turkey. address 
books, almanacs and historical novels and imports accessories, stationery. children' s books, calendars, 
hobby books, playing cards. greeting cards), DUnya Infotel (imports professional and academic books in all 
languages), DUnya AktUel Basin Yayin Ticaret ve Sanayi (the retail bookstore chain. sells domestic and 
foreign newspapers and magazines. foreign language books), Dilnya Bilisim 3.5. (provides services for 
education). Eko (door to door delivery service for the DUnya group publications), Itba (teaching centre for 
language. banking. business management and secretarial training), Dia·DOnya Economic Researches 
(management training and market research centre to provide commodity and consumer market research 
reports to specialised domestic and foreign clients). 
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The comments made by Sonmez indicate some of the reasons for the holdings 
entering the media sector. According to him, the holdings have recently recognised 
the power involved in owning media institutions. Sonmez also argues that the 
motive for maximum profit is not valid in the media sector because the reason for 
investing in the media sector is not for material profit, but gaining power which 
can be used to influence the masses, or as a defence or attack against rivals 
(Sonmez, 1996:76). He considers them as a weapon for the large media groups64 
by emphasising that making profit is a secondary aim (Sonmez, 1995 :4-6, 1996: 
77). Gorgiilu's research, which is based on a comparison between 1965 and 1989, 
shows that there has been a decrease in the profit rate, with expenses increasing 
while income has decreased. When inflation is considered, and the real rate is 
calculated, it is found that the profit of the newspapers decreased by 69.67% 
between 1965 and 1989 (Gorglllii, 1991: 65-67). 
Even though the profit in the media sector has decreased, it can still be argued that 
using the media as a weapon brings profit. Even though media bosses do not make 
profits from the media itself, their activities in the media help them to increase 
their profits in their other sectors. One, and the simplest, way of doing that is 
through promoting and advertising their other products and services in their media, 
as will be seen below. There are other ways in which the media companies can 
increase their profit and gain advantages for their other businesses. As Tuncel 
states, the media can be used as a tool to apply political pressure, it can reduce the 
risks to the capital in other sectors, it can be used for advertisements of the owner's 
other interests, and it can increase their possibilities for obtaining state credits and 
64 In fact, many examples of this situation have been witnessed; media groups used or threatened to use their 
media against each other. For example. Do~an Group's magazine called EP Ekonomi Politika published an 
investigation on 28.3.1993 about Kemal Uzan who is the owner of Star TV. a banker, and a tradesman as 
shown in the tables. The magazine was giving information on how Uzan became rich with the support of 
the state during the MP (Motherland Party) government in a corrupted way. Kahraman states that the day 
the magazine was published, Uzan made contact with Aydm Do~an who is the owner of the magazine, and 
threatened him with using Star TV against the Do~an group. Then, the directives were given by Aydm 
Do~an to collect all the magazines in the market. The editor of the magazines, and the journalist who 
carried out the investigation and wrote in the magazine were dismissed (Kahraman, 1996: 256). This shows 
how the owners can use their media as weapons against each other, and by doing so how they can limit the 
media content. 
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other opportunities (Tuncel,1994:37). Thus, using the media as a weapon for 
politics and for commercial interests appears not to be exclusive, but on the 
contrary, they reinforce each other. 
In the next section, I will trace the rise of the advertising industry and its 
implications for democracy. The bitter competition of the commercial media will 
be examined through promotion campaigns. At the same time, the unification of 
the power of the two media groups will be taken into account with its implications 
for news coverage. 
1.2. Rising advertising sector 
The advertising sector is another important element to be taken into account in 
order to draw a map of the media industry in Turkey. As mentioned previously, the 
conglomerates promote their other businesses, products and services in their media. 
This reduces their expenses in the other areas. 
The table below shows the top ten products or services which paid most for 
advertising in 1994 and 1995. Interestingly, almost all of them are media 
companies. As can be seen, Sabah, Hiirriyet and Milliyet are in prime positions. 
Fewer advertisements are given to TRT by media and other companies compared 
to the private television and press. So, they mainly use their TV channels to 
advertise their newspapers (mostly the promotion campaigns) or other media, and 
they use the press for advertising their TV channels. In addition, their other 
companies which are not in the media sector can also be advertised by their media 
groups, such as tmar Bank which is the bank of the Uzanlar group, which also 
owns tnterstar TV. Thus, the conglomerated structure allows the groups to 
advertise their companies in their own newspapers and television channels, so 
reducing their advertising expenditures. 
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The Advertisement Expenditures oC the Top Ten Products-Services in 1994 
NO PRODUCTS! TRTTV PRIVATE TV PRESS TOTAL 
SERVICES EXP. EXP. EXP. EXP. 
1 Milliyet 15.850.927 3.341.580.253 65.797.950 3.423.709.601 
2 Sabah 2.693.310 3.168.804.140 4.455.292 3.175.952.742 
3 mar bank - 2.799.195.404 188.287 2.799.383.691 
4 Ala-Show 
-
2.250.613.085 54.089.962 2.304.703.047 
5 HUmye, 35.800.385 1.726.811.865 23.072.709 1.785.684.959 
6 Lever product 2.783.325 1.012.173.277 46.399.212 1.061.355.814 
7 Alo-Bil2i . 903.428.419 99.786.101 1.003.214.521 
8 Dum soaD . 915.273.350 48.750 915.322.100 
9 Sana marnrine - 730.544.823 3.413.381 733.958.205 
10 Cine5 - 39.074.973 668.756.162 707.831.135 
Table 6 The Advertisement Expenditures in 1994 
The Advertisement Expenditures of the Top Ten Products-Services in 1995 
NO PRODUCTS! TRTTV PRIVATE TV PRESS TOTAL 
SERVICES EXP. EXP. EXP. EXP. 
1 Sabah 990.000 4.010.899.377 8.131.336 4.020.010.713 
2 Mil1iyet 93.960.477 2.366.905.588 20.038.500 2.482.147.590 
3 HUrriyet 42.852.870 1.889.461.981 
-
1.932.314.851 
4 KanalDTv - - 1.508.841.969 1.508.841.969 
5 Cine5 - 820.968.767 501.036.849 1.322.005.617 
6 Coca cola 1.040.000 1.170.122.448 26.268.281 1.197.430.729 
7 Star Tv - - 1.050.546.853 1.050.546.853 
8 Atv Tv - 96.427 943.567.792 943.664.219 
9 Kanal6 - - 867.669.296 867.669.296 
10 Ala-Show - 808.505.389 31.553.113 840.058.502 
Table 7 The Advertisement Expenditures in 1995 
Source: These tables were formulated using the monthly data of the Bile~im Marketing Research Company. 
The number of advertising agents. and the shareholdings with the foreign 
advertising firms have risen over recent few years. Table 7 below shows the rising 
advertisement sector in Turkey in the last three years with the income of the top ten 
advertising agents. and table 8 indicates that more than half of the twenty five 
largest advertising agents also have foreign shareholders: 
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THE RISING ADVERTISING SECTOR 
NO AGENT . ", NO AGENT .... NO AGENT .... 
--
-- --
BILLION 
,>WON 'D.IDN TI-
11. 11. 
1 CENAJANSlGREY 1.058 1 CENAJANSJGREY 1531.6 1 CENAJANSlGREY 3331,3 
2 ADAMTANITIM 527,4 2 ORAFIKAILINT AS 678.9 2 GRAFIKAlLINT AS 1365.1 
3 GRAFlKAILlNT AS 513,1 3 OUZELSANATLAR 1351.6 3 GUZELSANATLAR 289S.7 
4 GUZELSANATLAR 611.2 4 LOWEADAM 713,9 4 LOWEADAM 1487,0 
5 MANAJANSlTHOMPSON 518,. 5 MANAJANSrrHOMPSQN 629.2 5 MANAJANSlfHOMPSON 1491.3 
6 MORAN OGILVY&MATHER 481.0 6 PARSIMCCANN·ERICKSON 559,5 6 PARSIMCCANN-ERICKSON 1421.3 
7 PARS/MCCANN-ERICKSON 345,2 7 PENAJANSI DMB&B 546,0 7 PENAJANSJ DMB&B 977,0 
8 SAATCHI&SAATcm 346,8 8 SAATCHI&SAATcm 494.9 8 SAATCHI&SAATCHI 1696,3 
9 Y &R REKLAMEVI 302,4 9 Y&RREKLAMEVI 613,2 9 Y &R REKLAMEVI 1547,6 
10 . 10 VaRUM 603.7 10 vaRUM 1760.2 
Table 8 The rising advertising sector 
SOURCE: YeniyOZYll18 SEPTEMBER 1996 (these are the agents' own declarations, and do not include VAT) 
25 LARGEST ADVERTISING AGENTS 
AGENTS OWNER FOREIGN SHAREHOLDER 
CENAJANSJGREY NAILKECEU GREY 
GUZEL SANATLAR UNVER ORAL, ALINUR VEUDEDEOAGLU BACKER SPIGEL BATES 
LOWEADAM NAZAR BUYUM, ERSIN SALMAN LOWEADAM 
GRAFlKAILINT AS SEDAT SAMI SlALOM LINT AS WORLDWIDE 
MANAJANstrHOMPSON EUACIMAN J. WALTER THOPMSON CORP. 
Y &R REKLAMEVI ATll.l.A AKSOY, ONER BIROt... SERDAR ERENER YOUNG&RUBICAM 
YORUM ZUHTU SEZER, MEHMET URAL 
PARSlMCCANN-ERICKSON PINAR KIUC MCCANN-ERICKSON 
PENAJANSi DMB&.B A YSEOUL DORA, BA TU ISMEN, BOLENT OZVEREN DMB&B 
SAATCHI&SAATCHl JOHN MCNEEL SAATCHI&SATCHI AOVERTISING 
REKLAM MORAN YUKSEL DINC;EL OGILVY &MATHER WORLDWIDE 
MARKOMILEO BURNET AYHAN DUYGU CECAN, PAOLA VOLPARA, LEO BURNET WORLDWIDE INC. 
ROTAREKLAM CINAR KIUC 
BBDOGRUP 
RPMIRADAR FUSUN GENCSU. PAUL MCMILLEN CDPEUROPE 
MEDINA&TURGUL JEFAMEDINA DDB NEEDHAM WORLDWIDE 
AJANS ULTRA SALlH ECER, FARUK. KAPTAN. SINAN UNAL BOLEI DRU DIPUIS PETIT WORLDWIDE 
PANEL OMERSENGULER 
REPRO AFFAN BASAK 
REKLAMCILlK AUCANTURAU 
Y ARATIMIFCB HULK! AKTUNC EURORSCG 
BIRLESIK REKLAMCIUK ENOIN OZOEN.1ZMIR TOLGA BBDO 
ILANCIUK YAKUPBAROUH 
AJANSEKOL CIHANGIR ALTAN. BOLENT GURAY 
TERRA NOVA HULUSI DERICl 
Table 9 25 Largest Advertising Agents source: EKONOMIK FORUM, NOVEMBER 95: 25 
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The table below shows tbe advertising income of tbe six newspapers (this is the 
sample analysed in tbe following chapters) in order to give an idea of tbe rise over 
tbe last three years. Although Zaman's income from advertising is increasing very 
fast, again most oftbe income is gained by tbe newspapers oftbe Bilgin and Dogan 
groups, Hiirriyet, Sabah and Milliyet. 
Advertisement Income of the Six Newspapers 
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Figure I Advertising Income of the Six Newspapers 
n ~ ~ " 3~ 3 
'" 
" '" :a 
'" " '< :a 
NEWSPAPERS 
c 
" ~ 
This table is/ormulatedfrom the monthly data o/the Bile$im Marketing Research Company. 
Advertisements in the newspapers occupy a significant place. According to 
research carried out at the end of 1989, 18.99% of the space in the seven most 
circulated newspapers is occupied by advertisements (Tutar, 1989: 34). According 
to another piece of research, advertisements occupied more than 20% of the space 
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in 1990. This figure is higher in some newspapers. For example, advertisements 
occupy almost half of the newspaper in Hiirriyet (Gorgiilii, 1991: 34). 
It is argued by the managerial staff of the media institutions that the media cannot 
exist without advertisements, and democracy can not exist without the media. 
Advertising income is considered as a financial support and a guarantee for the 
independency of the media from the government. 65 
The accounts which suggest that there is a positive link between advertising and 
democracy, or that advertising and media institutions can be independent from the 
state, are not convincing. Firstly, the state takes part in this process, giving varying 
amounts of financial assistance, as will be seen later. Also, the relationship 
between media institutions, advertising agents, and the companies which place 
advertisements can cause restrictions to the news. 66 
The advertising agents mediate with the big trade groups for the media. These 
agents organise and direct the whole advertising budget of the company for which 
they work67• This obviously gives them power over the media institutions. The 
advertising agents or their customers can use their influence over the media 
institutions and affect the news. 
Demirkent indicates the level of control of the media over the advertising agents, 
by stating that big media groups put the advertising agents in a difficult position by 
intervening in their job, by making requests or sometimes threatening the 
advertising agents. Mostly, this is done through creating false news about the 
65 The editor of Sabah said in an interview conducted in the summer of 1996 that: "If the private sector does 
not develop. the powerful and independent press can not develop either, In that case, all the infrastrucrure 
would be in the hands of dictatorial military governments, and such a government would keep all the 
advertisements and other means for itself like a communist state. The less the state has a role in the 
economy. the more there is economic freedom and press freedom. The necessity of minimising the state is 
the idea which is supponed by our newspaper all the time", For similar statements, see also Marketing 
TUrkiye, 15 ,04, 1997: 28·30, Hazar, 1994, 
66 During the interview conducted in the summer of 1996, the editor of Sabah said that the effects of the 
advertisements on the press content is not an issue at all. He said: "Our best customer is a cigarette 
producer. yet we still write news about the dangers of smoking", 
67 see Ekonomik Forum, Nov 1995: 24-25 
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products publicised. They may publish a series of news items about the dangers of 
a product advertised in the other newspapers (Demirkent, 1995: 149-150). The 
reverse also occurs at the same time. That is, the advertisements can affect media 
coverage. Some news may not be written in order not to prejudice the relationship 
with the company which advertises in the newspaper (Demirkent, 1995: 124). That 
some issues may be raised while others are played down or disappear does not 
appear to be democratic as it threatens the diversity of and access to information. 
In addition, a new kind of news can emerge as a result of the commercial interests 
of the media institutions. A company -not necessarily the media group's company-
may itself become the news with its product or activity. According to the archive 
organised by the Sabancl Holding Press Adviser, SabanCl and his companies 
featured as in the news in the press 2825 times in 1994. 912 of these reports were 
on Sabancl himself. In the first five months of 1995, there were 607 news items on 
Sabancl, and 937 items on his companies (Ekonomist, 30.7.1995). The two large 
media groups have a close relationship with two different big business groups. It is 
known that the Bilgin Group has a close relationship with Sabancl, and the Dogan 
group is supported by Ko~ (Nebiler, 1995: 73, Demirkent, 1995: 279). Sabancl8 
and KOf69 are the richest business groups in Turkey. 
68 Sabancl's main businesses are textiles and banking. He has shares in companies co-owned with 
multinational companies such as Turk-Philips, Bifa, Ankara Hilton, BNP-Dresdner-akbank, Susa, Dusa, 
Beksa, Brisa, Cigna-sa. Mersin Otelcilik. Sabancl has companies in other countries as well. such as Exsa 
Handels Gmbh in Germany, Universal Trading ltd. and Ak International in Britain, Holsa International in 
USA and Switzerland, Hefti Weaving in Switzerland (SOnmez, 1992) 
69 In the 1960s, Aydm Dogan, the owner of the Dogan group had a firm in the automotive sector which was a 
sub agent of Ko. group. This was the the business which made Aydm Oogan rich, and which later made 
Oogan and Ko. shareholders in the automotive sector (Kahraman,1996:245-246). Ko. established the first 
American-Turkish investment with General Electric a.s. in 1947. Kol"s companies are Turk Traktor, Turk-
Siemens, Tofas, Simko, Sark Sogorta, Otoyol, Otosan, Mako, Goodyear, Etmas, Ooktas, KOI'-Amerikan 
Bank, A1tinyunus, KOI'-GKN, Garanti Insaat, Bozkurt Mensucat. Ko. has companies outside Turkey as 
well. such as Kofisa Trading co. and Inex Investment Extension co. in Switzerland, Ramerica and Ram 
International in USA, Interbrucke Gmbh in Germany (SOnmez, 1992). 
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1.3. Fierce competition of the media groups: Promotion 
campaigns 
The promotion70 war which started between the media groups in 1993, illustrates 
the degree of competition between the media groups. The change made in the TRT 
regulation in May, 1988, removed the restrictions on advertisements and led to the 
media institutions organising promotion campaigns. It was advocated by the media 
as a new way to increase circulation. Since that time, they have been involved in 
very intense competition to sell more and to get more advertising. 
The campaign was started by Sabah at the suggestion of the owner, Din~ Bilgin, at 
the end of 1992. The Meydan Larousse encyclopaedia promotion increased 
Sabah's circulation71 while adversely affecting that of the other newspapers, 
especially Hiirriyet and MilIiyet. They also arranged similar promotion campaigns 
by claiming that the encyclopaedia they were offering had a better paper qUality. 
The war continued with the Dogan and Bilgin groups promoting their newspapers 
very aggressively and attacking each other on their TV channels. 
When the encyclopaedia campaign started, there was little criticism because it was 
a cultural promotion. Subsequently, there has been a wide range of promoted 
products, including bed spreads, duvets, cutlery, pans, ovens, blenders, bags, 
bicycles, calculators, music sets, TV s, computers, houses, and cars. The media 
institutions themselves became traders. The companies whose models were being 
given away through the promotion were advertised during the campaigns. This 
brought unfair competition against other companies, especially the smaller ones. 
These campaigns have also prevented the media institutions from reporting certain 
news about the producers or the quality of the products since they themselves 
market that product (Demirkent, 1995: 124). 
70 Generally everybody who collects the coupons from the newspapers for a certain period such as a few 
weeks, months Of a year can obtain the product through the distribution agents of the newspapers. The big 
prizes can be organised with draws. 
71 Sabah's circulation was 697,061 in 1992. According to the infonnation given by Press, Broadcasting and 
Infonnation General Management the rate increased to 1,030,833 with the promotions in 1993. 
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The Iow circulation of the newspapers has been presented as the justification for 
the promotions. The most dominant explanation put forward for Iow circulation, 
particularly by media professional, is the Iow level of education of the country in 
general. However, economic factors, mainly the fall in real wages against inflation, 
have played a big role in the Iow circulation rates. The table below gives an 
indication of the changing wages and the prices of the newspapers 72: 
Table 10 Wages and Newspaper Prices in Years Source: GlJrgala. 1991: 99 
The reasons which derive from the media themselves also affect the circulation. 
These can be listed as the media losing prestige and trust, Iow quality reporting, 
lack of investigative journalism, failure to capture people's hopes and aspirations 
in the newspapers and, ironically, promotion (Hazar, 1994). Although promotion 
campaigns were presented as a way to increase the low circulation, it did not 
guarantee keeping the circulation at a high level. As soon as a promotion campaign 
finishes in one newspaper, the readers won through that campaign stop buying that 
newspaper. The promotion campaigns have reached the point where they are no 
longer aimed at gaining new readers, but at preventing the loss of existing readers 
(GorgiilU, 199 I: 95). 
The newspapers lost their reliability especially as a result of their quarrels because 
of promotion, and the ongoing advertisements which attack the other group's 
newspapers. The readers have started to perceive the newspapers as providers of 
products rather than purveyors of news. Curnhuriyet, which does not run 
promotion campaigns, had an advertisement on TV with the slogan "Curnhuriyet: 
It only gives the newspaper". 
72 For another study which makes a similar comparison see Tutar, 1993:40 
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The struggle between the newspapers of the two groups has become more intense. 
They renewed their efforts: now, the groups have their own small newspapers to 
gain more income through promotion campaigns. They started to publish small 
scale newspapers with different names like Posta, Takvim, tyi Gazete and Ate~. 
The same group charges more for the newspaper which has promotion coupons 
than for those which do not. The news reports in these newspapers of the same 
group are almost identical. They just make changes in the layout of the news and 
the photographs. 
1.4. The coalition of the media groups 
As seen above, the two groups get more advertisement income than the others. 
Although they are in competition as can be seen with the promotion campaigns, 
they aggregate their power to maximise their profit at the same time. This has been 
affected in two ways: in advertisement and in distribution. In the next subsection, 
this co-operation will be described together with the publishing of a common 
declaration in the newspapers. 
1.4.1. Co-operation for profit: 
The two big groups have already taken the biggest slice from the advertising pie. 
They also made an agreement together through the establishment of a common 
marketing company called Bim~ 73, to increase their profits. This company 
approaches firms asking them to advertise on the TV channels, in the newspapers 
and the magazines of the two groups. It attempts to capture all the advertising 
budgets of the firms through offering discount incentives. This method exempts 
them from paying a fee to the Radio Television Supreme Board. As a result of this 
co-operation, the two groups maximise their profits. The other media institutions, 
on the other hand, receive a smaller income from the advertisements74• 
73 B~ is owned by Kanal D and ATV with 50% shares each. Before that, Mepas was the common company 
of Kanal D, ATV and Show·TV. Since 1996 January, Mepas continues only as the company of Show·TV 
(SOylemez, 1998: 109). 
74 Ekonomik Forum, November 1995: 12. 
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Another type of co-operation has occurred in distribution. The two big media 
groups, Dogan and Bilgin, unified their distribution companies into one, Bir-Yay 
7S. Now, Bir-Yay dominates the sector as the biggest distribution company. They 
argue that this unified distribution system is fair, and will improve distribution, 
fasten investments, and increase circulation. The editor of Sabah states that: 
"The unification of the distribution companies is highly functional and efficient. They 
label it as monopolization. This is wrong. There is no journal we do not distribute 
because of its ideas, leftist, communist, Islamist, seriatist, all who criticise us. Neither 
do we prevent their publication. Distribution is very expensive, it needs 
infrastructures. So, they should pay the prices of these infrastructures,,7. 
However, since distribution is expensive to establish separately, the middle and 
small scale institutions have to accept the conditions and price increases that Bir-
Yay brings. This is obviously another element which prejudices these media 
institutions while being advantageous for the two large groups. 
1.4.2. The alliance for national interests 
The optimistic evaluations on the private television channels mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter found their reflection in the press with the emergence of 
the newspaper called Sabah in 1985. Sabah is a popular newspaper which describes 
the three necessary elements of its first page as being interesting, amusing and 
sexually provoking (Miinir, 1993: 50-60, 140). 
Aksoy and Robins argue that the low circulation has led the newspaper industry to 
accept state credits from the government. According to them, making the 
newspaper more popular can increase the circulation, and Sabah succeeded in that. 
Sabah 
"was not part of the national media elite, and had not been compromised by drawing 
on state financial support. This afforded the newspaper a valuable peripheral 
perspective that allowed it to challenge the limits of the 'official' culture" (Aksoy et 
aI,1997:84). 
75 for details of distribution see Yurtsever, 1995:10·12, Marketing Tilrkiye, 1 .11. 1991:3 
76 the interview conducted with the editor of Sabah in the sununerof 1996. 
95 
CHAPfER4 THE MEDIA IN MODERN TURKEY 
This might have been the case initially, but later it has been seen that neither high 
circulation, nor Sabah being new and not part of the media elite could prevent it 
asking for state credits. Thus, Sabah is no different from the other newspapers in 
terms of its relationship with the government, as will be seen in detail in the next 
subsection. The authors give examples of these challenges to the limits of the 
official culture such as Sabah's decision to publish the newspaper on religious 
holidays 77 or printing a photograph of President Demirel in his swimming costume. 
Although these developments are new, they are indeed indications of the 
sensationalism of the newspaper. These examples seem too weak to draw the 
conclusions that Sabah 'broke the taboos', 'it began to show Turkey as it "really" 
was', and 'it articulated the perspective of those who had been marginalised in 
Turkish society' (Aksoy et al. 1997: 84). 
The biggest ethnic group in Turkey is the Kurds. There is ongoing violence 
between the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) and the Turkish army. The Kurdish 
issue has been reduced to a military problem. The way Sabah covers the Kurdish 
issue is not so different from the other mainstream newspapers. The 'success' 
stories of the military have been printed with headlines such as 'spring cleaning'. 
The legal party which mainly focuses on the Kurdish issue has been targeted and 
framed as being an extension of the PKK. 
Gerger labelled the Turkish press as a national security press, state press or official 
press. He asks: "How would the state do differently if it published these 
newspapers?" He says that some formal differences could be found. It would be 
more dull, there would not be any photograph of naked women, but the essence 
would not be different (Aksoy, 1993: 41). This evaluation sounds simplistic since it 
almost equates the state and the press, and despite many common features, the 
popular press discourse and the state discourse can not be the same. However, it 
has some truth, especially in terms of the coverage of the Kurdish issue and the 
PKK. The Turkish media relies on the state and military officers as news sources, 
77 These days were holiday for the journalists. In addition, the Turkish Journalists Association used to publish 
newspapers on these days and use the income for the association. This challenge by Sabah can be 
explained more in terms of its ambition as a newspaper to compete with the other weIJ established 
newspapers. 
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therefore the coverage is one-sided, namely official. The policies of the 
newspapers on the Kurdish issue might be explained with the existence of legal 
pressures over this subject rather than it being just voluntary self-censorship 78. 
However, this is the case not only in coverage of the Kurdish issue, it is possible to 
see other cases in which the newspapers work for and even ally themselves with 
national interests. 
As they do it for profit (as seen above on the alliances in advertisement and 
distribution), the newspapers of the two big media groups, Sabah, Hiirriyet and 
Milliyet form a coalition on the news coverage when the issue is about 'national 
interests' or 'national security'. The common declaration made by the media 
bosses after the economic stabilisation programme is an example of this situation. 
It shows how the so-called watch-dog supports the government on national 
interests. The common declaration of the two media groups with the title "An 
Invitation to the Nation! Come on Turkey! We Will Win This War" which was 
published in Sabah, Hiirriyet and Milliyet on the 22 April 1994 was as follows: 
Our country is at one of the most sensitive turning points of Republican history. We 
are at war. This is not only a war to overcome economic hardship. This is, at the same 
time, a war for Turkey to prove itself once more to its friends and enemies in the 
political, social and democratic arenas. 
The media is conscious of its duty and responsibility. 
As media institutions which have this common declaration on our pages, we want to 
put forward the following points to the public. 
78 Kahraman (1996: 275·276, 347.348) traces the recent policy of the media on the Kurdish issue. He states 
that, when Demirel was the Prime Minister, he asked for support from the press for three months until the 
struggle with the PKK was over. The support meant not writing anything except the official 
announcements. The press obeyed. Later, Demirel asked for another six months full support from the press. 
After that, there was no need to ask, he argues, because the press had become like a voluntary guard. Press 
support has been seen as one of the most important elements of total war by the MGK (The National 
Security Council). The task of the press was described as maintaining the psychological war in the name of 
the state. According to this, the press was expected to publish only the information provided by the state. 
There was not to be any research or interviews in the press. The psychological war would be intensi vet 
using just official information. MGK declared that the number of deaths reported amongst the PKK was to 
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Turkey is in need of a national mobilisation today. We will be the vanguard, 
defenders and followers of this. 
Turkey is in need of unity, belief, trust and determination today. We will be defenders 
and followers of this. 
Turkey is in need of brave and effective decisions far beyond the daily political 
disputes today. We will be defenders and followers of this. 
Turkey is in need of prioritising the integral interests of the country over the interests 
of people and institutions. We will be defenders and followers of this. 
Turkey is in need of talented political and bureaucratic staff who are conscious of 
responsibility. These staff should be mobilized to leave all kinds of political 
differences aside. We will be defenders and followers of this. 
The Duty Falls Upon All of Us 
Let's not forget. We all, as institutions, foundations, individuals and citizens, are cogs 
in the wheel, the giant mechanism called 'economy'. 
All our behaviour affects the operation of this mechanism deeply. A simple rumour 
leads to panic. A few hundred dollars which is taken from a bank and hidden under a 
pillow affects the whole system negatively. While we suppose that we will get 
through today, the things we have done threaten our tomorrow. All of us should be 
conscious of it, should be aware of it. 
Industrialists should not stop production. 
Working people should be more efficient and contributive than ever. 
Politicians should not confine themselves to the barren government opposition 
disputes. 
The parliament should enact the waiting bills as soon as possible. 
Occupational and social associations should mobilise all their power for Turkey. 
The state and the government should use their minds and hands more efficiently than 
ever in order to overcome the problems, to preserve the social peace and justice. 
be increased in the press. The military attacks on the Kurdish villages were to be represented as PKK 
attacks. 
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Universities, intellectuals, teachers should produce and suggest solutions, they should 
keep the environment of productive discussion lively. 
Citizens should think ''What can I do for my country today?" without being seized by 
pessimism and weariness. 
Our youth should not believe the provocations of those who try to exploit the 
sensitive situation of our country. 
There Is No Other Turkey 
This country is our country. And this crisis is our crisis. It can take a long time to 
overcome the hard days, it can be difficult. Let's not forget, no war can be won 
without wounds and bruises. We should believe and trust that we will win. Turkey 
has to win. Because there is no other Turkey! Our greatest support on this road is our 
common will and moral power. We have to cast off the pessimistic shroud that has 
spread over Turkey, and we have to embrace again our will to win and our 
determination which made this nation 'great'. All of us have to be conscious of the 
responsibility which falls upon us and behave according to that. All together, 
employees, employers, farmers, officers, tradesmen, managers, bureaucrats, 
industrialists, bankers, merchants, politicians, presidents, journalists, doctors, house 
wives, lawyers, sportsmen, artists, teachers, students, should walk shoulder to 
shoulder towards the light at the end of the tunnel. Because we have a common fate! 
Because all of us are in the same boat! 
We are ready to make sacrifices as a society and as individuals, we have started that 
in order to pass the hard test that we are facing. Now, today is the day of being aware 
of our power, producing and implementing the solution. This consciousness should 
expand to all sections of the society. 
Come on Turkey! 
This common declaration basically aims to support the government's economic 
stabilisation programme, which was announced at the beginning of the month. It 
uses the official and nationalist discourse which is mainly based on conspiracy 
theory. The metaphors of war and enemies of Turkey are used although it is not 
clear what the war is, who the enemies are. They declare the necessity of national 
unity which is the main and the most repeated element of official ideology, as can 
be seen in the Constitution and the state institutional discourses. They talk in the 
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name of the country by emphasising that the interests of the country as a whole 
should come before the interests of individuals or institutions. The term 'interests 
of the country' again could have been used by the military in a war, in accordance 
with the declaration's description of the situation. 
Thus, the declaration speaks in the name of Turkey for the unity and the integral 
interests of the country. It should not be confused with public interests here79• 
They address the public from a high level by emphasising the duties and 
responsibilities by inviting them to behave appropriately. Moral power and 
responsibility are emphasised rather than differing interests or unequal distribution 
of wealth or the rights of citizens. The state is not seen as being for the people, 
rather people are seen as existing for the benefit of the state, by advising the 
citizens to think 'what can I do for my country?' . 
It is emphasised that all people are the same, the fate of all people is common. This 
idea echoes the principle of populism in Kemalism. The people are appealed to as 
members of professions and told what to do. Even the parliament is addressed and 
told to enact the waiting bills. The media appear to be above everything. The 
citizens are advised to think, the universities, intellectuals, and teachers are allowed 
to discuss, but thinking is restricted: it should be for Turkey. Discussions should be 
productive. Young people are wamed against the provocations of those who try to 
exploit the sensitive situation of the country. This is a typical provocation hysteria 
which is used to explain all disorders. The social movements somehow are not 
considered as an outcome of discontent with the conditions in the country itself, 
but instead seen as an extension of 'our external enemies'. 
The declaration also demands sacrifices without mentioning what these sacrifices 
might be. It is only implied that some things will be good for the country. The 
writers of the declaration, the media elite of the two big groups, consider 
themselves not only as followers of national mobilisation, but as the creator, the 
vanguard and defenders of it. This declaration, which sounds like the propaganda 
79 For a different view which argues that Turkish journalists perceive themselves as the guardians of the 
public interest see Heper, 1996: 121 
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of an authoritative state, seems to be an attempt by the media to gain the consent 
and support of the citizens in the name of the state. 
The extract below is another example of the media protecting national interests: 
some journalists went to an island called Kardak and planted a Turkish flag as a 
reply to the Greeks planting the flag of Greece. It produced another crisis in the 
already tense relations between Turkey and Greece. Whether the island belongs to 
Turkey or Greece is not the issue for this thesis, but the important thing is the 
attitude of the Turkish media during these discussions and their defence of the 
action of planting a Turkish flag. The editor- in-chief of Hiirriyet, Ertugtul Ozkok 
advocates that action in an interview8o: 
Q: Your attitude towards the Kardak crisis was criticised, you were labelled 'Rambo 
journalist' and you got angry with that. Why? 
A: ... we sent our journalists, saying 'go and take a photograph of Kardak island'. They 
went to the island in very bad weather conditions taking a risk. This is the excitement 
of journalism. They went there, and when they saw the Greek flag, they planted the 
Turkish flag. 
Q: Is it a correct journalistic practice not to consider the issue for a month and at the 
end of the month going and planting the flag? 
A: What should they have done in your opinion?: Should they have taken the 
photograph of the flag and left it there? 
Q:Yes. 
A: Think about what would happen in Turkey when the photograph of the flag was 
published. A Turkish gun boat would go there, the soldiers would remove the Greek 
flag and plant the Turkish one. Now, we did this as people who do not have any 
official character. This provides an opportunity for negotiation between the states. It 
can be said 'My friend, I did not do this. Two journalists went there, that does not 
concern me. And also, your Antenna TV went and planted the flag there. You ask 
them for an account, and I ask my people' ... 
Q: You were criticised for contributing to the creation of a dangerous crisis, but you 
are claiming that you prevented a much bigger incident.. .. 
80 from AkrtIe1, 14.03.1996. 
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A: What we did might have been a mistake. You can say that this is not the duty of 
journalists. 
Q: It is not. 
A: Then I can say that if we left the Greek flag there, we would have the opposite of 
the current reactions from intellectuals. It would be from the nationalists this time. 
The telephones would be jammed. These guys would be criticised with the same 
strength 'Don't you have any feeling of honour? You have left the Greek flag there' ... 
Do you know, we have had a great deal of support from the people for our behaviour? 
Only the columnists have criticised us .... This is not abuse. It is called 'reflex of 
citizenship' .... 
Q: You are of the opinion, Turkey first, journalism later. Does journalism not mean 
impartiality though it is difficult? 
A: Being a journalist in Turkey is not the same thing as being a journalist in America. 
There is such a geography around you that you can not understand this if you do not 
carry a responsibility to maintain the existence of this country. Journalists are not the 
citizens of the world. There is no such thing! There is no one who lives on the moon, 
whose passport is not stamped with any country ... 
... The owner of this newspaper pays me to find the events that others can not follow, 
every day. It is a forest. If you are not the best, you go .... 
.. .I can show the most impartial attitude, pretend to be impartial, in the world. See 
how it makes the most biased news against Turkey. I am a Turkish journalist. You 
can not expect the journalists in Turkey to be Supermen and adopt the journalism 
ethics of other parts of the world. There is Syria at your door. There are Iran, Iraq, 
Artnenia, Greece. There is a circle around you. A Turkish diplomat is not the same as 
a Portuguese diplomat. He/she has a meal and a nice invitation and sleeps at the end 
of a nice day. For Turkish diplomats, cryptos work until the morning. 
This extract again contains nationalism and conspiracy. At the same time, it shows 
the media acting like a government even at the expense of the values of 
professional journalism, such as impartiality. The first extract was the outcome of a 
very planned and organized act of the two media groups to support the policies of 
the government whereas this one is of a spontaneous reaction. They are both 
nationalist. That the media's owner is not the state does not mean that the media is 
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completely separate from the state. On the contrary, there is a close relationship 
between the state and the private media. 
2. Media-state relationship: Not a contradiction 
As explained at the beginning of the chapter, the media in Turkey has been linked 
with the state from the beginning. It was used for the establishment of the Republic 
and then had a mission to modernize the country. There have been many changes 
since then. The media centres are not near the political establishment anymore, but 
in the area called tkitelli, which is far from the centre of Istanbul, full of 
technologically advanced equipment. It is obviously possible to trace the other 
differences. In this chapter, although the changes are recognised, they are not seen 
as being a fundamental change from the state to the market. Instead the close 
relationship between the state and the market, the continuity of the past or more 
particularly the statist tradition through the private media institutions, will be 
considered. In fact, the biggest change in the 1990s Turkish media scene, the end 
of the state monopoly in broadcasting, was facilitated by the Prime Minister of the 
period, Turgut Ozal. The first private television channel, Magic Box (now 
lnterstar) was owned by Uzanlar and Ahmet Ozal, who is the son of Turgut Oza181 • 
The strengthening private media institutions with the rising advertising industry, 
promotion campaigns and rising circulation are not completely independent from 
the state, on the contrary, they can live together by reinforcing each other. 
One of the origins of considering the private media separately from the state, I 
would argue, is the lack of conditions of freedom in Turkey. Since civil rights and 
freedom have still not been fully established because of the reasons discussed in 
the chapter on Turkey, the state has had a banning, censoring and restricting role 
on the media. Not just historically, but also in the 1990s, Turkey is full of examples 
of imprisoned, tortured and killed journalists. It is the radical media which suffer 
81 It was in fact Ozal himself who showed the way for private broadcasting. He mentioned that although it was 
not legal to set up private television channels on Turkish soil because of the Constitution, broadcasting 
from abroad is not illegal. Following his explanation in late 1989, Magic Box started broadcasting from 
Germany ($ahin et al. 1993: 33). 
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more from the legal and illegal power82 of the state whereas for the mainstream 
media self-censorship is an issue more related to fmancial worries. An interesting 
point which should be mentioned here is that the mainstream media can use the 
discourse of press freedom even though the issue is only of commercial interests 
being in danger. For example, after the elections which brought the Erbakan (the 
Welfare Party leader)- C;:iller (the True Path Party leader) coalition government, 
Erbakan stated that they would restrict the promotion and the public opportunities 
for the media. The media refer to this as war and censorship. The Dogan Group in 
particular reacted strongly to this. Erbakan was labelled as the enemy of the media 
and democracy83. After a month, the law to restrict promotion was vetoed by the 
president. 
Sonmez summarises the economic relationship between the state and media very 
well: according to him, the state has a power over the media through the price of 
the paper, official advertisements, cheap credits of the state banks, the advertising 
budget of the state institutions, investment promotions, and, probably peculiar to 
Turkey, through hidden payments from the Prime Ministry as an incentive or 
punishment (Sonmez: 1997:77). 
There are doubts about the fairness in the distribution ofthe official advertisements 
84. The three newspapers get most of the official advertisements as they gain the 
82 According to the Press Council Report. 25 journalists were killed, 68 were attacked by police, 67 publishing 
institutions were closed in one year. 262 journalists were taken into custody and 127 were put into prisons. 
The newspaper called OZgiir DIke was bombed (Demokrasi, 15.03. 1996). OZgiir Olke was the extension 
of Ozgur GUndem which was closed in 1993. That newspaper has always been targeted by the state since 
its news was mainly on the Kurdish issue, and their ideology was different from the mainstream one. The 
state accused it of being separatist and supporting terrorism. Their journalists were attacked. kilted, became 
'lost'. taken into custody and tortured. This newspaper still continues with the name of Demokrasi. Similar 
legal and illegal pressures have been exercised mainly on the leftist magazines (Kahraman, 1996: 210-214, 
274). 
83 Also, an alliance has been witnessed: Their worries over profits were linked with the secular worries of the 
Kemalist social democrat parties (see Milliyet,7.7.1996, 8.7.1996,13.8.1996). 
84 see Erin~, 1996: 100-101 
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most from the private advertising85• The advertisements which are paid for from 
the budgets of the state institutions also cannot be said to be fairly distributed86• In 
fact, these two, the official advertisements from the Press Advertisement Institution 
and the advertisements from the budget of the state institutions can affect each 
other. The politicians at the top level can intervene in the distribution ofboth87• 
The power of the Prime Minister in combination with all these methods has been 
predominant especially over the last two decades in Turkey. Despite the examples 
of the past, this situation increased more especially after 1980. 
Some media professionals at the managerial level mention that the erosion of the 
values in the press occurred during the Ozal period. In contrast to the earlier 
periods, the media professionals state that, they were called by Ozal in the middle 
of the night, or certain columnists and editors in chief had to have special meetings 
85 This example illustrates the dominance of the three newspapers Sabah, HOrriyet and Milliyet. These three 
got 31 billion. 101 million, 125 thousand 875 lira which is almost half of the advertisement budget of the 
Prime Ministry Privatization Administration in 1994. At that time HUrriyet was Simavi's. If the Dogan 
group and the Bilgin group are examined at by including all their newspapers, magazines and TV channels, 
it is found that Dogan got 9 billion 645 million 166 thousand 272 lira, Bilgin got IS billion 238 million 752 
thousand 889 lira. These two groups received more than one third of the advertising budget of the 
Privatization Administration. In 1995, the budget was higher as a result of the World Bank credits. The two 
groups got most of the budget again. The three newspapers got 57 billion 541 million 970 thousand lira. 
With their newspapers, magazines and TV channels, the Dogan group received 47 billion 279 million 78 
thousand 644 lira, while Bilgin got 51 billion 110 million 167 thousand 808 lira. Together they got almost 
half of the total advertisement budget in 1995 (data collected from the Prime Ministry Privatization 
Administration, Press and Public Relations) 
86 A press officer who works in the official institution which is responsible for privatization states: 'when the 
prime minister or minister call our managers, we may give advertisements to the other newsapers as well' ( 
the interview conducted with the Press and Public Relations Officer in the Prime Ministry Privatization 
Administration Council in 1996 summer), 
87 Sabah reported the news on a sex scandal involving the Minister GUne~ Taner and Cenajans Advertisement 
Agent's owner Nail K~eli in 1990. After the news, the minister gave a directive that no official 
advertisements should be given to Sabah any more. According to Miinir, in fact, the reason for writing that 
news was the advertisements of a state institution: Siimerbank, state economic enterprise, which was the 
institution UDder the ministry of GUne~ Taner, which gave its advertising campaign only to HOrriyet. Sabah 
reacted to that by reporting the news about the minister. Since Sabah was going to be damaged, 
negotiations took place in the end. An apology was published the following day, the Minister forgave 
Sabah, and advertising flow restarted (MODir, 1993: 160-161). 
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with Oza! as a result of some special issues' taking place in the newspapers88. The 
fact that Turgut azal had close relations with some columnists (Demirkent, 1995: 
239) was because of his awareness of the power and the influence of the 
columnists in the press. 
Groc explains the MP government's differing pressures on the press with the 
transformation from Kemalism to liberalism of the MP. He evaluates the period of 
1980-1990 as a conflict between the press and the new government. The 
government's aim, for him, was to 'reduce the critical influence of a mainstream 
lobbying group which had formed around Kemalist traditions' (Groc, 1994:200). 
It is true that (not only directly through the pressures, but also through the 
increasing logic of competition) the developments which were encouraged by the 
MP government, such as technological modernization and competition for 
advertisements, made the newspapers more vulnerable to the pressures from the 
government. The sector foundered in an economic crisis (Kologlu, 1994:86-86), 
even a Kemalist newspaper, Cumhuriyet, reviewed its policl9• However, Groc's 
descriptions of the azal government as distancing itself from the earlier military 
rule, and some defmitions attributed to azal such as 'the reformer of the old order, 
who aimed to liberate social, political, and economic life from the weight of the 
state, from which society had long suffered' (Groc, 1994:204) are completely 
misleading. Although there were tensions between the government and the press, it 
would not be correct to defme the MP government in that way: ''Thus, the 
government began to accuse the press of total indifference to the processes of 
social and political emancipation it was bringing about and to its parallel efforts at 
dismantling certain structures of the Kemalist state" (p.205). The nature of the MP 
88 see Aktllel, 14.03. 1996 
89 Even CUmhuriyet which is known as a Kemalist and statist newspaper declared that it was going to support 
the liberal economy under the threat of closure. During 1983-1985, Cumhuriyet was preparing for the 
technological modernization of the newspaper. and it was in need of financial help. The decision taken at a 
managerial level was to not support the SDP (Social Democrat Populist Party) alone before the October 
1991 elections, but instead to advocate coalitions. In particular, the suggestion of the TPp· MP (True Path 
Party·Motherland Party) coalition instead of the TPp·SDP led to quarrels between the columnists of the 
newspaper. and some resignations followed. Those who resigned claimed that the news was being thrown 
away because of the financial relations of the newspaper (Karaca. 1994: 206-207, 212·215). 
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government was discussed in an earlier chapter. I would argue that when Groc 
explains the criticism in the press in the 1990s against the MP and aza! with the 
Kemalist tendencies of the press, he ignores the fact that the policies of the MP did 
not work in many aspects, which brought a strong reaction from the public. The 
press, then, could not ignore such popular discontent if it was to be popular. The 
claims of Kemalism versus liberalism are already a focus of the thesis and will be 
examined in detail in later chapters. 
It is true that aza! punished some newspapers. In fact, one concrete example of 
aza!' s punishment of the press was experienced with the end of the newspaper 
Terciiman. Terciiman was a supporter of the DP (the Democratic Party), and later 
the extension of it the JP (the Justice Party). The owner of Terciiman, Kemal Ihcak 
was close to Demirel, and, as a contractor, he got many jobs and credits from the 
state However, when azal came into power, he punished the newspaper by 
withdrawing credits. The credits were given only under the condition of cessation 
end of the column by the owner's wife Nazh Ihcak, who is the daughter of the DP 
minister, and also a strong Demirel sympathiser. The debts, in the end, caused the 
sale of the newspaper. Kemal Ihcak died bankrupt. The readers of Terciiman 
turning to the new newspapers called Tiirkiye90 and Zaman 91, was also a factor in 
90 Its origin is a tarikat (Islamic community) called IiUccllar which began publishing a newspaper called 
Hakikat in 1970. Hakikat was renamed Tiirkiye in 1972. and raised its circulation with Turkish-Islam 
synthesis. one of the constiroents of the official ideology of the 1980 military coup, as mentioned in the 
earlier chapter (Kahraman, 1996: 290-292). Now, it belongs to the large holding Was, as seen in the tables 
in the appendix I. 
91 In fact. the editor of Zaman states in the interview conducted in 1996 that Ozal made their establishment 
easier. Although the official owner is not Fethullah GUien. known as Fethullah Hoca. Zaman, Zaman 
Marketing, Cihan News Agency. DUnya Radio, Samanyolu Television are all linked with the Fethullah 
community as the journalists in Zaman confirmed during the interviews. The community also has many 
colleges and universities in Turkey, Albania. Malaysia and in some of the new Turkic republics in Russia 
La~iner describes this religious community as a post modern religious movement: for him, it is an 
articulation of Turkish nationalism, traditional political Islam. neo-liberalism and elitist strong state project 
(l.al'iner, 1995a: 11). Despite the Welfare Party, the Fethullah community tries to gain access to the upper 
levels of the society: economic, political and cultural elites. FethulIah Hoca's understanding of Islam is 
flexible. He believes that the religion changes according to life conditions and he does not deny the 
necessities, institutions and the norms of modem life (La~iner. 1995b: 6~7). 
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Terciiman's fall, but the main reason was C)zars punishment in a response to 
Terciiman's insufficient support 92 (Kahraman, 1996: 177-179). 
The relationship with the media continued in a similar way to that which existed in 
the Ozal period with Tansu <;:iller (whose policies were closer to Oza! than to her 
own party's leader Demirel as explained in the chapter on Turkey). Their 
understanding of the media, and their attempt to obtain the media's support was 
very similar although <;:iller used rewards more. When she was the Minister of 
Finance, she introduced a new practice. Ministers of Finance sign the documents 
which offer some facilities (like custom exemption or state fund-originated low 
interest credits) to those media companies which will make investments93• 
Although signing of these was routine work until then, <;:iller gave a special 
directive to the Treasury, according to which, the owners of the media companies 
had to contact her before she signed the documents (Erel, 1994b: 130). When Tansu 
<;:iller was a candidate for the TPP leadership, the 'press started to pay their debt to 
<;:iller', Erel argues, with the news and columns describing her as 'the symbol of 
change', 'the wind of renewal' and 'charming professor' (Erel, 1994a) 94. Later, 
these financial rewards caused confrontation between <;:iller and the media groups. 
Also, the media groups have been involved in acrimonious debate in their 
newspapers95. 
92 Now, their son, Mehmet Ni n,cak owns the newspapers called Ak~, Takip and Ate~, the distribution 
company called Dost Distribution and Alem Radio. ~am has a very high circulation at the moment 
because of its promotion campaigns. 
93 It is not clear whether this money is used for investments in the media sector. For example, Cumhuriyet 
claims that Zaman established a Mazda automotive branch with the investment promotion money which 
was supposed to be used to establish a printing office (Cumhuriyet, 23.10.1995). 
94 The journalist Erel states that <;i1ler signed 2.6 billion TL investment documents.Most of them were given 
to the newspapers Sabah, Milliyet. HUrriyet, TUrkiye and Interstar TV (Erel, 1994b: 130). She also argues 
that problems of !mar Bank (the bank of the Uzanlar holding which owns InterStar TV channel as listed in 
the tables before) was solved by the Treasury, and some privileges were given following the positive 
coverage of the Inter-star TV on {:iller. (Erel, 1994a). 
9S The media groups attacked each other by questioning the amount of money they obtained as investment 
promotions. state credits or funds in 1995. They questioned each other by asking whether this money, 
taken directly or indirectly from the government, led the media institution to support a political party, 
leader or the government, and, if so, at what expense, whether they gained advantages from the state for 
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The 'carrot and stick policy' referred to before, was very powerful after the 1980s 
through Ozal and <;:iller and this affected the media coverage by causing the media 
institutions to support certain candidates or policies. There are two points which 
should also be mentioned in order to take into account the continuity and the 
complexity of the relationship: 
The first thing is that the favouring of some candidates by the newspapers has 
examples in history96, although there are a wider range ofmethods97 used now. 
The second point to be stressed is that the relationship between the media and the 
state, more specifically between media and the government, is not stable. The 
relationship changes according to the articulation of the different interests. The 
relationship between capital and the media owners as explained in the first part of 
the chapter, is important in that respect because the partisan attitudes of the media, 
especially during the elections, do not always have to derive from the financial 
reward or punishment mechanisms of the government. Besides, it might be related 
to the differing interests of the different sections of the capitaes. 
their businesses outside the media sector by using their identity as a newspaper owner. For these 
discussions see especially Sabah. 17.8.1995, 15.10.1995, 19.10.1995, 26.10.1995, HUmyet, 11.5.1997, 
13.5.1997,20.5.1997,16.2.1995, Milliyet, 2.3.1995,18.8.1995,19.8.1995. 
96 Zincir1aran explains how they supported Demirel as the head of the JP (Justice Party) when he was the 
editor in chief of HUmyet in 1964. He explicitly mentions how they discussed this with the owner of the 
newspaper and supported him because 'Turkey needed dynamic and new politicians'. The supporting 
headlines during the election, and the news which represented Demirel as the best candidate gave him a 
high public profile. After he was elected, 'the newspaper proved its power once again' (Zincirlaran, 1994: 
126-127). 
97 Not only through the news or the columns, as used to be the case, the press currently uses opinion polls 
which are conducted by research companies of their groups or companies they are in a close relationship 
with. These polls, which are not objective. function as a lobbying activity for the candidate or the political 
party that the newspaper supports. For the examples of the media's involvement in the government-
building process. more actively and directly through informal meetings between the owners, influential 
columnists, editors, and the politicians see Kahraman, 1996:371·381 and Nebiler, 1995: 130·131 
98 For example, the two groups supported two different right wing parties. and confronted each other by 
publishing opinion polls which showed that the party they supported would have more votes than the other, 
before the elections in December 1995. Sabah advocated the TPP, Htirriyet and Milliyet advocated the MP. 
There could have been a financial rewarding relationship with the government at the same time, as the 
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3. Conclusion 
In this chapter, an attempt has been made to draw a map of the media in Turkey. In 
doing this, the main concern was to warn against the idealisation of the private 
media. The private broadcasting which started in the 1990 can be a cause of this 
idealisation since it is more diverse than and different from state broadcasting. 
Another source is the strong state which has violated basic civil rights. In this 
environment, it is rational to claim freedom from the state even if this has been 
done for commercial interests. Thus, I argue in this chapter that the absence of the 
understanding of public, and public service broadcasting, and the absence of civil 
rights can make the private sector seem as if it were democratic. Although there is 
nothing wrong in describing the state and state broadcasting as official or 
totalitarian, automatically attributing to private broadcasting characteristics such as 
freedom or diversity, is wrong. 
There are many reasons why we should be cautious about the private media in 
terms of democracy. Firstly, the private media is concentrated, and at the same 
time it is conglomerated by media owners being involved in the other businesses or 
holdings' involving the media sector. The main motive of the private media 
institutions is maximising profit. This was seen in their competition in the 
promotion campaigns. This motive, together with the advertising relations, has a 
restricting effect on information. 
The private media has a close relationship with the state despite the media 
professionals' claim that as the media is strong, and has its own financial resources 
such as advertisements, it is independent of the state. As seen in this chapter, in 
fact, they can unify their power for the national interest or for the government. This 
is consistent with the way the media has been established and developed in Turkey. 
leader of the MP explained Sabah's favouritism for the TPP as being a result of the credits (Nebiler, 
1995:130·131) . However, the division of the newspapers in this case coincides with the division of the 
centre right. As <;alislar states, the TPP aims to integrate with Europe and advocates Customs Union 
whereas the MP addresses the sections of capital which will be damaged by this change, like the 
automotive industry (C;:alislar in Cumhuriyet, 29.12.1995). The close relationship of the powerful national 
business group KO\' with the Dogan group, and Sabah's parallel attitude with the other business group 
Sabancl might be a reason for that partisan coverage of the media 
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As mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the media worked to establish 
modem Turkey. This may be explained with the general situation of the private 
sector in Turkey. They were always linked with the state. They were created and 
developed by the state, and partly because of that, they did not challenge the state. 
Since the private media was subject to economic reward or punishment by the 
government, it reported news in a partisan way, imposing one candidate, party or 
programme. 
Showing the limits and the dangers of both the state and the market is a starting 
point for creating the conditions for democratic communication. What is to be done 
to create democratic communication in Turkey is to change the restrictive legal 
structure, to end the legal and illegal power of the state over civil rights and to 
transform state broadcasting into public service broadcasting. In addition to these 
actions, it is necessary to curb the concentrating and conglomerating power of the 
media. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Media Professionals and News Production 
Dynamics 
As a complement to the earlier chapter which analysed the general structure of the 
Turkish media, this chapter considers news production dynamics via interviews 
conducted with journalists and editors. It also examines changes in the media 
industry and their influence on the work of media professionals. 
Before starting the analysis of the interviews, some preliminary information about 
the conditions in which the journalists work is necessary to provide a context for 
their comments. 
Firstly, in parallel with the concentration and conglomeration of the media, there is 
a trend against trade unionism. One of the media professionals at the top 
managerial level claims that unions affect them negatively, and they could not 
work with the union in 'the current cOliditions of the country' (Otan, 1995: 72-73). 
De-unionisation of journalism has been achieved in a variety of ways. In the 1980s, 
the big media groups made a commercial decision and established different 
companies for the different sections of the newspaper. Thus, for example, the 
journalists who worked in the advertising section of the newspaper were not 
considered to be journalists, and could not be members of the union according to 
the existing legal framework since that section was another company. The union 
was prohibited from recruitment at the newspaper called Sabah. Other newspaper 
bosses who employed journalists who were union members threatened the 
journalists with dismissal, and the journalists had to leave the union99• Only two 
newspapers, (Cumhuriyet and Evrensel), have employees who -are members of the 
union. At the moment, there are no members working for the private TV channels. 
This has many negative effects for the journalists, since they can no longer act in a 
collective way. There are huge differences in salaries between the media 
professionals especially since the emergence of the private TV channels and their 
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'stars', even in the news as a presenter or anchorman. These stars of the television 
channels, who are at the same time columnists in the newspapers, are paid 
thousands of dollars, and get very high transfer payments, such as one hundred 
billion lira, when they transfer from one company to anotherlOO. However, the 
journalists who work all day and sometimes night without any defInition or 
certainty about working hours, are very poorly paid. 
Another tendency in the new media environment, partly as a result of the high 
rewards mentioned, is the increased identification of the managerial staff at the top 
levels with the owner. They regard themselves as being the same as any other 
company manager. Thus, although the separation of ownership and the 
management is claimed to exist, in practice, it does not, since the managerial staff, 
mainly editors-in-chief, have a strong identification with their 'bosses,lOl. 
Although the journalists can not unite to confront problems, the media bosses do, 
so the situation leads to the further empowerment of the already powerful. For 
example, as mentioned above, the media groups have similar newspapers with and 
without promotion coupons. The importance of this for the journalists is that their 
reports from the big newspapers have been used in the small newspapers with 
minor changes. Thus, the already cheap labour of the journalists has been exploited 
two or three timeslO2. 
99 interview with Ercan Ipekci, the head of Turkish Journalists Union Ankara branch in the summer of 1996. 
100 for details see AktueI Para, 8.9.1996, Babiali Magazin, April 1996, 7: 82, and Otan, 1995:27. 
101 The editor in chief of Sabah, Zafer Mutlu describes his job as a responsibility for making the newspaper 
rich like any other company manager: ..... Thus, I always have not differentiated myself from a general 
manager of Ar~elik. My main job was to make my boss a lot of money. My company will grow, my 
company will earn more money, and I will also earn money besides the basic salary" (Mfinir,1993: 138-
140). Of course Zafer Mutlu is not the only one. The editor in chief of Show TV, Ufuk OUldernir published 
one of his close friends (Hasan Cemal) photograph taken in a party environment and used it in Milliyet 
without his permission when he was an editor-in-chief of Milliyet. Gtildemir's defense for using a 
photograph taken in a private place was that Cemal had damaged Milliyet with his writing. He says that he 
would not hesitate to do the same to other people who damage the company he works. So, ethical values, 
professional values, seem to have been replaced by the company's interests (Aktuel, 14.03. 1996). 
102 information given during the interview with Ercan Ipekci, the head of the Turkish Journalists Union (TOS) 
Ankara branch in the summer of 1996. 
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There is no job security for the journalists in Turkey at the moment. The situation 
became worse when the two big groups (Dogan and Bilgin) signed an agreement. 
If a journalist leaves any organization of one group, the other will not accept him! 
her to work in any organization in their group. Since they cover a large proportion 
of the sector, the chance of the journalist finding another job when they leave 
would be very low. 
The analysis below is the outcome of the in-depth interviews (lasting from 60 to 90 
minutes) with two journalists and an editor from each of six newspapers (Sabah, 
Hiirriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Zaman, Diinya) in Ankara and istanbul during the 
summer of 1996. All of them have written on economics, seven of them are special 
I 
economics journalists. The others write both on economic and political news. Two 
editors were mainly responsible for economics, the others for ,politics, when they 
were working as active journalists. All of the interviewees were university 
graduates, 11 out of 18 from departments of journalism, or radio-television, the 
other seven graduated from politics, economics and law departments. All the 
journalists have at least four years working experience, most of them have six or 
seven years', seven of them have more than ten years' experience, one who is an 
editor has twenty three years experience. Only for four of them is the newspaper 
they are working for now their first job as a journalist. 
Although the questions were prepared before the interviews, they were not asked in 
a specific order. Instead, a question of 'how do you spend your ordinary working 
day, can you tell me what you do?' was asked as a first question, and the 
journalists had the opportunity give information on things which had not been 
anticipated prior to the interviews, and construct the issues in their own words. The 
other questions were asked during the conversation, so the interviews can be 
described as semi- structured. 
1. Journalists, Their Definitions of The Newspaper and 
Autonomy 
The definitions, stances and approaches of the newspaper in which the 
interviewees worked was not something asked for in the interviews, but it was 
commonly volunteered by the journalists and the editors. They used different 
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criteria, such as market, ideology, style and organization to describe the newspaper 
in which they worked, and its difference from the other newspapers, sometimes 
with reference to the other newspapers. 
When considered in that respect, it is possible to see a similarity between these 
interviews and those with the Hiirriyet and Sabah journalists. 
They emphasised the popularity of the newspapers, which was related to their size 
in both cases. The Hiirriyet journalist mentioned the newspaper being well 
established whereas the Sabah journalist talked more about the political orientation 
of the newspaper: 
"In a big newspaper like Hilrriyet, target mass is larger. Hilrriyet is a well established 
newspaper which has an institutional character" (a journalist from Htirriyet) 
"Big newspapers are the newspapers of the masses. They are free of fringe ideas. We 
identify ourselves with an urban, democrat, liberal, contemporary new world order" 
(a journalist from Sabah). 
Having a different or striking style was also a common theme in their descriptions 
of the newspapers Hiirriyet and Sabah. 
"Bureaucrats prefer Dtinya, because they find their speeches faithfully reported in the 
newspaper whereas we write more briefly, and they are annoyed when the message 
they had given is lost" (a journalist from Htirriyet) 
"Our style at Htirriyet is different, it is to emphasise the most striking feature, make it 
dominant in the news." (Editor from Hilrriyet.) 
"We choose the topics which can be interesting for people. Some topics can be very 
important for the business world, but not very important for the normal citizen, so we 
do not need to put this on the first page. The things which should be given in a 
sensational way are put on the first page. Reaching the reader is very important for us. 
The important thing in journalism is to be creative. Planes do not crash every day, the 
government is not overthrown everyday, so the important thing is adding to 
emphasise some points in the news, and we are the best in the Turkish press at that." 
(Editor from Sabah) 
Another similarity can be observed in the responses of the Zaman and Cumhuriyet 
journalists. They focused more on the basis of their policy and their ideology. The 
. . 
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emphasis on the middle ground in terms of religious understanding and income 
was striking in the words of Zaman's editor when describing the readership: 
.. Zaman addresses the Islamic intellectuals. There are some radical, aggressive 
Islamist media. The existence of Zaman decreased this radicalism. Zarnan is against 
radicalism, and terrorism, it does not matter where it comes from, it advocates that the 
essence of the religion is in the middle. Zaman' s readers are young, between 25 and 
35 years old, university students from the middle income group" (Editor from 
Zaman) . 
..... we are more leftist." (a journalist from Cumhuriyet.). 
Making a comparison with the others was a very common strategy especially when 
they were describing their newspaper. While the Zaman journalist took the more 
marginal newspapers as a point of comparison to emphasise that they are in the 
middle, the journalist in Curnhuriyet wanted to show that they are on the left. 
The editor of Curnhuriyet, when referring to the description used by others, used 
the term Kemalist. Although he accepted this description of the newspaper, he 
argued at the same time that writing news which has a range of different issues can 
not be ideological, so can not be Kemalist . 
..... They label Cumhuriyet as Kemalist. Okay, it is Kemalist, what is the harm of 
being Kemalist then? Also, when we talk about the news, we can not say that the 
news is Kemalist. How come the news can be Kemalist? Today, we have written fifty 
news items so far, we cover all the issues. Since this is the case, it can not be a 
Kemalist comment of I;iller's press meeting. These are all the extensions of the 
fashion to swear at Atatiirk nowadays (Editor from Cumhuriyet). 
Another common theme in their description of the newspaper in Zaman and 
Curnhuriyet was their independence as a result of the owners' lack of involvement 
- . 
in any other businesses. Diinya's editor stressed the paper's economic content 
while agreeing with the Zaman and Curnhuriyet on this issue103• 
103 The claim of having no other business is not true especially for Zaman, as seen in the chapter on the media 
industry. This emphasis might be because of showing their differences from the other newspapers of the 
two groups, Sabah, Hiirriyet, Milliyet. As will be seen later, the newspapers of the two groups were 
mentioned very often by the others working for Cumhuriyet, Zaman and Diinya. 
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"We have connections with the other media institutions such as Samanyolu TV, 
Cihan news agency. These are the institutions of the same community, but their views 
and ways of doing things are different We are even different from istanbul Zaman, 
here we have more autonomy. We do not have any financial link with these. We 
obtain our income from advertisements and circulation. Sometimes a businessman 
who has religious beliefs may give some help as hayrat (charity in Islamist sense), 
and this businessman may have schools, but there is no link between their finance and 
Zaman's." (Editor from Zaman). 
Being financially independent was seen as something which guaranteed writing 
without considering any interest group. 
"We do not have any interest with anybody, so we can write easily." (a journalist 
fromZaman) 
"This newspaper only has a publishing company which always makes a loss. So, the 
news is not written by considering the financial balances here." (a journalist from 
Cumhuriyet). 
Not being involved in another business was given as evidence of the ability to 
write the truth without comments: 
" DUnya does not have any business except in the media sector. In the other 
newspapers they write the news according to the bosses' or owners' wishes. We try to 
access all the views about an event as much as possible. As DUnya journalists, we do 
not have comments on the news, we write what we hear ... we do not write our news 
on the basis of speculations." (a journalist from Diinya) 
"DUnya does not depend on any group or institution. We do not have any interest in 
sensational personal news, we try to deal with truths: How the Turkish economy is 
doing, what it is being affected by ... etc. rather than the meaningless political 
quarrels .. " (.joumalist from DUnya). 
The owners' lack of involvement in other businesses can be considered as one 
dimension of autonomy according to the journalists. While this does affect the 
ways jourualists work, another element mentioned as being more related to their 
professional autonomy was the issue of 'making special news'. The former is seen 
only in the interviews with the journalists from Zaman, Cumhuriyet and Diinya, the 
latter can be found in the interviews with the journalists from the other newspapers 
as well. All journalists mentioned the 'routine' news and 'special' news. The news 
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based on press briefings was considered as routine news whereas the news 
produced by contacting people and investigating was considered as special news. 
Making special news was seen by some as determining the agenda: 
'I can detennine the agenda and create the special news from the routine news' (a 
journalist from Zaman). 
'I do special news, so I determine my agenda' (a journalist from Milliyet). 
When the journalists, especially economics journalists, emphasised their 
individuality and autonomy, it also meant writing their own news which was not 
determined by the agenda meetings. They mentioned that the conditions for that 
are knowledge, expertise, gaining confidence and trnst, and education in the 
institution. 
"I can work on any topic I want. In the morning I am asked what is happening in the 
economy, I say that I will search this and that. Also, they offer me other topics ... " (a 
journalist from Curnhuriyet). 
''We do not restrict ourselves to that day's agenda meeting. Every piece of news has a 
chance to be published. The important thing is gaining the confidence of the editor, if 
you gain it, he would not ask you whether that news is correct. If you are at that stage, 
you can write your report, leave it and go." (a journalist from Sabah) 
"Htirriyet trusts its journalists. Since it educates the journalists according to their 
expert areas, journalists already follow the developments and write when it is a 
continuation of a file, or is important for the agenda. or has news values. We exist in 
an autonomous sphere. They do not say do this, do that.. (a journalist from Htirriyet). 
The idea of being a specialist journalist having the specialist knowledge and 
, 
writing specialist news, of having autonomy, was very dominant in the interview 
with the journalist from Curnhuriyet. It was combined with her satisfaction and a 
strong sense of identification with the newspaper: 
"I have an advantage over the others since I know about the economy. I do not ask 
questions like 'what will happen?', I ask things like 'this is going to happen, isn't it?'. 
I know which topics I should search for, because I know what will happen. Rather 
than taking what the news sources say, I look at what the data, indicators show. I 
write my news pointing out that 'this data means this, this data means tha!...'. I can 
interpret the numbers and write my reports beca~se of my knowledge of 
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economics .... there is an understanding in Cumhuriyet that the ideas and suggestions 
from the journalists are always taken into consideration. We are lucky since there is 
nothing like censorship. It is a good feeling, 1 can produce, affect and direct" (a 
journalist from Cumhuriyet). 
However, later she adds that: 
"I can do that since I know the priorities of the newspaper. This is a collective study 
in the end." (a woman journalist from Cumhuriyet) 
Even the journalists who claimed that they have autonomy were aware that it was 
restricted. They either took these restrictions for granted with their description of 
the profession, or they mentioned that there was nothing they could do or that they 
resisted in their own ways. The mechanisms that shape, affect or restrict the news 
writing process, and the ways the journalists understand and deal with these 
mechanisms needs to be examined. 
2. The Mechanisms of Constraint 
The mechanisms of constraint in the news production process will be considered in 
three categories: Editorial control, self-censorship by the journalists and 
professional values. 
2.1. Editorial control 
The fIrst thing the journalists, especially the editors, mentioned about the news 
production process is the morning meetings. It was mostly considered as a neutral 
process in which the news stories were distributed in an environment of free 
discussion and collective decision. 
''Every section has morning meetings separately. All journalists give their own 
report." (a journalist from Cumhuriyet.) 
"At the morning meetings, everybody speaks and discusses, then we decide quickly." 
(Editor from Cumhuriyet) 
"Our structure is more democratic, our meetings are free. The editor in chief, editors 
and sub-editors can give their opinions freely in the meetings and make their points 
about the first page" (Editor from Sabah) 
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The editor in Sabah considered that the discussions of the editor in chief, editors, 
and sub-editors are sufficient to label the process as democratic or free by 
completely taking for granted the exclusion of the journalists from this process. 
The editor in Zaman similarly mentioned that in the morning meetings only the 
editors and sub-editors discuss. However, he mentioned that they have meetings 
every Monday which include the journalists as well. He said that in these meetings 
everybody can say whatever they like, even express opposing ideas: 
"We do not have certain boundaries. We negotiate and tolerate by revealing the 
differences, so we find the middle, centre point (Editor from Zaman). 
The differences were something to tolerate in order to achieve the centre point. He 
also added: 
" ... there is no conflict. We already speak the same language". 
Thus, the opposite ideas are the differences of the people who already actually 
"speak the same language". The journalists, who come to work there, are already 
supposed to "speak the same language", and/or the editorial staff in the newspapers 
work with them in order to encourage their socialisation or integration into the 
institution. In fact, when the editor of Zaman was talking about the decision to 
employ some women journalists, he said: 
''There are six women journalists on the lstanbnl Zaman. Now we are carrying out a 
training programme for four full time and four part time women to be journalists here 
(Ankara). We even decided what they are going to read". (Editor from Zaman) 
It may be an extreme example that the editor decides what the journalists read, 
most probably in accordance with the newspaper's ideology. This does not 
necessarily happen as formal training in all the newspapers. Instead, a more 
indirect and informal institutional socialization process occurs through the advice 
of the more experienced journalists, or editors: 
"1 can access some places which can not be accessed by my young friends as a result 
of the fact that 1 can easily get the information which they could not. The essential 
point to the journalists is about how he/she frames the news. 1 always help my friends 
about that. Five or six people call me everyday and ask how they can get the 
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information. In a sense I supervise them. Sometimes they access their sources via my 
references." (a journalist from Curnhuriyet) 
This advice was not considered as control, interference or direction by the 
journalists: 
"I did not experience any direction from the editors both in HUrriyet (the newspaper 
she worked before) and Sabah, but there can be some editorial advice" (a journalist 
from Sabah) 
'The people who are on the higher level sometimes advise us to look at the other 
dimensions as well. Maybe that day you were in a hurry, you could not consider the 
other dimensions properly. Thes~ are technical shortcomings. As a result of forgetting 
or distraction, you can write a very closed or unclear sentence, there may be a gap, 
then it should be made explicit and clear. Or, the people [he means editors or sub-
editors] can hear things that are spoken at the top levels. They do not say 'write this', 
'write that', 'write like that', at least in our newspaper." (a journalist from DUnya) 
In contrast, the editor of Hiirriyet indicated the large extent of editorial 
interference: 
"I discuss with my friends Gournalists) who are following an event, and make an 
agreement about how to write, what to emphasise. We even decide to write some 
things in the news and not write others. It changes according to my contacts with 
Istanbul (he means with the editors and editor-in chief in Istanbul)" (Editor from 
HUrriyet). 
Writing the report is the most active step for the journalists. After the report is 
written, the negotiation process occurs on an editorial level between Ankara and 
istanbuL The role of the journalists then decreases: 
'The fIrst page in every newspaper is determined and arranged by the editor-in-chief, 
I have meetings with news sub-editors and editors there (in Istanbul) via 
teleconference." (Editor from Milliyet) 
"In the meeting the editors and editors-in-chiefs discuss all the news and decide 
whether it is going to be published and on which page. If the editor thinks that one 
piece of news is very important and it should be published, then he establishes a 
dialogue with Istanbul" (a journalist from Zaman), 
He also mentioned that they are not involved in this process, 
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''We write and leave. In fact we can not even find time to intervene in the process 
after writing the report." (a jourri'alist from Zaman). 
All the journalists and editors mentioned that istanbul decides the final form of the 
newspaper. However, they did not tend to say that changes were made to their 
reports after the editing process. 
In some situations, they declared that the news they wrote would not be changed at 
all: 
"I do not face any situations like that, my reports are not changed" (a journalist from 
MiIliyet) 
"After you, they only edit your report. Every single word, and headline remains as it 
is, without any change, when the report is written by a good journalist." (a woman 
journalist from Sabah) 
Since most ofthem did not consider this editing as changes, some really could not 
find any example when asked: 
"Sometimes they change the titles and they want to give another style, in istanbul, in 
page organisation. However, I have not experienced any situation in which the 
essence, and the emphasis of my reports have been changed and have felt annoyed." 
(a journalist from MiIliyet) 
The changes made in the editing process, such as to headlines, were seen as very 
small details. The main change was described by one journalist as the change in the 
topic: 
"My reports are not changed. The headline is the appreciation of the page editor. He 
can decide according to page setting or the way the report is written. We can never 
say 'what is this? I did not write such a report'. We do not have such things. If the 
report is about a divorce because of disagreement, it can not be changed to being 
because of adultery. The news appears as I write it" (a journalist from Zaman) 
Mostly they thought that these were only changes in the form of the news rather 
than in the meaning: 
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"the meaning does not change at all The fact that they are having the last word does 
not mean that they are telling everything. The pages are edited to make the news 
better to read." (a journalist from Diinya) 
"The news we send is almost the same in the newspaper. However, we may not see 
some situations very well. Istanbul gives the shape, develops and rermes the news, 
adds some dimensions which are related with Istanbul" (Editor from Diinya) 
" Istanbul does not change, they ouly edit. They can change the headlines. They can 
put a more impressive headline, which I did not think of before. I do not feel 
disturbed by that." (a journalist from Diinya). 
Besides the explanations of professional refinement, the changes were also seen as 
a result of technical reasons, such as space: 
"It is edited, sometimes there is not enough space on the page so it can be shortened 
or the headline can be changed" (a journalist from Zaman) 
"I do not have anything like that. My reports are not changed, even the headline. 
Sometimes some changes are made because of some space problems, when the report 
is too long for the space" (a woman journalist from Cumhuriyet) 
While the journalist in Cumhuriyet did not at first think the editing because of 
space restrictions altered her reports, later she mentioned that there can be big, 
surprising changes. However, she emphasised that this was not ideological, but 
technical, and they could not be informed because of time shortage: 
"Sornetirnes I am surprised, I say 'look, it is different, where did they get this 
headline', but it is not ideological, these are the headlines which can be seen as 
suitable by the page secretary because of the space problems. We are not informed 
about these changes because of the time shortages" (a woman journalist from 
Cumhuriyet). 
In contrast, the experienced journalist, and columnist in the same newspaper in 
istanbul, said that journalists are called and asked about the changes: 
"The news that comes from Ankara is placed without changes, but if it has many 
inappropriate things, the journalist who reported that news is called and asked: Shall 
we do it like that? They never make any changes without asking me (a journalist from 
Cumhuriyet). 
123 
CHAPTERS MEDIA PROFESSIONALS AND NEWS PRODUCTION 
Some accepted that it is possible that the emphasis in the news can be changed 
during this process although they did not want to elaborate, and instead mentioned 
it as a small detail: 
Sometimes there are changes in the emphasis. Apart from that, it is OK, there is no 
problem abont that." (a journalist from Zaman) 
Also, sometimes they give importance to one thing, they make something the 
headline, and bring something to the fore." (a journalist from Curnburiyet). 
During the conversation, even the journalists who argued that their news had not 
been changed, talked about the changes. The interesting thing here was their use of 
very definite language structures (such as the words 'never', 'not at all', 'it is not') 
when they mentioned that their news would not be changed, as seen above, 
whereas they used less certain expressions (such as the word 'sometimes') when 
they expressed the changes. 
The journalist at Zarnan talked about the experience of his friends rather than 
discussing his own: 
"Sometimes my friends get annoyed about the changes, because their news can be 
changed and lead to some misunderstandings, the follOwing day they can not even 
look their news source in the face [a Turkish phrase to express embarrassment], 
because their name is written and they may not be able to stand the reactions after the 
news appeared. My newspaper, particularly, has very sensitive readers". 
Another journalist also mentioned that they can be in a difficult position in their 
relationship with the news sources104 after some changes occurred in the news: 
"My reports are sometimes changed in format and in istanbul they change the 
headline. It bothers me sometimes. They may rewrite and change the meaning, you 
\04 The striking thing here is that they did not object to the changes made in the editing process saying that 'it 
was not exactly what happened' or 'the report did not reflect the event exactly'. They did not raise the 
issue by using these arguments maybe because they assumed that. despite the dominant professional rules, 
the news is a construction, and the reality is constructed differently. The framed news according to the 
interests of the owners in the recent years especially in the private TV charmels might also have played a 
role in their conceptions. 
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may not recognize your report, and this puts you in a difficult position with respect to 
your news sources" (a woman journalist from Sabah\Os) 
Thus, some journalists accepted that the meaning of the news can be changed, the 
news may not be published at all, and there might be reasons other than technical 
ones: 
The editor of Milliyet in Ankara said: 
''They do not say do not write this or that, but they may throw the report into a 
mbbish bin in Istanbul. Nobody tells you, you see the end result". 
"Sometimes it is because of the shortage of space, sometimes the guy does not put the 
report in the newspaper because he does not like it or because it was not suitable for 
the newspaper's general policy. Well, this is the pain of journalism." (a journalist 
from Zaman) 
Although the comment'the pain of journalism' implies he takes it for granted, this 
is not exactly the case. In fact, he said he was angry about the changes. 
"I sometimes get annoyed at the end of the process, I swear because I make a big 
effort in writing the report .. I may not see the reports, which is very important for me, 
in the following day's newspaper.:" (a journalist from Zaman) 
Although their anger over these changes shows that they were not indifferent to 
them, these journalists also said that there was nothing they could do to prevent it 
occurring: 
"Actually I do not resist editorial change, I do not call and ask the editor in istanbul, 
because there is a hierarchical relationship. I do tell the people here, and they tell the 
others ... If you start to discuss such things like why your report is not published, they. 
start to freeze you out. You can never be offended by them even though you write the 
news all week and nothing is published. Their agenda can be different, this is the 
appreciation of the editors in the end. You may think that this is the news that should 
be put on the first page with big headlines and it may not even be published at all. If 
\05 This journalist is also the one who mentioned that there would he no single change in the report and the 
headline if the report was written by a good journalist. as a reply to the question about editing and the 
relations in the newspaper. However. when she was talking about the relations with news sources. she 
complained about the editing process by saying that the news can not be recognised after it. 
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you offend, you offend yourself, you affect yourself, nothing else, and you can reach 
a situation in which it is very difficult to write a report." (a woman journalist from 
Sabah) 
There were issues which another journalist in Curnhuriyet was unhappy with, but 
again he felt powerless to alter them Also, for him, the newspaper he worked for 
was relatively better than the others: 
"It is not an easy thing to join the management of the newspaper, even in this 
newspaper. In other newspapers you cannot even open your mouth about the policy 
Everybody can write the things they want here, but the managerial staff can still say 
'what kind of thing is this?' or they can offer another thing ... this is the newspaper in 
which I can get my reports accepted most of the time. I can not say that the policy of 
Cumhuriyet is very good, but there is nothing else I can do about that at the moment. 
If I were on the managerial board, I would have some responsibilities about that, but 
now I am interested in my own working area." (a journalist from Cumhuriyet) 
The idea of the journalists being unable to join the management was considered by 
some journalists as a necessary thing: 
"There is a reason for this. There are filters, as a journalist you are at the bottom, then 
there are sub-editors, editors, editor-in-chief. Since of these filters have a function, 
these people occupy these places. These filters are natural, necessary, and function to 
make changes .. " (a journalist from Hilrriyet Woman) 
As seen in the extract, she thought that the hierarchical organisation in the 
newspaper was necessary. The filters here are used to defme a very natural and 
necessary process. 
Others also legitimised these changes by regarding them as an extension of the 
division of labour in the newspaper, or'~ necessity of the nature 'of the profession. 
"We are not in a position to take decisions. We only take the picture of an event." (a 
journalist from Sabab) 
"In the end I am a journa1ist. There are editors in Ankara and istanbul, and their 
business is to control. The report might not be published, this is not our business, this 
is the business of people in Istanbul. Our job is to write a report." (ajourna1ist from 
Zaman) 
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2.2. Self-censorship 
The issue of self-censorship was revealed in the interviews in relation to the 
editorial control mechanisms. Issues such as indirect control by editors, or more 
broadly, professional socialization were not discussed. 
The lack of conflict between the journalists and the sub-editors or editors is seen as 
the absence of any control mechanism However, professional socialization 
prevents this conflict: 
"In time, you seize the style, and you write the report as they want." (a journalist from 
Milliyet) 
When the editor of Milliyet talked. ~bout self-censorship, he considered it as 
something peculiar to the journalists. According to him, it means excluding or 
reducing some elements in the news rather than constructing them differently. He 
did not see self-censorship as being the only thing responsible for narrowing the 
news content, but considered it one of the restrictive filters, together with the 
editorial filter. This was in contrast to the journalist previously quoted, who talked 
about the filters as necessary elements. The interesting thing in this interview was 
that he made a very critical comment. Even though he was an editor, he did not 
include himself in his criticism, as if he was somehow outside the process: 
"The journalists sometimes apply self-censorship. If I write this, the boss will get 
annoyed. There are already many things to obstruct the journalist in his writing. So, if 
a journalist applies self-censorship, it is worse, as you yourself then restrict the 
people's freedom of receiving the news. You have a filter, the editor has another 
filter, then the news loses its content when it arrives at the reader and it makes us 
think 'what is the point of this news? Why is this news in the newspaper?" (Editor 
from Milliyet) 
Despite this, self-censorship was seen as something which depends on each 
individual journalist and something which they can prevent. Although it was 
recognised that the news may not be published or some elements excluded, it was 
not problematic, it was another process which was outside their responsibility. The 
interesting thing here is that the journalists, even the ones who did not talk about 
the changes made by editors mentioned editorial control in order to prove that they 
" 
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do not carry out self-censorship. They said, the journalists should not think about it 
when writing the news: 
"Self-censorship is the most important thing. This should not be applied by the 
journalists. Journalists should not be interested in which inter,st group is affected by 
the news, a journalist should care about writing the report, nothing else. Helshe 
should write the report even though helse is sure 100% that the report will not be used 
in the newspaper. Using the report or not, excluding some elements or not is some 
other people's business, like the editor, or editor-in-chief. As a journalist you do not 
have other any mission such as making these people's business easier. It is very 
important that individual journalists have this idea. The newspaper is published by the 
journalists" (a woman journalist from HUrriyet) 
"I always write the news even though I know that it will not be used. HUrriyet 
generally, make it shorter, with small headlines, maybe not on the first page, but uses 
it on another page whereas other newspapers would throw it away. The important 
thing is not to self-censor, but to carry on writing." (a journalist from HUrriyet) 
The editor of Diinya, related self-censorship to the newspaper's policy, but added 
that its existence is up to individual journalists: 
"Maybe we can talk about self-censorship by the journalist. It derives from the 
newspaper's policy and the interests as an outcome of the policy. Although we 
seldom experience these kinds of things, it does not reach the extent which harms our 
professional understanding. Of course it depends on the journalist'S own manner. I 
can say on behalf of myself and my friends here that we try to be independent as 
much as possible" (Editor from DUnya). 
In contrast to the ideas which assume that self-censorship depends on each 
individual journalist, and it should not occur, a journalist from Zaman mentioned 
that 
"For example, there are some news stories that I can write in this newspaper, some 
others that can be written by another journalist who works in another newspaper" (a 
. I' fr Za )106 Journa 1St om man . 
106 This does not mean that the self-censorship mechanism only works in Zaman and not in the other 
newspapers. The issue here is the journalists awareness of self-censorship or application of it 
unconsciously. I think the second happens in all newspapers, including Zarnan and including those which 
deny that it occurs, with all informal, unstructured mechanisms. The difference in Zaman might be, as 
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This was an issue mentioned by other journalists when they talked about the ways 
of resistance, as will be discussed in the last section of this chapter. 
The long extract below from another Zaman journalist is an example of self-
censorship when journalists have a strong identification with the newspapers for 
which they work. Thus, in this case self-censorship becomes not only an individual 
issue, but the articulation of the individual approach with the institutional identity, 
as seen with the use of the words 'my readers' and the explanations about not 
writing negative news on the Welfare Party and police: 
"For example, there is tension in the Prime Ministry now between the bodyguards of 
Erbakan [the leader of the Welfare Party] and Security guards. It is quite difficult for 
me to write about this, because some of my readers are supporters of Refah [the 
Welfare Party], and they can react against this news. For m~ again, it is difficult to 
write directly about the wrong behaviour I observed in the police. Why? Because the 
police consider Zarnan as their friend. Zarnan is liked by the police because of its 
news which does not criticise the police!O'. So, I do not write that. There are some 
things left unwritten. There is no such thing written as 'you can not write about the 
police'. There are some things that you can write, others you can not because of the 
conjuncturel situation of the newspaper, its general policy " (a journalist from 
Zarnan). 
These "unwritten" things actually affect the way journalists write although the 
existence of such things was not addressed much. 
mentioned above. their giving a more formal training to new journalists and possibly expressing more 
clearly what to emphasise or what to avoid in the news in terms of newspaper p~licy. 
. . 
107 These ideas of the legal owner of Zaman below give the context, and show the relationship between the 
comments of the journalist from Zaman and the ownership mechanisms and orgaqizational ideology: 
Kaya argues, in his article, on the police-media relationship, that news about mistakes or late interventions 
of the police at some events such as murders, takes more prominence in the press, and this situation creates 
an image which is inaccurate. Especially the news on terror, according to him, contributes to the 
unsuccessful, weak and passive image of the police. He states that the image of people who are unarmed 
and beaten in the streets helps to create an atmosphere against police, and becomes a material 'to be used 
in pleasure' by 'the professional police enemies' who are waiting to reduce the prestige of the police. 
According to him, 'what is expected from media'. instead: 
'is to inform the public in a positive way about police and police services. Only the public who are 
informed positively can support police, and therefore police can be successful in their job .... (Kaya, 1996: 
1148, liS!). 
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"I hear that the police are behaving wrongly ethically, they become drunk or disturb 
people. I can prevent this without writing a report, without revealing it. I can call the 
head of the security and say 'look, there is something like that. These can humiliate 
you. In recent days an event occurred around here. People who had relatives in prison 
were beaten. I told them that time that 'if you abuse the old ladies, this will not be 
good for you', but they did not listen and abused them anyway. The police behaved 
towards the people as if the people were armed. In fact these people were suffering 
because of their children. Of course there were some young provocateurs who were 
shouting, and they caused confrontation between the police and the old people, and 
after that they left." (a journalist from Zaman) 
He emphasised the beatings of the old ladies, not the others. 
"You never know, my son could be there". 
On the one hand, he had a degree of sympathy for them in a common-sense way 
because the demonstrators had not used violence. On the other hand, he curtailed 
his identification with them by returning to the issue of their real aim: 
" What is this for? It is meaningless to divide the society". 
The aim of the people was to divide society. In fact the reason for the old ladies 
being beaten by the police was their children. The others, present, were labelled by 
the journalist as young provocateurs, who had caused the confrontation between 
the police and the old ladies on purpose. The journalist was annoyed by this event, 
because it would not be good for the police, so the participants were presented as 
the 'young provocateurs' whereas the police were seen as the victims of the event. 
The way to prevent these things was to talk to the police directly without 
publishing it. Then, I asked the question: "Isn't reporting this event in the 
newspaper, using the power of the newspaper, the best way of preventing this 
happening again?" 
The reply was: 
"Of course we write the things if we believe in them. We tell them [ the police], if 
they do it again, we will write about it or send it to another newspaper to form a 
pressure group"." 
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It is like solving family matters at home before going out. Since he described the 
newspaper as police-friendly, to write things that could contradict this policy, 
would be quite difficult, and would therefore only be used as a last resort 'to 
constitute pressure groups'. Since the journalists stated that they would only write 
something if they believed in it, reporting is not a completely objective reflection 
of reality, but rather something that can be constructed socially. This will be 
considered further with the examination of professional values. 
2.3. Professional values 
''The things that we have written is half of the things we could write" (a journalist 
from Sabah) 
It was professional values which, according to him, prevented him writing the 
other half. 
"but the principles of the profession bind us. There needs to be very concrete 
evidence to publish a report in the newspaper. Sometimes you may not find the 
evidence even though you know it exists. If I write a column, or a book in the future, 
I can write them, but then it will not be news, but a story or comment. News reporting 
is a serious thing, you should follow your claims to the end with the evidence." (a 
journalist fromSabah) 
The ideas that emphasise the nature of the news as a concrete form of evidence 
were reinforced with the differentiations made between the news and columns. It 
was stressed that the news is not comment, and should not be incorrect, distorting 
reality or directing readers, but should be objective: 
"We try to give the event as it is, without distorting. Our work is to present news 
material in a different format or to work on points which can be difficult for the 
readers to understand. However we never touch the essence of the news. We write 
differently in our comment columns." (Editor from Diinya). 
"If you are writing a report about an event, elements which direct readers should be 
avoided. Zaman is working with a mission of objectivity" (ajoumalist from Zaman). 
The professional values expressed with news value and objectivity were presented 
as factors which balance the potential restrictions that might result from the 
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newspaper's policy or from misuse of the news for the personal aims of the 
journalists: 
"Although we support privatization, as a result of the criterion of the news value, we 
cover the anti-privatist ideas and the shortcomings that have occurred during 
privatization" (a journalist from Diinya). 
''This is a newspaper which believes in the development of the private sector, but the 
working criteria and tradition which have been established in Dunya makes people 
ultimately objective. The thing is, the news you have written is either correct or 
incorrect. The important point is to have personal and professional moral values. For 
example, journalists can not use the news for their own personal aims, say, in the 
stock market." (a journalist from Diinya). 
According to the editor of Zaman, different topics could be covered as a result of 
objectivity: 
"Objectivity and scepticism are the most important things in journalism. As long as 
we are objective, different ideas do not matter, so every topic can be news." (Editor 
fromZaman) 
Using news sources as evidence was seen by one journalist as a guarantee of the 
news being correct: 
''The journalists should not write the news without basing it on a source which is 
confirmed and checked. The news should be correct" (a journalist frorn Cumhuriyet). 
The news sources have a limited range, as will be seen in the analysis of the news 
in the next chapter. Almost all journalists interviewed mentioned politicians, 
bureaucrats, managers, experts, officers in public institutions and academics as 
news sources. As an addition to this list, only one journalist said that a worker 
could be a news source (from Sabah), and another one from Curnhuriyet said that 
everybody, even the journalists themselves were the news sources for him. They 
also mentioned the relations with news sources as one of the most important 
factors in following their profession. To contact and to be close to the news sources 
was very important so that they could write their reports. 
"Relations with the news sources needs a lot of work, confidence. In fact, news 
sources can prefer the journalists who they rely on (a journalist from Hiirriyet). 
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Close relations with the news sources at a high level were considered essential for 
the journalists in order for them to be well informed. 
"You should go and chat with him in the mornings, things can come up during these 
chats, and you can ask his permission to write. If he is sick, you should visit, or if 
he/she is dismissed from his job, you should call and give your good wishes to him ... " 
(a journalist from Sabah) 
"It is the case ·that I even discussed our family problems with my news sources on the 
phone before meeting face to face". (a journalist from Curnhuriyet) 
''We have very close relations with them, we go to meals to have fun together. We 
become friends and do things that friendship brings. Then they call and inform us. In 
time, they start to think like journalists and call and ask us 'can this event be news' " 
(a journalist from Zaman) 
According to the journalist, news sources have a purpose behind wanting to have 
contacts with journalists: 
" They have reasons for doing that, they either want to use this for their personal 
interests, or to put someone in difficulty. Sometimes it is possible to sacrifice a 
person with a report ... " (a journalist from Zaman) 
They also mentioned the dangers of being directed by the news sources. According 
to the journalists, knowing the area can prevent these dangers: 
"News sources have offered to write a partial report. We had a very informal, close 
relationship until that time. I finished my relationship with them immediately. If they 
ask for favourable news, it finishes naturally in accordance with professional 
principles .... The risk of being manipulated by the news sources is the case mostly 
when the journalist does not follow the event from the beginning." (a journalist from 
Dilnya) 
''When I first started my job, some businessmen and public relation officers involved 
in lobbying activities wanted to meet me. I did not understand at that time, then the 
offers started, for example they said that his company has such a big profit, 'why 
don't you write this', 'write that', I had to end my relationship so as not to be 
involved in such things ... As long as you know the data, you can not be directed ... " (a 
woman journalist from Curnhuriyet). 
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In contrast to these explanations, which consider the manipulative or directive 
effect of the news sources, one journalist evaluated the news sources more broadly 
by questioning their limited range and priorities: 
"The important thing is the words of the leaders. If you go to a meeting in the 
ministries council and miss the words of the prime minister, the remainder of the 
report is not important at all. Like <;:iIIer, Erbakan said they are focusing on which 
leader said what rather than the topics that are more related to people. In my opinion, 
the people queuing for the cheap bread should be more newsworthy than a <;:iIIer 
YlImaz word duel.." (ajouma1ist from Sabah) 
She also stressed the importance of impartiality. As seen above in the comments on 
objectivity as something which guarantees different topics becoming the news and 
extends the limits of the policy of the newspapers, impartiality is another 
professional value, considered in a positive way in terms of preventing the 
newspapers from being partisan: 
"Newspapers should be impartial, at least they should not make politics when they 
write the news on politics. Ne:-vspapers now are making politics themselves. Of 
course you can not make the news without making politics, but the things they have 
done are too much .... " (a journalist from Sabah) 
Some evaluated professional values, mainly impartiality, not in terms of the 
institution, but in relation to themselves. A journalist in Hiirriyet said that when he 
was working in Diinya, 
"The policy of Diinya did not fit with my ideas, but as a journalist you think of your 
profession as separate", 
A journalist who writes reports on privatization in Diinya said that he was against 
privatization: 
"However, when I look at the issue as a journalist, I write the news about 
privatization as a requirement of my job. It cannot be the case that the journalist leaks 
his or her own views into the news he or she writes. It should not happen anyway. 
Even though the news has contradictions, I write like that, I have to reflect like that as 
a requirement of my profession." (ajournaJist from Diinya). 
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A journalist in Cumhuriyet considered the restrictive effects of the professional 
value of impartiality on the news content. He was against impartiality, but this did 
not mean that the evidence should be distorted: 
''Why should I become impartial? Say, on the one side there is war, on the other 
peace. On the one side human rights, on the other torture. It is impossible. Even the 
naked truth is impartial. I never distort the evidence, but I have partiality" (a 
journalist from Curnhuriyet ). 
He questioned the role of the media in politics by giving examples: 
"There is no such thing as the so called fourth estate. The media has never become a 
fourth estate in Turkey. Journalism is always a power against the people in the streets. 
The press always gets credit from the state and has always depended on the state, 
trade institutions, and the private sector. A newspaper can ruin a politician, but it does 
not mean that they are powerful. Having power means being one of the elements 
which determines the system. We are in the 63rd day of the death strikes. There 
should be a way to change the system of law, but it is not the case in this current 
situation .. " (a journalist from Cumhuriyet). 
It should be mentioned here that the journalist from Cumhuriyet mainly criticises 
the other newspapers rather than the one for which he works. In the remainder of 
the paper, the interviews with the journalists will be summarised by focusing on 
how they criticise the media institutions for which they work, in what ways, and 
how they resist the structures. 
3. Criticism and Resistance 
This section aims to summarise the ideas of the journalists by focusing on which 
dimensions of constraints they criticised most, how they criticised and in what 
ways they attempted to resist them. 
The journalists interviewed did not talk about the restrictive power of the state on 
the media, although this is the case in Turkey as explained in the earlier chapter. 
This can be explained by the fact that the mainstream newspapers are not as subject 
to pressure from the state as the more radical and small scale newspapers and the 
magazines. Instead, the issue of the state was represented in the interviews as the 
relationship between the government and the media, characterised as party 
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favouritism. The media here was labelled as 'they' even though it was the 
newspaper the journalist worked for: 
"They prefer to align themselves to one side rather than writing the news related to 
the majority .... .it came to the point that when the newspaper wrote favourably about a 
party leader, it could have more subsidies, or in the opposite scenario, it could receive 
nothing. This is the contradiction with the order of things. Generally the government 
should be criticised by the newspaper and the opposition, but now the opposition 
political parties have started a war with the newspapers, as seen in the Mesut Y 1Imaz 
and Sabah relationship." (a journalist from Sabah). 
"In recent years there have been very rigid attitudes towards parties and politicians. It 
was not that extreme before. The partiality of the press has stemmed from the 
government, and reduced the prestigeousness of journalism." (a journalist from 
Hiirriyet) 
The reasons for party favouritism varied in the interviews with the journalists, and 
were seen as the government itself or the financial interests of the media groups, as 
seen above. The result of this tendency of the media was seen as the end of 
professional values such as objectivity, as will be seen in the words of the editor of 
Zaman. It should be emphasised here that, especially when the journalists from 
Zaman and Cumhuriyet mentioned these points, it was an issue for the big media 
groups, such as the Dogan and Bilgin groups, rather than something which is 
related to the media institution for which they work. In fact, the changing 
ownership dynamics were repeated themes in the interviews with the journalists 
from Zaman and Cumhuriyet: 
''The press have become politicised, the situation is terrible, they are not objective. I 
can recognise false news that can manipulate the citizens. However, do the readers 
have this privilege? No" (Editor from Zaman). 
"In recent years the Turkish press support a political party like a sports team. Sabah 
nsed to support Y1Imaz, but now favours <;i1ler against Ylhnaz. If they are the voice 
of certain interests, power or people who are united around an idea, or belief, the 
press cannot be free. Then you have to do what the boss of that structure tells you to 
do ... we were talking with a journalist from Hiirriyet the other day. He said they were 
journalists during the Simavi period, but now they are working as servants of the 
boss .... They even forced Taha Akyol to write a column against Sabah during the 
promotion quarrels. We do not have such things here" (a journalist from Zaman). 
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He also emphasised the big business characteristic of the other newspapers. Unlike 
the journalists in Cumhuriyet, he included the ihlas group with the other two media 
groups. It seems that when the journalists refer to the other newspapers, this 
reference is also related to their becoming a kind of competitor in the market. Thus, 
only the Zaman journalist referred to Tiirkiye, which is the newspaper of the ihlas 
group: 
''These are all because of the benefit relations ... They regard journalism with the logic 
of a businessman and have jobs, investments and institutions in evel)' sector. Dogan, 
ihIas, and Sabah are the same, they are supported by advertisements, state subsidies, 
they always need more capital and credit since they have many businesses, they have 
to depend on the government, how can they be independent?" (a journalist from 
Zaman) 
,I ; 
This criticism was stronger among the Cumhuriyet journalists since it suited the 
'leftist' discourse of Cumhuriyet. They focused on commercialisation of the media 
as an economic issue. This explained everything, according to them, so there was 
no need to talk about political elements such as party favouritism: 
"There is no party favouritism in the media, everything is money. Since they have 
many businesses, the state can harm them easily. How can you be a journalist in these 
conditions?" (Editor from Cumhuriyet) 
"Monopolised press means being a part of that monopolised capitalist system. That 
part can not criticise the whole they themselves take part in. The problem is about the 
whole. That is, the whole is the reason for the police beatings, the war that has existed 
in the South-eastern area for 14 years ... The press does not have any values, especially 
, , 
the people who are at the top levels, they have no values at all. It is worse than any 
private company, because when the private companies use corruption, the effects of it 
are small whereas when the press becomes a nest of corruption, everything becomes 
spoiled. In order to bring it to reason, a great power is necessary, I guess it is 
necessary to make a revolution because everything runs off the rails." (a journalist 
from Cumhuriyet). 
As seen here, most of the journalists, especially the ones from Cumhuriyet are very 
critical about the general conditions of the Turkish press, but not about the 
newspaper for which they work. Their high identification with the newspaper may 
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be the reason for that. Although it is debatable whether the newspapers Cumhuriyet 
and Zaman are radical, the words of the Cumhuriyet journalists suggest so: 
''We work as a representative of certain political ideas, we are more leftist and work 
in this direction. There is no contradiction between the institutions and the journalists 
in certain radical ideological structures such as Zaman and Cumhuriyet" (a journalist 
from Cumhuriyet) 
Cumhuriyet and Diinya journalists did not complain at all about the institution for 
which they work, and there was no suggestion of resistance. For the former, it was 
mainly because of the identification with their paper, whereas for the latter it was 
professional values, as seen previously. 
The solutions or resistance to the concrete problems they themselves experienced 
as a result of the daily mechanisms in the newspapers, were limited. There was no 
unitary element which reduced their resistance. The elements included editorial 
control mechanisms, their socialisation in the organisation, self-censorship as an 
extension of this socialisation and professional values. A further factor is that, as 
mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, the journalists are no longer members of 
a union. There is a lack of security in their employment. This situation can reduce 
resistance and introduce competition between the journalists. However, at the same 
time, it can bring a sense of solidarity. This solidarity is not a collective solidarity 
under the umbrella of the leadership of the trade unions since union membership is 
not acceptable to their bosses. Nevertheless, at least recognising their common 
problems and their decreasing status can bring some solidarity as a source of 
resistance on a small scale. Although it does not change their working conditions, 
it might work to reduce the restrictions originated mainly through editorial 
mechanisms. In fact, one journalist mentioned that solidarity might have increased 
recently despite the fact that journalism is very competitive: 
"Since journalism is a very individualistic, competitive profession, and depends on 
individual success, there has always been big competition between the journalists. We 
regard each other as a threatening element, and keep our reports from each other. 
Maybe solidarity has increased a little bit in recent years." (a woman journalist from 
Milliyet). 
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The journalists interviewed expressed that they realise this solidarity and resistance 
by exchanging news with other journalists in order to allow that news to be 
bl' h d . h 'f' h' 108 pu IS e ill anot er newspaper, 1 not ill t elf own : 
"I have solidarity with other journalists who work in different newspapers, even the 
ones that have an opposite idea. I. for example. give the news to the news agency 
which is leftist. then a report that is not suitable for our newspaper can be published 
somewhere else. There is not a great competition between journalists. Also these 
things are important to create a public opinion." (a journalist from Zarnan) 
''We help each other and exchange the news. For example. there are some news items 
that 1 can write in this newspaper, some others that can be written by another 
journalist who works in another newspaper." (another joumalist from Zaman) 
"If 1 am obstructed, 1 can tell the other journalist to write in another newspaper ... " (a 
journalist from Hlirriyet) 
''Nothing remains hidden" was repeated by many journalists. Possibly this 
reflected their optimism. Nothing could remain hidden because they would let 
other newspapers know, or wait for the power dynamics to change: 
"However. nothing remains secret. Once, they did not want to print my news and said 
'lets not write these things about this guy'. Then the balance of the benefits changes 
so fast that 1 wrote this again two months later. and it was accepted. This is a wild 
atmosphere, sometimes its wildness gives us advantages" (a joumalist from Hlirriyet). 
"Nothing can remain hidden because you can confirm the information later. The 
actors. and their positions and expectations will have changed in a few years. They 
may. for example, situate themselves in an opposite camp" (a journalist from Sabab) 
Nothing would remain hidden. They themselves would write somewhere else if not 
in the newspapers: 
"if 1 am obstructed .... .! can write with another name somewhere else." (a journalist 
from Hilrriyet). 
109 Similarly, Tunsta11 observes that information exchange exists between journalists who are in competition. 
However,in contrast to his study which revealed that routine information is shared instead of potential 
exclusives (Tunstall, 1971:229). this study of interviews shows that the journalists in Turkey exchange 
even the special news which would not be published in the newspaper for which they work. 
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4. Conclusion 
The main issue that was omitted in the interviews with the journalists and editors 
was that of the state. Although the legal and illegal restrictions of the state 
continue, the media professionals interviewed tended not to talk about thatl09• This 
might be because their newspapers are more mainstream, and do not object to state 
pressure as much as the small scale and more marginal newspapers and magazines 
do.lf this is the case, it is striking since the discourse of press freedom has been 
used for a long time against the state, and particularly recently it has been used by 
the large media groups as well when their commercial interests are threatened by 
the regulative structures of the state. 
The main reason, for their reluctance to talk about the state and its pressure on the 
media, I argue, besides the fact that these newspapers are not damaged much by the 
state, is the current media environment in Turkey. As seen in the earlier chapter, 
the media owners have had a close relationship with the prime ministers over the 
last decade in order to maximise their interests. The concentration in the sector 
gives them an advantage, especially before elections. This close relationship 
between the media owners and politicians can affect the conceptualisations of the 
journalists. For these journalists conceptualisation of the state is reflected in 
political candidates or party favouritism. 
As explained in the earlier chapter, the emergence of the private TV channels, the 
strengthening of the media groups with the ownership of the newspapers, 
magazines, and TV channels, their concentration as the oligopoly of the two 
groups, their involvement in other businesses. the other businesses entering the 
media sector, their profitable and irresponsible broadcasting during the long 
unregulated years, their involvementjn promotion campaigns as a result of the 
• 
severe competition ... etc., allowed us to see the negativities ofthe market. 
109 Only the editor of Sabah talked about the state, but not in terms of its legal or illegal power. He mentioned 
the necessity of minimising the role of the state in the economy in order to achieve press freedom. and 
create an independent and powerful press. 
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I argue that, besides the close relationship with the government, there have been 
two other developments in this environment which have been influential in leading 
the media professionals interviewed to criticise the current media environment 
rather than the state. The first development is the media changing their content 
according to the commercial interests of the owners. The second is the increasing 
differentiation in terms of reward between the star media professional and the 
ordinary journalists, as mentioned in the introduction to the chapter. Whereas the 
highly rewarded and high status media professionals at the top managerial levels 
have a high identification with the media institution for which they work, the 
journalists tend to see themselves as being less attached to the media institution 
which does not attach a true value to their labour, and creates an unsafe working 
environment. 
Besides contributing to the negligence of the state, the developments mentioned 
above have had an opposite impact on the professional values of the journalists 
interviewed. The violation of professional values for party support, for a close 
relationship with the government, or for the profits of the owners, made them 
advocate professional values. Like all journalists everywhere, they supported these 
values, such as objectivity and impartiality. They assumed that criticising 
professional values would empower irresponsible and partial journalism. The main 
. question here is whether the profe~sional values function; to internalise the 
commercial dictates, as mentioned above, with the use of the discourse of press 
freedom, or function as a protection against it/ to by the attempts of some 
individual journalists who do not have strong identification with the newspaper. It 
is difficult to say that the second is likely when considering their limited autonomy 
and power. In addition, it should be pointed out that the potential power of the 
journalists to resist the commercial dictates is limited as a result of their restricted 
critical stance i) on the market mainly with the ownership; ii) on the state with the 
government and party politics; iii) on the control with the editorial interventions. 
110 This idea is from Robert W. McChesney who argues that the ideology of professional journalism 
functioned to internalise the commercial dictates in 19308 America: "".despite the ostensible claim that 
ideology of professional journalism protects the 'news product from the pressures of advertisers and media 
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The professional values can have a protective or resistive effect, but the issue is 
how they are used. 
The critical stance in the interviews was not towards the market in general. For 
example, there was no criticism about the role of the advertisements. In particular, 
the journalists from Zarnan, Curnhuriyet, and from Diinya, perceived the restriction 
and control as being derived from ownership. Since they are not in one of the two 
dominant groups, they talked about ownership, the owners having other businesses, 
and the fmancial dependency on other sectors, in a critical way, by referring to the 
Dogan and Bilgin groups. At the same time, they declared that they have autonomy 
because of that. Although ownership was an issue in terms of restricting the 
content, the other processes were not considered from a critical perspective. All the 
journalists, including the ones from the two groups declared that they have 
autonomy because they make special news. They tended not to talk about the other 
dynamics, such as the socialisation process, structured mechanisms, such as agenda 
meetings in the morning, the editing process, and informal and unstructured ways 
of control. They either considered these merely as details, or approved or 
legitimised them as a result of time and space concerns, or the division of work 
within the professional understanding (the discourse of 'this is not my job, it's their 
job'), or in some cases they were aware of their limits and had to accept the control 
mechanisms. 
They were critical about the working processes when their reports were rejected. 
Some explained this with the 'policy' and applied self-censorship, whereas it led 
some to exchange the news with journ~lists in other newspapers. This process was 
a method of resistance. This could be seen as the journalists' conformism as 
opposed to resistance. However, even though there is a recognition and acceptance 
that the news would not be published in that newspaper, they again did not have to 
work to publish somewhere else. This shows that they are not indifferent, and some 
make an effort to make a small change. If the conditions are considered, this could 
be understood as their only way of resistance since they are not allowed to organise 
themselves collectively and join the union. When they can do that, the journalists 
owners attempting to cast undue influence over the news, the ideology of professional journalism clearly 
internalised the commercial dictates of the newspaper as it developed" (McChesney. 1997: 118-119). 
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will have the power to make changes in the general structure of the media industry 
in a more democratic direction. However, in order for this to happen, there have to 
be changes not only in the conditions which restrict their collective action, but also 
in their identification of the variety of the constraints. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
The News and Ideology in the Turkish Press 
Despite what the journalists and the editors said, as reported in chapter six, not 
only the editorials and columns, but also the news is ideological. The news is not 
simply the objective reflections of reality, but rather it is an ideological 
construction. This chapter contains a content analysis of the news on privatization 
of the state economic enterprises in Turkey. My aim is to provide a concrete 
example for the ideological positions on the state and capitalism in Turkey by 
showing who speaks about the issue, in which ways and on which aspects in the 
news. 
In this content analysis, the criterion for the selection of the news is that it should 
be related to privatization. The news which will be analysed was restricted to the 
six months before and after the law (the period of 15th May 1994-15th May 1995) 
on privatization, which was enacted by the parliament in November, 1994. The 
importance of the legislative process is that it provides an intensive coverage of the 
issue. The sample was narrowed down by taking the news from the six newspapers 
every second week for a period of a year. The purpose of doing this, rather than, 
for example, taking a full six months, was to gain an overview of the whole year 
and to trace the possible differences before and after the law was enacted. 
Although I carried out all codings of the 1,114 news items, the coding schedulell1 
was read by two other people and applied on a few news items to ensure that the 
categories were understood by others in the same way. 
111 see Appendix 2 and 3. 
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1. The Newspapers 
Hiirriyet 
Milliyet 
Sabah 
Zaman 
1948 
1950 
1985 
1924 
1986 
Table 11 General Information on the Sample Newspapers 
information obtained/rom Press, Broadcasting and Information General Management 
Three (Sabah, Htirriyet and Milliyet) of the six newspapers in the sample are the 
newspapers of the two biggest media groups in Turkey. The circulations of these 
three newspapers make up more than 70% of the total circulation of the newspaper 
industry. It would be considered sufficient since these cover more than half of the 
newspaper industry. However, with this research I also wanted to trace the 
differences between the newspapers. If these three newspapers are described in 
terms of their ideology, it can be said that Sabah is liberal,' Htirriyet is centre, 
Milliyet has a more social-democrat leaning. However, there are no big differences 
between these three. As explained in the chapter on the media industry, Htirriyet 
and Milliyet are newspapers of the same group. In addition to these, I have 
included Cumhuriyet which is known to have a social democrat and Kernalist elite 
character, and Zaman which is the newspaper of the Islamic Fethullah sect which is 
known to be liberal Islamic. Dtinya, as an economics newspaper, was also included 
in this research.1l2 
The photocopies below may give an idea of the format of the sample Turkish 
newspapers. 
112 Research which is based on 1.200 newspaper readers, lists the newspapers according to their positions on 
the left or right of the political spectrum from Cumhuriyet on the left, Milliyet. Hlirriyet and Sabah. to 
Zaman on the right (the research did not include DUnya). Marketing Ttirkiye. I Agustos 1995. vol.5. 
no:103. 
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CHAPTER 6 THE NEWS AND IDEOLOGY IN TURKISH PRESS 
As seen in the table, if the newspapers are ranked according to their circulation, 
Sabah has the highest, followed by Hiirriyet, Milliyet, Zaman, Cumhuriyet and 
then Diinya. If the newspapers are compared in terms of their size, it is seen that 
Hiirriyet is the largest newspaper with an average of 42 pages. Milliyet follows that 
with 35 pages, Sabah with 32 pages. Cumhuriyet has 23, Diinya has 18 and Zaman 
has an average of 16 pages 113 
When this information is considered, in conjunction with the figures below 
showing the number of the news items on privatization, Zarnan's lesser coverage 
may be explained by it having relatively less space. On the other hand, it can be 
seen that the largest newspaper, Hiirriyet, does not have the greatest number of 
news items on privatization. Instead, Cumhuriyet and Diinya have much of the 
news. Diinya's high level of concern about his issue can probably be explained by 
its character as an economics newspaper. Cumhuriyet, on the other hand, is 
sensitive about the issue for another reason. Since it is a Kemalist newspaper, the 
privatization of the state economic enterprises and its effects on the Kemalist 
principle of statism are of great importance for Cumhuriyet, as will be seen in 
detail in the chapter 7. 
113 Basin Dan Kurumu Genel Mudurlugu (General Management of Press Advertisement Institution). 
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As can be seen in the table below, the main actors in the news adopt supportive 
positions about privatization. They are the Prime Minister, True Path Party 
members, business people, business organisations, managers of SEE (state 
economic enterprises), heads of the administrative bodies of privatization, and 
heads of trade unions and ministries. 
There are few actors opposed to privatization. In fact, only Miimtaz Soysal 
(member of the Social Democratic Populist Party) and the DLP (Democratic Left 
Party) are against or neutral to privatization rather than being supportive. There are 
other actors who are against, but on very few occasions: For example, the Prime 
Minister two times, the MP (Motherland Party) five times, business people and 
companies are reported in opposition only twice. 
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There are many people who are never seen to be against privatization. These are 
the heads of the administrative bodies of privatization, TPP members, other MPs 
and ministers, the Deputy prime minister, international busine~smen, the Head of 
the Constitution Court, the President, Treasury experts, international finance 
experts and economists. It is true to say that actors who are against privatization 
are rarely reported in the newspapers. There is not even a balanced distribution 
between the politicians in Parliament. There are major frequency differences 
between the Prime Minister and other politicians, between the TPP, the ANAP 
(Motherland Party) and the other parties, WP (Welfare Party), DLP (Democratic 
Left Party) and RPP (Republican People's Party). 
The frequency of the Prime Minister occurring as a main actor is higher than 
business people and companies, but in total, business people and companies are the 
most referred to. The workers, who are the people most affected by privatization, 
I 
were referred to 24 times whereas business people were referred to 172 times. It 
was interesting that economists appeared only once as actors, and even then it was 
in a supporting position as a secondary actor. The newspapers do not tend to have 
scientists or experts as actors. Instead, the actors in the news are mainly 
businessmen and politicians. It seems that the news does not even cover the ideas 
of privatization theorists. The whole story is reduced to simple selling: the main 
actors of the story are those who will sell/regulate selling and the ones who will 
buy. 
The reason for making a division between the people and the institutions was to 
reveal the tendency of the Turkish press to focus on the forrp.er rather than the 
latter. The indicators of this personalising tendency can be found in the table. The 
number of people referred to in the news (1,316) is three times as high as the 
number of institutions (427) referred to. 
The institution, called KIGEM (The Centre for Developing Public Enterprises-a 
think-tank), which takes a critical stance against privatization and works to control 
privatization procedure, does not feature in the news very much (3 times as 
primary actor, 6 times as secondary actor). 
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In total, it can be seen from the table that the number of supportive actors is greater 
than the actors who are opposed to privatization. Supportive actors mostly are 
primary actors (507 actors are supporting, and 106 actors are against as primary 
sources, while 147 actors are supporting, 64 actors are against as secondary 
sources). 
The number of actors in neutral positions is also very high, as can be seen in the 
table. The high rate of the heads of the administrative bodies (21 times as main 
actor, 18 times as secondary actor) and administrative bodies of privatization (61 
times as primary actor, 60 times as secondary actor) in neutral P?sitions contributes 
to the increase in the number of neutral actors. In fact, not only the technical 
information such as numbers and prices about privatization, but also everything 
declared or done by these actors and institutions becomes news, as observed during 
the coding process ofthe content analysis. In addition, the fact that the press gave a 
great deal of attention to the legislative process reduced the issue to a technical one 
rather than a controversial issue with all the different and opposing views. As can 
be seen in the table of themes, legislative issues with different dimensions were 
repeated 297 times as the main issue in the news. 
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Table 12 Actors and Their Dispositions 
1141 have been influenced by the work of Deacon and Golding in developing the dispositions as 'supporting', 
'against' and 'neutral'. According to that, the content not only has an 'interpretative' dimension which 
addressed the question of what aspects of the issue are covered, but also an 'evaluative' dimension which 
asks whether the accounts are pro or anti the issue covered. For the details of this fonnulation see Golding. 
1990: 97, for the use of it in a study of poll tax see Deacon & Golding, 1991: 308 or Deacon & Golding, 
1994:125-126,141-142. 
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3. Themes of the News 
As can be seen in the table below, the reasons for privatization are both positive 
statements and targets, and negative ones. Although it may seem strange that the 
reason 'to end the SEE's burden on the budget deficit', which is the most popular 
main reason, repeated 49 times, it is in fact expressed exactly in these words. The 
word 'burden' was used in the news instead of more value-free words such as 
'effect' or 'impact'. 
There are only two categories which are critical of privatization ('to provide 
opportunities for the businessmen who. are close to the government' and 
'ideological'). There were' 34 instances of these two statements. There were 52 
statements which expressed that the SEEs should not be privatized. Thus, there 
were only 86 critical or oppositional arguments against privatization. Whereas all 
the other statements (after excluding the 5 unclear ones) were supportive of 
privatization (365). This number can be added to the other supportive statements 
(see the section on the defmitions on the SEEs in the table) for privatization such 
as the privatization of the SEEs being slow (28 times) and that the privatization 
should have happened sooner (57 times). So, in order to give a picture of the 
evaluations of the news, it can be said that the critical or oppositional evaluations 
take place a total of only 86 times while the supportive evaluations occur 450 times 
(365+28+57). This means that more than 80% of the ideas the newspapers 
included supported privatization. 
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Table 13 Reasons of PrivatizatWn 
SEEs are referred to more with negative statements than with positive ones. There 
were only 187 positive statements out of a total of 633. That the SEEs make a loss 
was the most repeated one and was the most frequently occurring as the main 
theme (90 times, 20.3 as the main theme). The least repeated negative theme was 
the low quality products and services of SEEs. The most frequently repeated 
positive theme is the profits of SEEs. It might be argued that the reality of SEEs 
was simply reduced and seen from a mainstream economist perspective, mainly for 
its losses and profits. The dimensions which are more related to people as citizens 
were not dominant. The least repeated positive dimensions of SEEs were their high 
quality and cheap products and services. The workers in SEEs were mentioned for 
their high wages. The issue of employment also existed in another category 
'interference of the government or politicians in the operation of SEEs by leading 
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to excess employment for the political interests'. The possible positive 
correspondence of these statements such as SEE's becoming a source for 
employment and workers' having a productive force, did not occur at all. 
through frequent 
Table 14 State Economic Enterprises 
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Table 15 Legal/ssues 
Legal issues are very important in the news. This can be considered as quite 
normal since the sample was chosen on the criterion of the law. Here though, it is 
striking that almost all the legal issues occurred as the main news, which shows the 
importance of the legal issues in the press. In particular, the bill and the discussions 
before the law were covered widely by the press (151 times). The news about legal 
issues constituted a considerable amount in the total sample (297 in 1744). The 
tables on the following pages also show the importance of the legal procedure. 
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some SEE in terms 
Table 16 Effects of Privatization 
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The effects of the privatization were mainly administrative, technical, practical or 
economic rather than political. It should be mentioned here that the category 'the 
effects of privatization' does not necessarily imply the effects after privatization of 
the SEEs. The effects can be addressed generally without any reference to the stage 
of privatization or any specific SEE. These can even be addressed for SEEs which 
have not been privatized. Thus, after the figure below, which shows the news over 
time, it is necessary to look at the stages of privatization in the news (see the figure 
4), and then to see the relationship between stages and the effects of privatization 
(see the table 17, 'The First Five Main Effects and the Stages of Privatization'). 
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The first week in the sample is the period in which public announcements appeared 
for some SEEs to be privatised. There was news about the economic situation of 
the SEEs which would be sold. 
The meat and fish industry was privatised in the second week. Since that sale was 
very debatable, there was more news, mainly about the polemics over that selling. 
There was no new development in the third week, so the news decreased until the 
rise due to the selling campaigns of the steel factories. 
The fourth week brought the cancellation of the privatization of the meat and fish 
industry, the abolition of the authority law and also an application by some MPs' to 
the Constitution Court for the abolition of the legal manifestos on privatization. 
The following week was the period in which the privatization procedure was 
stopped by the decision of the Constitution Court to abolish the legal manifestos, 
on the 22nd July. 
August and September were very stable, there was no major rise or fall in the 
news. The parties met for negotiations, and exchanged their ideas on the bill on 
privatization. The Parliament's summer holiday was also a factor in making that 
period quiet. 
As soon as the Parliament started working, the news increased. It was at a peak 
between 24-30 October. The tension over the bill rose because of the intensified 
meeting procedure between the political parties during that period. 
After the fall in relevant news items in the period of7-13 November, the number of 
items rose again in the following week. In fact, that week saw the enactment of the 
law on privatization ( the 24th November). 
The four weeks following the enactment of the law were quiet. In the periods of 30 
January-5 February and 13-19 February, there was an increase in the news mainly 
due to the trade unions' purchase of the Meat and Fish Industry and related 
polemics. 
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During the following two weeks, the privatization procedure was slower because of 
the administrative mechanisms, according to the news. April was full of news 
about the criticisms of the 'slow' administrative mechanism and consequently the 
removal of the Head of the Privatization Administration, and the resignation of the 
Transport Minister. Also there was news on the privatization of the tyre industry 
and telecommunications. May brought a decrease in the news. The privatization 
slowed down, and reached an 'impasse' according to the comments in the news. 
THE DISTRffiUTION OF THE NEWS ACCORDING TO THE STAGES OF 
PRIVATIZATION 
1% 
36% 
55% 
.After privatization III Pre-privatization 
o Unspecified o Cancellation of privatization 
Figure 4 The Distribution of the News According to the Stages of Privatization 
From the above figure, it can be seen that the Turkish press did not cover the stage 
after privatization as much as it did the stage before privatization. This can be 
considered quite reasonable since the criterion used for the research sample was the 
legislation process, and it could be assumed that privatization would be 
implemented after the law. However, this was not the case at all. Although there 
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was no law pennitting privatization, the government made privatization possible 
with a series of legal manifestos published from 1986 onwards. 
The term 'unspecified' indicates the news which did not mention the stage of 
privatization, and mostly the news which was not about any specific institution, or 
any specific privatization story. It can be said, by relying on the notes taken during 
the coding process of the analysis, that most of the 'unspecified' news items in 
terms of stages were the ones about the legislation procedure. 
Table 17 TheFirst Five Main Effects and The Stages of Privatization 
This table indicates that most of the declarations about the effects and the results 
were mentioned before privatization. It shows that the newspapers followed the 
developments after privatization less than they did before. In particular, the news 
items containing the categories 'the unemployment of workers', and 'obtaining 
income from the sales', did not occur after privatization. However, it is known that 
unemployment occurred following privatization. It seems that the press considered 
neither of these to be news, maybe because these two contradict the 'ideal' of 
privatization. 
11514 of these took place in relation to the legal issues (7 in the news about the law, 6 in the news about the 
bill and 1 in the news on the abolishment of the legal manifestos). 
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4. Conclusion 
The actors and the themes of the news were very closely related. Which actors the 
news contained may not have determined what was said, but it at least affected it. 
This study revealed that people who are not businessmen or politicians do not have 
much chance of being included in the news. Those who oppose privatization also 
do not have much chance. The limited number of opposition actors in the news 
were mainly members of parliament. Opposition was recognised when it was 
raised by the members of the parliament. 
In the news, privatization is represented as simple selling. There are people who 
will sell or who will regulate selling, and there are those who will buy. The main 
issue is of loss/profit. SEEs are referred to for their negative features, mainly for 
their losses rather than their goods or services. In fact, the losses of SEEs were the 
main reason given for privatization in the news. 
The news was more concerned with the period before privatization. The SEEs 
which were already privatized were not as newsworthy as those that were still to be 
privatized, despite the so-called watch-dog function attributed to the press. The 
considerably higher amount of themes of 'SEE' and the 'effects' compared to the 
'reasons' leads us to think that the question 'why' is not so important. There is no 
room in the news for discussing what privatization is, whether it is necessary. It is 
taken for granted with all the technical and administrative aspects. 
The higher amount of 'effects or results' of privatization before privatization 
shows that the news is about promises/anticipations rather than daily life, concrete 
effects of privatization on workers, or generally on citizens who produce and use 
public goods and services. This is not very surprising since people as workers and 
citizens do not have access to the media as actors, and they are not considered as 
news sources by the media professionals, as seen in the earlier chapter. There it 
was seen that the news production process is the same in all newspapers. The fact 
that there is little difference in actors and themes of the news between the 
newspapers might be partly because of the strong similarity of the mechanisms and 
news sources. It is observed that the news in Diinya and Cumhuriyet is more 
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detailed than the others. However, the difference between these two and the others 
is mainly the extensions of the differing quantity or the length of the news rather 
than showing any qualitative difference. In the next chapter, the differences of the 
newspapers will be examined and further discussed through an analysis of the 
editorials and columns of the newspapers. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Media Elites and Privatization: Analysis of the 
Editorials and Columns 
In this chapter, the editorials and columns about privatization in the six sample 
newspapers (Sabah, Hiirriyet, Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Zaman, Diinya) will be 
analysed. The criterion used to select the sample is the same as for the sample of 
the news: that is, selecting the editorials and columns that were published in the six 
months before and after the enactment of the law on privatization (the 24 
November 1994). By doing this, the aim is to ascertain whether there are 
differences in the ideas before and after the enactment. This can show us how the 
media elite situate themselves during a legislative process. 
The media elite in Turkey play a key role in debates, they have more power than 
the news journalists, and they are influential in politics,116 sometimes as if they 
were members of parliament. Their role is mostly like a lobbying activity for the 
government rather than being a ·watch-dog'. As a general characteristic of the 
Turkish press, it can be said that the editorials and columns are very important for 
the readers. These occupy more spacell7 in the newspapers compared with, for 
example, the British newspapers. 
The analysis of the editorials and columns is complementary to the analysis of the 
news. As seen in the earlier chapter, there were no significant differences in the 
ways the news was covered among the different newspapers. The existence of 
differences will be examined in this chapter by focusing on the discourses of the 
editorials and columns in the different newspapers. 
116 Metin Heper states that the journalists in Turkey aspired to a more dominant role than that of journalists in 
the continental European style. their wish is Inot only to influence but to shape political regimes, policies. 
and the course of events in the polity and society' (Heper, 1996:120) 
117 According to this study, there are few columns in Zaman (which has the least news as well) whereas the 
columns had greater importance and covered more space in Cumhuriyet and Sabah. However, this does not 
mean that the editorials and columns are not important for Zaman. but can be explained as a result of the 
size of Zaman. 
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The news is about what happened today, it does not contain much infonnation 
about the history of the event; therefore it has a restricted intertextuality. The 
professional values and the use of the language of factuality in news writing are 
factors which make the news genre limited. On the other hand, the editorials and 
columns as different genre do not have to use the language of factuality even 
though they also sometimes include factual infonnation from the news, books, 
encyclopaedias or statistical documents. The ideological discourses are more 
visible in the editorials and columns since it is more permissable as a genre to do 
so. They can frame the events and give a certain angle by telling the reader how to 
make sense of an event. They can offer a perspective without having to 'balance' it 
with the principles of objectivity, neutrality and impartiality. They do not have to 
deal only with today even though they mostly write about events that have just 
happened. Compared to the news, they have a higher level of intertextuality, they 
can relate the event more to the other events that have happened previously or 
elsewhere, and can put the issue into a context. The editorials and columns thus 
give more opportunity to focus on a more detailed representation of an issue. 
The editorials in the newspaper indicate many things about the position of the 
newspaper. However, for this analysis, it is important not only to examine the 
position of the newspaper, but also to see the differences within a newspaper, so as 
to examine whether the particular views which might be different from that of the 
newspapers, can be represented. Although it can be said that this is limited, and 
each columnist works within permitted margins, their ideas do not always have to 
match with the institutional policy. Thus, this analysis also tries to capture whether 
there are different parameters for the issue examined by including columns in the 
investigation. 
The analysis is based on the investigation of meaning at a macro level of discourse, 
by focusing on topics and themes rather than the fonn, linguistic or grarnrnar (van 
Dijk, 1997: 8-10). Extracts are included in the analysis in order to illustrate the 
'gist' of the discourses (van Dijk, 1997: 10). This analysis is not a summary of 
what was written in the editorials and columns in the sample. The focal points were 
taken for consideration, and these were the outcome of some research questions: 
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-Whether an editorial or column advocated privatization or not. 
-Were there reasons given when privatization was advocated or whether 
privatization was taken for granted as an inevitable or an obligatory change? 
-What reasons were given, and which comments were used in support of or in 
opposition to privatization? 
-Were there differences in the ideas presented before and after the enactment of 
privatization? 
While this analysis focused on the political arguments and evaluations CA), it 
excluded some other statements in the editorials and columns. Those which gave 
information on party politics, political forecasting, polemics and allegations CB), 
the statements which repeated the news as facts or story; which gave information 
or summary of the developments about an event CC), the statements which gave 
detailed information on the specific examples or offered statistical information and 
listed numbers CD) and repetitions CE) were excluded. 
Although it is hard to make a clear cut division between these statements, and also 
to categorise the editorials and columns, below, two examples will be given of 
those statements which were taken into consideration, and those which were 
excluded by the researcher: 
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The First Dialogue in Privatization 
Ertujtrul Ozk6k, 10.8.1994, HUrriyet 
The fIrst non-official response to the surprising suggestion of Mesut Ytlmaz, which 
was published in yesterday's Hiirriyet headline, came yesterday from someone who is 
'very close' to the Prime Minister C;:iIIer. 
The person I talked to, who is very close to C;:iIIer, responded to Ytlmaz's suggestion 
about his support for the government on privatization with these words: 
"I bet Mrs. C;:iIIer welcomes this suggestion". 
A short time after this response, the State Minister Aykon Dollan called Oltan 
Sungurlu from the MP and gave the message 'Let's solve this issue together'. As soon 
as Sungurlu got this message, he called the leader Mesut Ytlmaz, and immediately a 
general evaluation meeting was held. 
At the end of that evaluation meeting, I~m C;:elebi and Mehmet Ke~eciler were 
assigned to discuss the issue of privatization with the TPP 
If the TPP gives an official response, these two MP members will start meetings with 
the full authority of the MP. 
Discordant Voices in the TPP 
Nevertheless, at the same time, The General Secretary of the TPP, Hasan Peker gave 
an explanation which was the opposite of his earlier one and said exactly that: 
'ytlmaz, who sleeps until noon everyday, has attracted some reactions from the public 
as a result of his obstructions to privatization, and he is now manoeuvring to 
compensate for his mistake. When the conditions he put forward are considered, it is 
seen that he is not serious. He is saying that they will give support and not bring the 
issue to the Constitution Court if their conditions are met. From our perspective, this 
does not seem genuine'. 
Peker is throwing away Ytlmaz's suggestion on privatization, which is one of the most 
important issues in Turkey, in a very thoughtless way with this primitive polemic. 
Which one of these is C;:iIIer's view? 
Has Negotiation Started? 
The person I talked to is very close to C;:iIIer, and has a position through which he/she 
can know C;:iIIer's ideas. This person seems to be taking Ytlmaz's suggestion 
seriously. Furthermore, this person mentions herlhis idea about which of the 
conditions imposed, the TPP General Secretary did not 'fInd serious': 
'The privatization of state banks can be started with Halk and Emlakbank. Vaktfbank, 
because it has charitable status ('vaktf' in Turkish), Ziraatbank because it gives a 
public service for farmers, can both remain as state banks' . 
A short- C;:iIIer's friend is giving the impression that the suggestion of Mesut Ytlmaz 
has now started to be discussed. He/she is avoiding engaging in the simple polemic of 
the TPP General Secretary. 
This incident reveals one more time how important the high ranking officials of 
political parties are. These officials who do not have any merit except the ability to 
talk, can kill a dialogue before it is born. These dialogues could be productive, in the 
most important issues of the country. 
The TPP Board of Directors will meet tomorrow, and some changes in the party's 
officials are expected at this meeting. I hope, more careful officials will be found 
instead of the ones who obstruct the productive dialogue on privatization with 
irresponsible speeches. 
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{
The Balance of Bankruptcy 
The words I have heard from <;iller' s circle were promising. Turkey is wasting time in 
A privatizing, time is as valuable as gold, the time for privatization will never return. 
Every day which has been lost is written in the list of debts. These debts are 
accumulating and making the country bankrupt. 
B 
The main opposition party is now bringing a constructive suggestion. However, a 
party official who possibly does not know what privatization means, is ruining this 
with a speech you might hear in a street coffee house. 
Politics should not sink that low. 
The leaders of parties should not allow their colleagues to make any speeches about 
the issues which concern the fate of the countrY. 
A {TurkeY has to make a definitive decision on some important issues and apply them. 
B Privatization is one of these issues. The words of <;iller's close associate promise that 
a good process can start. 
c 
The Briefing on the Customs Union 
A second important issue is developing these days. The process of counting down to 
Turkey's customs union with Europe will start on 12 December. 
The Foreign Minister MUmtaz Soysal received his first briefing on this issue. Cem 
Duna, who is the regular representative of Turkey in European Community, joined 
this briefing as well. 
A Turkey needs to be in definitive agreement on some issues. A Turkey which has 
{
The Customs Union with Europe is at least as important as privatization. In fact, these 
two are not independent of each other. 
realised privatization and the Customs Union with Europe will be very different from 
that which exists today. 
E {What should be done is not to create unnecessary polemics on these two issues and to 
lead unnecessarily to time being lost with street politics". 
A 
C 
D 
-- Can the Sea Dry up? 
I>Ukran Soner, Cumhuriyet, 30.7.1994 
Our ancestors who pretend to be smart while saying that 'The property of the state is 
the sea, the one who does not exploit it is a pig' [Turkish expression meaning: one 
should use all of the opportunities/assets of the state to the fullest possible extent] did 
not only lead to the society having some values which are contradictory with their real 
long tenn interests; unjust and unethical, but also they seriously deceived the society. 
The property of state is not like the sea so it will end. 
The ideologues of privatization lament uselessly because of the non-legal, non-
Constitutional applications of the government; of the annulment of the privatization 
decisions by the Constitution Court; and privatization being delayed. The politicians 
have already eaten up state economic enterprises. At the end of the day, no state 
economic enterprises will remain to be sold and operated. 
When I read the recent news on the Karabilk Iron-Steel Enterprise, my heart bled. The 
57 year old high temperature oven has leaked because the necessary maintenance has 
not been done. The maintenance dates are past for all three ovens. There is a risk of 
explosion at any minute. The ovens, and thus, the Karabilk Iron-Steel Enterprise are 
being left to die because, forget about not making technology renewal and investment, 
even the investments which are necessary in order to continue production have been 
banned by government decisions. The credits provided from abroad in order to allow 
it to survive are not being used. Today is the last day to use the foreign credit, which 
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has already been extended three months. While the credit has not been used, there is 
no attempt whatsoever to extend the due date or to use it later. 
I want to refresh your memory. Prime Minister <;:iller mentioned Karabtik in the list of 
the enterprises which were going to he closed down according to the 5 April 
Economic Package Decisions. The responsible minister Aykon Dojlan and the 
bureaucrat responsible for privatization, Tezcan YararnancI put forward that the 
closing down of Karabtik was unavoidable and Karabtik could not easily find a buyer 
even as scrap. 
Initially Karabiik workers, trade unions, public, expert economists and old bureaucrats 
challenged that claim. A series of reports and documents, which the government could 
not refuse, appeared and it was proven that Karabtik could be run, and if it is wished, 
could be made an efficient enterprise. It was revealed that there was credit waiting to 
be used, and the technology was not outdated and old-fashioned at all. The 
government, especially the social democrat side, found it difficult to face the scientific 
reports, and it was necessary to prepare another official report. The bureaucrats who 
gave the instruction to close down the OPT could not insist on their first reports, and 
accepted the reconsideration of the situation. Finally, the last official report prepared 
with Karayal9ID's request mentioned that Karabiik remains operational. Despite all 
this, look at what is happening. While the credit which can keep the enterprise alive is 
being abandoned, the ovens are left to rot as a result of not being maintained. Karabtik 
is being left to die despite the official reports. The property of the public, the life 
source of the region, the national wealth, is being killed. 
Is it only Karabtik? The same thing is valid for many other state economic enterprises. 
Forget about the continuation of production after privatization, there is no enterprise 
left to produce anything anymore. State economic enterprises are deliberately led to 
collapse and death. Forget the conditions to keep up with new technology and make a 
profit in production, even the necessary investments to keep them alive have not been 
made for years. The losses are doubled through becoming indebted to private banks 
with high interest charges. 
D estimated that it will increase to 400 million with doubling interest debts by the end of 
{
While the total national and foreign debt was 222,265 billions in December 1993 the 
rate become 303,084 billions in March 1994, an increase of 80,819 billions. It is 
this year. State economic enterprises are being sunk with these interest debts to private 
banks. As a result, there is no enterprise remains to privatize anyway. 
E {our ancestors who pretended to be smart not only misled us, but also they deceived 
us. The property of the state is not like the sea, so it will end. 
1. Advocating Privatization 
The extracts from the columns in two different newspapers below state the 
necessity and unavoidability of privatization without presenting any reason for it. 
The first one states that privatization is an economic issue that can be understood 
and therefore advocated by economists. It implies that there is no such thing as 
being against privatization. The only issue is to understand it or not as a value-free 
thing. People who are opposed to it are indeed the ones who do not understand 
economics. 
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"Privatization is particularly an economic issue. Almost all economists support 
privatization. Look at the people who are against it! How many of these people are 
economists? Many people whose main professions are not economics, but are 
involved in economics in some way advocate privatization, because there is no need 
to hammer it home ..... (Muharrem Karsh, Zarnan, 7.11.1994). 
According to this extract, there should not be any discussions about privatization 
because its inevitability is taken for granted. While the emphasis of this column is 
on the scientific economic knowledge, the next one does not reduce it to a 
technical issue, recognising it as a political issue. However, the conclusions of both 
are the same: privatization is unavoidable. 
"Is privatization basically a politics laden enterprise or is it a necessary step to be 
taken in accordance with the objective principles of economic science? I accept that 
every topic in social sciences is unavoidably politics laden, in particular a branch of 
science such as economics, which is in the end related to the distribution of income, is 
closer to politics. However, it is possible to explain why an initiative which is 
basically political is objectively unavoidable."(Serdar Turgut, HUrriyet, 5.8.1994). 
Although it has been argued that privatization is an inevitable thing and is seen as 
an obligation, at the same time it has been rationalised by giving reasons for it 
since the country has a long statist tradition. The reasons shown for privatization in 
the editorials and columns will be looked at below. Firstly, those which discuss the 
negative aspects of the economy, offering privatization as a solution to them, will 
be considered, and then the editorials and columns which regard privatization as an 
inevitable step to achieve good things, will be examined. 
1.1. Eliminating the Problem of State Economic Enterprises 
Privatization in Turkey is presented as a solution to the problems or a precondition 
of solving problems, by the editorial in Diinya: 
" ... because the needs which existed in the past still remain today ... As long as the 
privatization is not realised, these hardships will always stay"(Nezih Demirkent, 
DUnya, 26.10.1994). 
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This idea occurs in the columns in Milliyet as well: 
" ... today privatization is a necessity for Turkey to get out of the difficulties" (Taha 
Akyol, Milliyet, 23.7.1994). 
Another example in Milliyet uses a similar phrase, 'getting rid of the difficulties', 
and this phrase in the following sentences includes the idea of getting rid of SEEs. 
SEEs are equated with difficulties: 
" .... privatization is the minimum condition for getting rid of the difficulties of the 
economy .... unless SEEs are got rid of, nobody should blame the government saying 
that they could not defeat inflation"(Mubarrem Karsh, Milliyet, 7.11.1994). 
Considering SEEs as the main cause of all troubles, not just economic ones, can 
also be seen in the other editorials and columns. 
The column of Ali RlZa Kardllz with the title of "SEEs have eaten up the 
economy" gives a list of SEE losses, and argues similarly that unless the 'SEE 
problem' is solved, it will be impossible to get the millstone from round our necks 
just by using stabilization packages (Ali RIZa Kardllz, Sabah, 26.7.1994). 
When the statements on the problems with SEEs are examined, it is possible to 
divide them into two categories: SEEs' losses and inefficiency and SEEs as the 
source of excess employment: 
1.1.1. The losses and inefficiency of SEEs 
As has been seen in the content analysis of the news, one in five of the statements 
about SEEs was about their losses. This is an idea repeated in the editorials and the 
columns as well. Besides the losses, the inefficiency of SEEs is mentioned in many 
editorials and the columns. It is argued that SEEs cause budget deficits or inflation, 
and negative terms such as 'burden', or 'problem' are widely used in reference 
them. 
A Diinya editorial mentions "getting rid of this burden", implying SEEs, and that 
the solution to the 'burden' of SEEs is privatization: 
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" .... according to some calculations, 250 billion TL is lost every day. With the selling 
of a few institutions, efficiency will be created. Moreover, the budget deficits will be 
removed ..... (Nezih Demirkent, DUnya, 26.10.1994). 
Other columns mention the same point: 
''Public finance deficit is increasing because of the loss of the institutions, the so 
called SEE ... The state will get rid of 90 billion TL loss with the privatization of 17 
SEEs"(Oguz <;:etinoglu" 30.11.1994, Zaman). 
''The privatization should be realised quickly, and almost all SEEs which have made 
a loss in 1995 should be eliminated in order to reduce the SEE losses from over 70 
billion to 20 billion"(Osman Arolat, "Arolat'tan", 17.10. 1994, DUnya). 
Another column states that: 
''The aim of privatization is efficiency, to save the state budget from the losses and 
deficits of the inefficient enterprises" 
He also adds in the same column that: 
" ... As long as it is applied with good intention and insight, the state enterprises can 
even be transferred for free" (Muharrem Karsh, Milliyet, 3.10.1994). 
Although it is not clear what 'good intention' and 'insight' mean, why the word 
'transfer' is used rather than 'selling' and, who the SEE will be transferred to, this 
extract is very interesting in terms of showing the intensity of the complaints about 
the SEEs. 
In a column in Sabah, the issue of SEE's making a loss is stated with the emphasis 
on 'paying tax,11S. "Which is good? ". He considers two alternatives. One is SEEs 
making a loss and becoming a 'burden' for the budget, the other is making them 
ftrms which pay tax to the state after the deliverance from the losses through 
privatization. He favours the second option by stating that the good thing for the 
1181t implies that all the profitable firms pay tax. This is ironic since, as mentioned in the chapter on Turkey, 
one of the most important economic problems in Turkey is tax deficits. Korkut Boratav argues that the 
Turkish bourgeoisie views privatization as an alternative way not to pay taxes. If taxation was decided on 
as a solution to the financial crisis, they would have to pay them (Cumhuriyet, 19.6.1994). 
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national economy is a firm which makes a profit, which does not become a burden 
on the state, and indeed, pays its taxes (Taha Akyol" Milliyet, 10.6.1994). 
Another column in the same newspaper frames the issue from the view of the 'tax 
payers' and mentions the bad effects of SEEs on the Turkish people. It is stressed 
that the cost of the 'millstone SEE's losses' are silently paid by the people through 
taxes. The column continues: 
"Because of these SEEs, both Turkey and the Turkish people are getting poorer. 
There is no possibility for society to become richer with the mentality of using the 
economic resources so badly"(Mehmet Altan, Sabah, 5.9.1994). 
1.1.2. The SEE as a Source of Excess Employment 
"The plunder in SEEs sets the country on fIre" (Necati Dogru, Sabah, 23.7.1994). 
A column in Sabah stresses corruption and offers privatization as a moral 
obligation for the establishment of a 'clean state'. 
"privatization has become an obligation to stop the moral corruption in the public 
sphere immediately (AsafSav~ Akat, Sabah, 10.7.1994). 
The editorial of Sabah states: 
"Privatization is a door which is open towards productive economy and clean 
politics" (Giingor Mengi, Sabah, 22.7.1994). 
Another column from Sabah similarly argues that the state has been a source for 
'bribes and corruption' and suggests 'removing the state from economy' (Hasan 
Cemal, Sabah, 23.7.1994). 
The discourse of plunder and corruption of SEEs is mainly used for 'excess 
employment' in SEEs rather than being considered in the context of the 
government using the budget of SEEs in other areas, of controlling the managerial 
staff, or the corruption of the managerial staff. It seems that the content of the news 
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is more diverse about thatl19 while the editorials and columns120 which advocate 
privatization focus more on the excess employment. 
The excess employment is seen as plunder, as the cause of the losses and 
inefficiency of the SEEs, as exploitation of the majority by a minority, and as a 
problem that can be solved by privatization as implied below: 
"People who pretend that privatization is a disadvantage for the working masses are 
lying. The enterprises which do not accommodate the rules of efficiency and the 
conditions of competition should not survive. If they exist with the state support, then 
it means that a big majority is definitely being plundered, and exploited on behalf of a 
certain minority. We as a nation are going to pay 100 trillion as the bill for 
undeserved salaries in the SEEs" (Giingor Mengi, Sabah, 25.8.1994). 
Giingor Mengi does not say explicitly whose undeserved salary in SEEs 'we' will 
pay as a 'nation'. He takes the trade-unionist criticisms which maintain the idea 
that 'privatization is a disadvantage for workers, because it brings unemployment', 
and alters the term workers to 'working masses', and implies that workers are the 
minority and are mainly responsible for the exploitation of the masses. 
Hurriyet's editorial of is a very good example to show the exaggeration in the 
Turkish press about 'excess employment': 
"Thousands, ten thousands of people are employed in SEEs. Ten people started to 
carry one egg. The costs have reached an unbelievable level" (Emin <;:Ola~an, 
Hurriyet, 25.11.1994). 
119 Besides excess employment which is repeated 20 times, the interference in SEEs by the government or 
politicians through controlling their budget and using it in other areas is repeated 30 times, through 
controlling the managerial staff is repeated 16 times in the news. The corruption of the managerial staff is a 
theme repeated 12 times (see the content analysis in chapter 6). 
120 The interference of the government in the operation of SEEs by controlling the managers, was found as a 
theme of a colunm about corruption in Zaman. This column, which differentiates political mentality and 
'commercial reality', and regards the latter as something exempted from politics states that: 
"Is it not the reason for this situation of SEEs that the political mentality has taken priority over the 
commercial reality for many years when SEEs have been administrated? The general managers have been 
changed every three months because the state has managerial control. These general managers could not 
say 'no' to these political pressures. Eventually. SEEs have become the private farms of the politicians to 
feed their supporters, not economic enterprises any more"(Fazi1 Karaman, Zaman, 3.10.1994). 
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Thus, the main reason and responsibility for the situation of SEEs lies with excess 
employment, trade unions, and even workers. A column in Sabah mentions the 
issues of 'SEE loss', 'SEEs as a mill stone round our neck', 'budget deficits', 
'bankrupted social security system' and concludes with the criticism of the trade 
unions: 
"The account of the state and the efficiency of the economy are not issues only for 
government and bosses today. The officers, workers and unionists of the state have to 
think about these from now on". 
He also criticises people thinking of nothing but their salary or wage, and 
emphasises: 
" .. .if we want to achieve a higher welfare level, we should keep in mind that we are 
all in the same boat" (Hasan Cema!, Sabah, 23.7.1994). 
The metaphor of 'being in the same boat' is an extension of the liberal idea of 
'common good', or 'common interest'. It assumes that everybody is equal 'in the 
same boat'. However, even though everybody is in the same boat, the boat has 
safer and nicer places for the rich, and the opposite for the poor. 
The dismissal of workers is sometimes implicitly suggested as a solution, as we 
have seen above, or more often the issue is ignored, or is mentioned as one of the 
items of technical detail in the budget. 
"Only with the elimination of SEEs, the employment burden, will the interest burden 
which derives from their inefficiency vanish. The loss which is more than 70 billion 
this year will lessen to 20 billion with the reduction in the number of workers and the 
end of the interest burden"(Osman Arolat" 17.10.1994, Danya). 
The dismissal of workers is mentioned very clearly, especially after the enactment 
of the law. This can be explained with our assumption that most of the newspapers 
worked as a lobbying activity for the enactment of the law on privatization. They 
did not mention these issues before the law, possibly so as not to encourage any 
fear about resistance to or distancing from privatization by the public. 
A column from Hurriyet legitimises the unemployment, and tries to convince 
people of the necessity of it in the short term. 
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"To sum up, privatization has to cause some people to lose their job in the short term. 
On the other hand, unless 'surplus value', namely capital formation which will 
emerge with more efficient use of the national sources, is provided, employment can 
not be created for the millions of unemployed" (Ege Cansen, Hurriyet, 23.2.1995). 
The editorial, "Sabah Diyor ki"(Sabah Says) did not even try to legitimise it and 
trivialises the issue of unemployment and the 'threat' of 'social explosion'. Giingor 
Mengi states that 
'there are at least 5 million young people who are ready to work 12 hours a day with 
5 million lira as a monthly salary'. 
He argues that since they do not create a social explosion, the elimination of 
excessive workers who have been employed in SEEs by their supporters, will not 
create a social explosion (GUngor Mengi, Sabah, 8.2.1995). 
1.2. Towards a Minimal State in the 'Global' World 
The editorials and the columns which advocate privatization state that the SEEs 
had important functions in the past, but have now completed their mission. The 
state in the economy is no longer historically valid. Thus, privatization is a natural 
historical step to be taken. 
Emin <;:ola~an from Hurriyet evaluates SEEs from the past using the word 'statism' 
in an economic sense: 
"SEEs were established in the period of Atatiirk. One ofthe six arrows of the regime 
was statism. It was necessary for that time. We did not have money to give outside, 
nor foreign currency for imports. We had to produce our products ourselves"(Emin 
<;~Iaian, Harriyet, 25.11.1994). 
Ertugrul Ozkok mentions that the SEEs were the most important economic tools in 
1923 because there was no capital accumulation in the private sector. Then, the 
state had a mission to mobilise the economy, and completed this 'historical 
mission'. 
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"Now, things have changed, and these 'honourable enterprises' of the 'fIrst white 
revolution' have become an obstacle for the 'second revolution"" and had a 
'counter-revolutionist' position" (Ertugrul OzkOk, Hiirriyet, 25.10.1994). 
The use of the words 'revolution' and 'counter- revolution' emphasise the current 
huge transformation, but can also be considered as an ironic reply to Turkish 
leftists, employing their own discourse. 
Hasan Cemal from Sabah similarly mentions that the state in the economy has 
completed its appointed time. 
"In the past, it made large contributions in terms of capital accumulation and a 
qualifIed workforce, but 'the father state' has been an obstacle for the development of 
the economy for a long time"(Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 25.11.1994). 
These ideas are not against development or modernization in a general sense, 
rather they are against the state being an active agent for development. They 
believe that the state has completed its function in the modernization process. It 
should be minimised and replaced by the market. Privatization is seen as a step for 
minimising the state. 
''Unless the state is minimised in the economy, inflation and the cost of living will 
continue to ruin the people. Unless the state withdraws from production in the 
economy, the abnormal losses of the SEEs will not end"(Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 
25.11.1994). 
The editorial of Hurriyet asks in relation to the bill on privatization: 
He replies: 
"What sort of revolution is Turkey making with this bill ?". 
'The state will be minimised, will be relieved, and it will return to its essential 
functions"(Ertngrul OzkOk, Hiirriyet, 29.1 0.1994). 
121 In another editorial, he calls the process 'The Second Republic in the economy"( Ertullrul OzkOk, 
Hlirriyet, 24.11.1994). The advocates of the Second Republic criticise Kemaiism, and support market 
against statism. For the Second Republic approach, see Metin Sever, Cem Dizdar, 2. Cumhuriyet 
Tartismalari, Basak pub., Ankara, 1993, 2.ed. 
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Although there is no further discussion about what the 'essential functions of the 
state' means, a column from Sabah gives clues, suggesting that the state should not 
be involved in production. The state should be small, but efficient. The column 
does not suggest that the state should be minimised as a political force over 
citizens, instead it suggests it should be strengthened. 
" .. .it is correct to strengthen the state in defence and security, justice, education, 
health and social security" (Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 23.7.1994). 
The editorials and columns advocating privatization mostly talk about the role of 
the state in the economy, they do not tend to talk about the state as a political force. 
Although one column which advocates privatization also mentions the 
democratization of the state, it does so in the context of local government (Mehmet 
Barlas, Sabah, 27.11.1994). Political statism is predominantly not a topic which is 
criticised by the advocates of privatization. The main focus is economic statism. 
Only when it obstructs privatization and the market in general, is political statism 
brought forward as an issue. For example, the column below criticises the legal 
system in Turkey for restricting the market economy following the annulment of 
the authority law by the Constitution Court. The column entitled" 'State law' is 
against liberal economy" argues that statism was not and will not be restricted to 
the economy; political and economic statism always exist jointly. 
The effect of statism on the law is mentioned in the column and it is asked: 
"How does the current system of law in Turkey adjust to liberal democracy and 
liberal economy, to what extent? In a different way, I can ask, is the law philosophy 
which has been framed and embodied by the 1982 Constitution an obstruction to the 
global values that are defined by democracy and market economy? .. "(Asaf Sava~ 
Akat, Sabah, 17.7.1994). 
As this and the following example show, democracy here is something to facilitate 
the operation of the market. It is an element of 'global values' that the character of 
the identity of Turkey should be in accordance with: 
''There is a new world beyond the boundaries. This is a world in which thoughts, 
power of enterprise, capital and information move intercontinentally without any 
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hindrance. The basic global values of this world are 'multiple voiced democracy' and 
'free market economy based on competition ..... " (Mehmet Barlas, Sabah, 11.7.1994). 
As seen here, privatization is not only advocated in order to eliminate some 
negativities such as state economic enterprises, but is also presented as a means to 
integrate with the global world. These are expressed in the editorials and columns 
as democracy and integration with Europe. 
1.2.1. For Democracy 
As seen above, minimising the political power of the state as a legal and illegal 
force are not expressed by the advocates of privatization. Rather, the words 
'democracy' or 'freedom' are used in a loose way mostly in relation to the 'free' 
market: 
''Freedom in the mentality of the economy brings democracy in the mentality of 
politics. Have you ever met any free economy in despotic regimes? The supreme 
authority in a closed economy decides everything: how you walk, how you sneeze, 
what you buy and sell, how, in the end what you believe, how ..... The political 
boundaries do not matter in a free economy. The understanding of integration with 
the world and freedom of enterprises are dominant" (Fazll Kararnan, Zaman, 
21.11.1994). 
Similarly, Akat states that: 
"The experiences of the last half century have brought very strong evidence that 
'private ownership-market' is not only an economic category, but the precondition of 
a liberal democracy" (AsafSava~ Akat, Sabah, 10.7.1994). 
It can be questioned how free the market actually is, what the understanding of 
freedom includes and whether freedom is sufficient alone without equality. The 
more important thing here, however, is the use of these arguments to support 
privatization. That is, the assumption that free market will bring liberal democracy 
is extended to another assumption which argues that firstly privatization should be 
realised, then it will automatically bring democracy. 
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According to Akat, privatization "is one dimension of the democratization 
attempt", and therefore privatization should be supported by many sections of 
society: 
.. It is of great importance that people who advocate change, democracy, integration 
with the world and a strong and modern Turkey, understand very well the crucial role 
of privatization in their project" (Asaf Sava~ Akat, Sabah, 10.7.1994). 
The column below does not only consider privatization as one dimension of 
democracy, but also asserts that privatization is necessary and vital for democracy, 
otherwise (without privatization) democracy should not be expected: 
..... privatization is of crucial importance not only in terms of the economy, but also in 
terms of the realisation of democratization. Nobody should anticipate democratization 
of the Turkish state unless a real privatization has been realised" (Mehmet Altan, 
Sabah,27.IO.1994). 
Another example similarly states that the nature of the state will change after 
privatization. Gokmen states that after privatization the Constitution will be 
changed, the state will become an organ responsible for the happiness of 
individuals rather than a source of pressure (Yavuz Gokmen, Hurriyet, 16.9.1994). 
As mentioned above, democracy as one of the reasons and outcomes of 
privatization is supported by the idea of being a part of the world. Thus, taking its 
place in the global world with a strengthened position is seen as the ultimate target. 
To achieve this, privatization is seen as necessary for democratization, and 
democratization is seen as a condition of being European 122, as can be seen in the 
extracts below: 
122 These ideas are very similar to the ideas of the Prime Minister of the period, Tansu C;:iller as seen in the 
third chapter. In fact. the writers give quotations from the speeches of the Prime Minister in their columns. 
For example, Sedat Ergin summarises his meeting with Prime Minister Tansu C;iller in his column in 
HOrriyel. According to this, C;:iller establishes an important parallel between privatization and 
democratization by considering these as parts of a whole. Democratization is also related to the Customs 
Union. <;iller states: "You assume that everything can be done immediately about democratization. It does 
not happen as you think. However, with the Customs Union, democratization will gain a great speed" 
(Sedat Ergin, HUrriyet, 2.3.1995). 
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"We need to know where we are in privatization before asking where we are in 
Westernisation, or where we are in democratisation" (Canan Barlas, Milliyet, 
30.4.1995). 
Asaf Sav~ Akat emphasises that political liberalization should follow economic 
liberalisation and adds: 
"As far as it can be done, privatization will accelerate democratization, and it will 
make Turkey's entering the world's 'first division' easier"(Asaf Sava~ Akat, Sabah, 
25.11.1994). 
1.2.2. For Integration with Europe 
The necessity of privatization for the integration with Europe takes place with the 
emphasis on the Customs Union. These extracts show the interrelationship between 
them and the priorities that are assumed. 
"Privatization being on the Turkish agenda has an importance beyond chance in this 
period in which Turkey is coming closer to realising the Customs Union with the EU. 
It is impossible for many SEEs to enter the Custom Union and become successful 
with their current structure in the current situation of the public sector in 
Turkey ...... (Osman Ulagay, Milliyet. 29 11 1994). 
Similarly another article in Hiirriyet states: 
'''The Customs Union with Europe is at least as important as privatization. In fact, 
these two are not independent of each other. Turkey needs to be in definitive 
agreement on some issues. A Turkey which has realised privatization and the 
Customs Union with Europe will be very different from that which exists today. What 
should be done is not to create unnecessary polemics on these two issues and to lead 
unnecessarily to time being lost with street politics" (ErtugnIl OzkOk, Harriyet, 
10.8.1994). 
The Sabah editorial is very certain about the Customs Union. It regards the 
Customs Union as a step for membership of the EU. Giingor Mengi mentions that 
the Customs Union is one of the stations on that road. The idea of historical 
necessity exists in the Sabah editorial, like many others. 
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"The main target should be European Union ... Tbe target for Turkey that is shown by 
--- !lie hiStory Is-Europe.Wobody should-feel comfortable before-arriving at thactarget" ---
(Giingor Mengi, Sabah, 8.2.1995). 
In another editorial, he describes the law on privatization, and the changes in the 
law against terrorism as two harnessed horses: 
''The confidence and speed that we will provide on the road towards integration with 
Europe depend on the harnessing of these two horses at the same time in 
safety ... Privatization will reconcile Turkey with international financial institutions. 
The consensus that will be provided on the Law on the Struggle against Terrorism 
will correct our record which prevents integration with Europe since it will free the 
people who end up in prison because they have written a book" (Giingor Mengi, 
Sabah,19.10.1994). 
2. Critical Accounts on the Privatization of SEEs 
There is no editorial or column in Cumhuriyet which argues for or lists the reasons 
for privatization. The critical accounts on the privatization of the SEEs are mainly 
the ones in Cumhuriyet. although it is possible to see critical ones in other 
newspapers (except Sabah) since they are not homogeneous structures and the 
column writers in particular have some autonomy. 
Some mention the drawbacks or possible negative effects of privatization: 
Mlimtaz Soysal.123 as a professor who studies Constitutions, criticises the 
privatization decisions on some SEEs for being illegal and being against the 
Constitution (Mlimtaz Soysal, Hurriyet. 14.9.1994). Also. he stresses the necessity 
of 'protecting consumers' and of 'preventing monopolization and cartelisation' 
(Mlimtaz Soysal, Hurriyet. 14.9.1994). 
123 MUmtaz Soysal writes columns regularly in HUrnye!. At that time, he was an SDP member of the 
parliament, which was a partner of the coalition government with the TPP Then. he became Foreign 
Minister, then resigned. During the period analysed, he attempted to make some democratic changes in the 
Law Against Terrorism, and he tried to persuade his party to present this democratization as a condition of 
accepting the legal arrangements on privatization. 
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---Taner Berksoy- from- Cumhuriyet states _that privjltization without complete 
- ---------
competition reinforces the inadequacy of the distribution of income (Taner 
Berksoy, Cumhuriyet, 1.12.1994). 
Taylan Erten states that: 
''It is inconvenient for competition to sell more than an institution (SEE) to one firm 
or group in these kinds of sectors" (Taylan Erten. 21.4.1995, Dunya). 
Oztin Akgii~, in Cumhuriyet. lists the drawbacks such as monopolisation, the 
exploitation of consumers, the profit drive of the companies, the increase in public 
fmance deficits and decrease in production (Oztin Akgii~, Cumhuriyet, 
16.10.1994). 
Some columns question the mainstream discourse on state economic enterprises: 
Miimtaz Soysal states that what has been opposed are 'the obsession' that 'public 
enterprises are always bad, private enterprises are always good', 'illegality', selling 
of SEEs which are 'necessary for balanced development' in a hurry (Miimtaz 
Soysal, Hiirriyet, 5.5.1995). 
Ziilfikar Dogan, from Milliyet, questions the idea that SEEs are millstones. He 
argues that there are state economic enterprises which have a renewed technology, 
which produce the essential inputs for the economy and even make a profit 
(Ziilfikar Dogan, Milliyet, 4.7.1994). 
One column from the same newspaper challenges the aim of SEEs as making 
profit: 
''The aim is not to make profit in the SEEs. The main idea is to bring advantages to 
the public"(Olctay Akbal, Milliyer, 6.10.1994). 
Some evaluate the past of SEEs differently from the editorials and columns of 
Sabah. They accept the inadequacy of SEEs, but argue that this is the outcome of 
deliberate policies: 
A column from Cumhuriyet explains the reasons for the current situation of SEEs, 
as the result of the policies that have been applied since the Ozal period in the 
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1980s. According to him, since Ozal cut the support for SEEs, their investment has 
decreased, SEEs have obtained credit with high interest rates from the banks. Many 
SEEs have made a loss because their earnings are eaten up in interest payments. He 
also emphasises that the economy did not worsen because of SEE losses. SEE 
losses are the outcome of the fact that the economy has been governed badly or the 
losses have been produced deliberately (Mustafa Balbay, Cumhuriyet, 25.11.1994). 
Oztin Akgiiy argues in a similar way that the attempts to destroy the SEEs that 
were 'the signs of our economic independence' intensified after the 1980s. 
Industrial investments were not made. Unskilful managers were appointed. They 
are full of debts (Oztin Akgiiy, Cumhuriyet, 2.12.1994). 
Oktay Ek~i from Hiirriyet argues that the assets of the state are being plundered 
through privatization. He states that this is the end of the plan. Firstly, the 
enterprises are badly managed, they are forced into debt, then the quality of the 
products and services decreases: 
'This policy is applied for a while. After the bad image is created, it is the turn of 
selling, privatization"(Oktay Ek~i, Hurriyet, 23.2.1995). 
Very similarly, a column from Cumhuriyet argues that the SEEs have been 
destroyed deliberately by the politicians as a result of not renewing their 
technology, not making necessary investments, and creating high interest debts 
with private banks ($iikran Soner, Cumhuriyet, 30.7.1994). 
These different evaluations of SEEs lead to more critical accounts on privatization. 
Bekir Co~kun in Hiirriyet addresses the claims that privatization ended the socialist 
state. He argues that what is collapsing is the social state: 
..... social state is collapsing step by step .. .look at the fate. even with the support of the 
social democrats" (Bekir Co~kun, Hurriyet, 25.11.1994). 
In a column on privatization, Miimtaz Soysal talks about 'globalized international 
exploitation networks'. The last obstacle for this network, according to him, is the 
'nation-state' which has a protective function (MUmtaz Soysal, Hiirriyet, 
5.5.1995). 
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Anti-imperialist discourse is more obvious in another column in Cumhuriyet: 
"Their aim (foreigners) is to realise their production with a lack of conscience about 
the environment in countries like ours, using cheap labour, and the state which is 
unable to collect taxes". 
He adds that this will bring benefit for some groups in Turkey because: 
..... with the end of SEEs, an important power against the private sector will have been 
eliminated .... workers organisations will have been destroyed .. Another concept that is 
removed with privatization is the development programmes to end the regional 
unbalances" (izzettin Onder, Cumhuriyet, 14.12.1994). 
Some columns in Cumhuriyet emphasise the republic: 
''lbe prime minister told foreign investors that 'Your being here and the historical 
moment in which we live make me excited'. We do not know whether she felt the 
same excitement as well during the celebrations of the 71st anniversary of our 
RepublicT' (TOrkel Miniba~, Cumhuriyet, 31.10.1994). 
ilhan Sel~uk from Cumhuriyet stated that the government wanted to sell the assets 
of '70 years Republic' carelessly with arbitrary decisions. (ilhan Sel~uk, 
Cumhuriyet, 1.11.1994). 
Even those who are not advocates of privatization, describe privatization and 
democracy as being in the same plane. They underline the democratic 
developments while those in favour prioritise privatization. The nature of the link 
between these two remains largely unquestioned. 
ilhan Sel~uk points out the necessity of enacting a law on democratization as 
something to balance the negative effects of privatization (ilhan Sel~uk, 
Cumhuriyet, 1.11.1994). 
A similar argument can be found in the columns in Dunya as well. Osman Arolat 
points out that democratization is necessary to make privatization beneficial for all 
people, and for reducing the state. He adds: 
" ... the success of privatization in Turkey is impossible unless a step is taken on the 
way of democratization, and unless the legal reform has been realised"(Osman 
Arolat, 17. 10. 1994, Diinya). 
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It seems that even in the columns which are critical of privatization the issue of 
democratization is addressed as something to balance privatization, and to 
moderate the criticisms on privatization. This can be argued easily since the same 
theme exists not only in Cumhuriyet, which is a Kemalist social democrat 
newspaper, but also in Diinya, which is a liberal, economics newspaper. The 
insistence of the coalition partner, the social democrat party, on making changes in 
the law against terrorism in the direction of democratization, at the same time as 
the enactment of the privatization law, might be of importance for the people who 
are against privatization, leading them to accept privatization and democratization 
together. 
3. 'Obstacles' to Privatization 
The people who evaluate privatization differently, more cautiously or critically, are 
personalised and seen as obstacles in the editorials and columns, mainly in Sabah. 
How the accounts which do not support privatization are evaluated is important 
because it can reveal what or who are perceived as the enemies for the advocates of 
privatization. 
A column from Sabah states that the people who obstruct privatization are, "SEE 
managers, the companies that sell products to the SEEs and some trade unions that 
suffocate the SEEs". Also it is mentioned that some politicians are hunting for 
votes by being against privatization (Ercan inan, Sabah, 8.6.1994). 
According to the editorials and columns, these 'obstacles' are mainly preventing 
progress, integration with the world and also Turkey catching up with the rest of 
the world (Taha Akyol, Milliyet, 23.7.1994). 
One of the obstacles, according to Akat, is the advocates of the statist tradition 
which has been dominant since the 1930s. The other is the advocates of 'political 
Islam' who oppose statists on other issues, but adopt 'economic statism' as much 
as the statists. He argues that the ideas which see the public ownership as a taboo 
and as a sacred value are 'cutting Turkey off from the world' (Asaf Sava~ Akat, 
Sabah, 25.11.1994). 
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In another of his columns, progress is the main theme and people who are 
opponents of privatization are seen as the opponents of democracy. 
He states that, in fact, people who are against privatization, "are trying to obstruct 
the democratization of Turkey". He argues that those sections which can not accept 
change, democratization and Turkey catching up with the rest of the world stand as 
'protectors of the current populist plunder economy' (Asaf Sava~ Akat, Sabah, 
10.7.1994). 
Similarly, for Hadi Uluengin, there are two options; one is a closed and inward 
looking society, the other is an open and outward looking society which provides a 
technological base for Turkey to catch up with the rest of the world. The fIrst 
option means going back, the other brings progress. He says that status quo 
militants who are "rowing against the current" and 'resisting the progress of 
humanity', serve to 'cheat the citizens' by embracing the 'taboo of the sacred 
state'(Hadi Uluengin, Hurriyet, 28.2.1995). 
Barlas stresses a similar issue by addressing the obstacles which are 'people from 
the Welfare Party', 'bureaucrats', 'status quo politicians'. He declares: 
"Whatever anyone does, the road for fusion with modernization has been opened for 
Turkey and cannot be closed. The future of Turkey is neither a theocratic state model 
nor a primitive Middle East socialism. (Mehmet Barlas, Sabah. 11.7.1994). 
According to him, there is no left-right polarisation in Turkey anymore. Rather the 
'old' opposed to the 'new', that is a statism which advocates maintenance of the 
status quo, opposed to integration in the global economy. 
He argues that it is ridiculous to obstruct privatization in 1994 and to struggle for 
the existence of SEEs, and to present this as progressiveness despite all the 
experiences ofthe world (Mehmet Barlas, Sabah, 11.7.1994). 
Another column entitled "If the obstructions continue, this (privatization) will not 
last" states that: 
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"Let's stop misleading ourselves. It is not meaningful to object to privatization for 
silly reasons ... when all the world is working very hard to get rid of state 
enterprises"(Erdogan AIkm, Milliyet, 10.10.1994). 
The idea that 'all the world, even socialist countries are privatizating' is a very 
common theme in these editorials and columns. It assumes the naturalness and 
unavoidability of privatization as a glolial necessity. It is linked with an emphasis 
on Turkey's delay in privatizating state enterprises. 
One column argues that the old socialist countries could only start to talk about 
privatization after the 1990s, but some of them started privatization quickly and 
have gone even further than Turkey"(Asaf Sava~ Akat, Sabah, 10.7.1994). 
Another column in the same newspaper states that the privatization of SEEs, which 
made the economy 'bankrupt', should not be obstructed because of ideas that 'can 
no longer be encountered even in Moscow and Beijing'(Mehmet Barlas, Sabah, 
11.7.1994). 
It seems that the 'collapse' of the socialist countries reinforces these ideas. One 
claims that Turkey is a socialist country: 
Ercan inan from Sabah asks: 
"Let's see when Turkey will be freed from being socialist?" (Erean inan, Sabah, 
8.6.1994). 
Here, socialism is presented as anti-democratic, and the people who are opposed to 
privatization are attacked under the assumption that they are socialist and, as an 
automatic result of this, undemocratic. 
Miimtaz Soysal is a personalised target in these editorials and columns, although 
he is not a socialist. He is seen as the main obstacle to privatization and described 
as "the current prophet of the religion of statism" (Muharrem Karsh, Milliyet, 
3.10.1994) 
In fact, he is used as the embodiment of other enemies. 
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Cengiz C;:andar from Sabah criticises Mlimtaz Soysal in the column entitled ''The 
democratization lie of the national left". C;:andar argues that Soysal is not 'aware of 
the world' since Soysal said that he could not feel comfortable with privatization 
because of the IMF. 'As if privatization was the idea of IMF' C;:andar adds. He 
claims that Soysal is 
"the last remnant of the mentality of the socialist-communist system which collapsed 
in 1989-1990 and was consigned to history. The economic mentality of this system 
was exactly the one Mtimtaz Soysal advocates today. Also, that system was 
insensitive to individual freedom and human rights" (Cengiz C;:andar, Sabah, 
11.10.1994). 
The fact that Mlimtaz Soysal is a lecturer has been used in the columns as well: 
"Is he not MUmtaz Soysal who has taught for many years that the parliament is a 
'harmony' institution? In his Constitution lectures, he must have said thousands of 
times that a member of parliament who does not want to join common responsibility 
should immediately resign"(Oktay ~i, Hurriyet, 18.10.1994). 
A column in Hurriyet entitled "Lecturers can not prevent privatization" addresses 
Mlimtaz Soysal and states that with objecting to privatization, in fact Mlimtaz 
Soysal "objects to democracy in Turkey". He states that people who obstruct 
privatization know that when the privatization is realised and the state has given up 
being boss, the people will be boss (Yavuz Gokmen, Hurriyet, 16.9.1994). 
Glingor Mengi of Sabah, after the annulment of the authority law, reacted very 
strongly in an aggressive way by focusing on Mlimtaz Soysal: 
''Ten thousands of hidden unemployed who work in the public sector, to be more 
exact, who do not work at all, and are fed by our taxes from the state treasury, should 
make a statue of lecturer Mtimtaz Soysal by collecting one hundred lira each from 
this month's salaries .... like the father of Cuba, Castro,like Kim n Sung ... These fossils 
who put on the progressive mask should only remain in history books". 
He describes 'these fossils' with these characteristics: 
Those 'who suppose that the social state means producing pyjamas, shoes, tea, 
milk, meat' , those 'trade dinosaurs who can not renew the technology since they 
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do not make a profit', those who use SEEs like 'the private farm of the party', and 
'feed many partisans from that farm'. 
He argues that there are few people who 'advocate the corrupted statist economy' 
apart from 'despots who do not have any aim except sustaining their dictatorship, 
and in third world democracies the people's flatterers who do not have the 
creativity needed for the competitive market'. "Soysal and his like-minded friends 
are making a mistake". He declares that there is a large group which uses the 
advantages of the state, and they are the 'millstone' of the economy and politics. 
He asserts that M. Soysal and his friends are supporting these 'parasites' because 
of their concerns about votes (Giingor Mengi, Sabah, 22.7.1994). 
These obstructions are seen as causing a delay in privatization, and parliament is 
requested to speed up the process: 
" ... even the Constitution Court is not an excuse anymore. If this obligation which we 
have been supporting but not realising for ten years is put off one or two years more, 
the dimension of the disaster will enlarge"(Gilngor Mengi, "Sabah Diyor ki, 
16.6.1994). 
4. Addressing the Parliament for the Enactment of the Law 
The idea of being late was repeated 57 times, and of being slow was repeated 28 
times according to the results of the content analysis of the news. This is 
emphasised and became a repeated theme, especially before the enactment of the 
law, in the editorials and the columns: 
"Turkey is wasting time in privatizing, time is as valuable as gold, the time for 
privatization will never return. Everyday which has been lost is written in the column 
of debts. These' debts are accumulating and making the country bankrupt" (ErtugruI 
Ozkok, HUrriyet, 10.8.1994). 
"Every day which has been delayed adds 510 billion 1L to the bills as SEE losses, as 
interest expenses as a result of being unable to privatize"(~eref Oguz, MiIliyet, 
10.4.1995). 
''When we look at the adventure of privatization, we see that the process is not 
short ... However, when we look at the results and the achieved end in this long 
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process, it becomes obvious that we are moving at snail's pace" (Osman Arolat, 
9.7.1994, Diinya). 
In another column, we can see the same expression: 
"Moving towards privatization at snail's pace has another reflection in the stock-
markef'(Ercan inan, Sabah, 8.6.1994). 
The editorials and columns analysed diagnose the other reasons for the delay, and 
show solutions. N. Demirkent, in the editorial of Diinya, states that the path the 
government followed was illegal, so the main problem is the coalition government: 
" ... The TPP-SDP (True Path Party- Social Democratic Populist Party) coalition 
government is not the fate of this country. TPP should realise that SDP, which is 
being weakened, is a tie" (Nezih Demirkent, Diinya) 12.7.1994). 
This idea is clearer in his other editorials. In one editorial, he targets the Prime 
Minister <;ilIer and states: 
" .. .it is obvious that there is no chance for C;:iller to deal with these things with this 
partner" (be means SHP-Social Democratic Populist Party) (Nezih Demirkent, Diinya 
10.9.1994). 
Other editorials and columns instruct the government about privatization especially 
after the annulment of the authority law, by stressing the need for a law on 
privatization: 
Hasan Cemal mentions the importance of privatization despite the fact that the 
Constitution Court obstructed the attempts of privatization, and adds: 
"If a legal frame was prepared properly, the result would be different" (Hasan Cemal, 
Sabah,23.7.1994). 
He says in another column that: 
"Let's not sacrifice privatization with partisan tactics. Our economy and so our 
people are losing out "(Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 25.10.1994). 
Following the Constitution Court's decision which states that privatization will be 
considered illegal when it is done on the basis of the authority law, the Sabah's 
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editorial states that every month which is lost risks the benefits of privatization. It 
emphasises that there is a need for an urgent solution to facilitate privatization . 
..... we need to see an enactment of a law on privatization. The Prime Minister can 
enact this law by sitting one day in parliament until midnight, of course if her aim is 
to make privatization, not to seek an excuse" (GilngOr Mengi, Sabah, 22.7.1994). 
Giingor Mengi addresses the same issue in "The end of the road": 
"Parliament has to enact the privatization law in September, because we have come to 
the end of the road, and the end of patience"(Gilngor Mengi, Sabah, 25.8.1994). 
Before the decision on the law, Ertugrul Ozkok wrote in his column under the large 
headline "Yes for the White Revolution": 
"I decided to write although today is not my day for writing. The reason is simple. 
Today, in 72 hours, Turkey will enter a very important, if this is the correct word, a 
'historical' decision making process". 
Like others, he points out that the countries around Turkey which have realised 
privatization, have made big steps in their economies: 
"If they can not enact the law, Turkey will remain a Third World country with an 
unnamed old fashioned socialist economy ... ". 
Then he continues: 
''This is why the following 72 hours are of great importance to the fate of Turkey, for 
the quality of life of the next generations, and for integration with Europe ... Also I 
invite all members of the parliament to this historical mission" (Ertugrul Ozkok, 
Hurriyet, 25.10.1994). 
This extract taken from the editorial of Ozkok shows that privatization is of vital 
importance. 
Another column addresses the oppositional parties by saying that signing it will not 
mean giving credit to the government. He states that they should sign it since they 
believe in it. He addresses them: 
"Do not worry gentlemen. We are here. We are witnesses. You are the essential 
owners of the idea of privatization. Lift your fingers, let's finish this matter .... What 
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will happen to the interests of the country? Thus, we advise insight for both sides. 
Turkey does not have any patience to delay even one day. Enough" (Rauf Tamer, 
Hiirriyet, 25.10.1994). 
Some editorials and columns in Sabah and Hurriyet worked as a kind of lobby for 
the enactment of the law, although it is explained with common sense by people in 
the column in Sabah one day after the law. 
Asaf Sava~ Akat in his column entitled "A historical step on the way to 
privatization" states that the 'symbolic value of the law is very high': 
"It indicates that the Turkish economy will keep on with the process that started in the 
1980s, of integration with the world". 
The enactment of the law, according to him, shows the power of the wave of 
'democratization and modernization'. He also claims that 
'the enactment of the law shows that the common sense of people, their aspirations of 
ease and welfare can affect the parliament'(Asaf Sava~ Akat, Sabah, 25.11.1994) . 
5. After the Law 
The extracts from the editorials and columns written after the law will be 
considered by looking for differences in the ideas and in the emphases after the 
law. It was mentioned above that the way in which the issue of unemployment was 
addressed differed before the law and after the law. 
After the law, Sabah' s editorial drew attention to the great anticipations of the 
people who were fed up with the problems of subsistence of their life and says that: 
'''Therefore the thing that should be done is not to provoke excessive anticipations in 
the society, on the contrary to reduce these anticipations to a realistic level"(Gtingor 
Mengi, Sabah, 26.11. 1994). 
Although most of them worked as if they were carrying out lobbying activities, the 
editorials and columns have a more cautious position after the law on privatization 
was enacted. This is also clear from the titles of the editorials and columns: 
'''The law has been enacted, but... ... 
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''The enactment of the privatization law is of course important, but..." 
"Is the Privatization Law a Miracle Solution?", 
"Correct messages, correct anticipation". 
The ideas in these editorials and columns will be summarised in order, with 
extracts taken from each one. 
In his editorial Nezih Demirkent states that the law is necessary, but the application 
is more important: 
''The Privatization Law is an important event for the history of the economy. 
However, history is not always full of successes" (Nezih Demirkent, Diinya, 
25.10.1994). 
In his co lumn Hasan CemaI states that: 
''The law should not be underestimated. However, it should not be seen as a magic 
wand at the same time!" (Hasan Cemal, Sabah, 25.11.1994). 
Osman UIagay replies to the title of his column "Is Privatization Law a Miracle 
Solution?" 
"No! This is not only my personal idea. Many people, native people, foreigners who 
are closely interested in privatization, have the same idea" (Osman Ulagay, Milliyet. 
28.10.1994). 
Another column uses the word 'miracle' as weIl: 
"Privatization is not the miracle medicine that we anticipated. it can not save Turkey 
itself...privatization is a tool for long term social transformation .... So we are 
privatizating in order to save our future, not our today. Getting results from 
privatization and producing benefits depend on securing economic reforms and 
stability ... Privatization should not be shown as a miracle medicine. Our agenda and 
targets force us to give messages which enable us to perceive privatization as a 
natural part of a process full of hardships and sacrifices"(Korkmaz ltkorur, Milliyet, 
20.11.1994). 
Although the law was presented as a miracle solution for all problems before, after 
the enactment of the law, as this column suggests, it is the time for hardships and 
sacrifices again for the people. As seen earlier, the inevitability of the dismissal of 
workers appeared as a suggestion after the law. 
This means that most of the newspapers continued their duty as a justifier of the so 
caIled stabiIisation programmes (seen in the chapter four). It can be argued that 
most Turkish newspapers work to solve the crisis of the capitalist state by serving 
to prevent legitimation crises in an era in which capital is accumulated differently. 
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6. Conclusion 
When this analysis is compared with that of the previous chapter, it can be seen 
that the editorials and columns contain more political dimensions than the news. 
The news is written on the basis of the sources who mostly gave technical 
explanations about the process. Privatization in the news was considered in a 
narrow sense as an economic and technical issue. Also there were no significant 
differences in the news between the newspapers, whereas here it is possible to 
observe the differences. However, these differences do not have a wide range, 
rather two polarities. Although it is possible to see different ideas in the same 
newspaper -apart from Sabah and Cumhuriyet - as a result of the greater autonomy 
of column writers as opposed to the journalists who are tied up with the news 
production dynamics as seen in the earlier chapter, there are two main discourses 
found in this chapter. Sabah and Cumhuriyet clearly show these two main 
discourses on privatization. 
All these extracts from the editorials and columns, except the ones in Cumhuriyet, 
show that Turkish elite journalists mainly support privatization and present the 
market as the source of efficiency, profit, employment, pure and clean politics, 
democracy, integration with Europe ... etc. 
According to the analysis, Sabah is the biggest supporter of privatizaton. Diinya, as 
an economics newspaper, considers the issue as something technical, and an issue 
of expertise, and is not as involved in party politics as the others. Hurriyet and 
Milliyet adopt supportive positions which are balanced by the columns of Miimtaz 
Soysal in Hurriyet, and the more social democrat character of Milliyet. Zaman, 
which is supported by the Islamic Fethullah sect, is again pro-market and pro-
privatization. 
Some editorials and columns which advocate privatizaton try to activate the 
parliament and to affect its decisions with their articles. It is mainly Sabah which 
leads the government to hasten privatization. The editorials and columns in Sabah 
indicate to the government that the solution is to enact a law. They present the law 
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as a very vital step for Turkey until the enactment, and then they have a mission to 
reduce the high expectations and excitement of the public after the law. 
For the supporters of privatization, including mainly the ones from Sabah, 
privatization is necessary to deal with the negativities in the economy. The SEEs 
are referred to in that sense as burdens or millstones with their losses and 
inefficiency by employing parasitic workers. The SEEs are presented as the reason 
for all problems not only the budget deficits or inflation, but also for Turkey being 
closed to the world. Thus, privatization is advocated not only to end the negative 
things in the economy (like the SEEs), but at the same time to achieve the positive 
things and ideals. 
While there are reasons given for privatization in the sense of the elimination of 
some negative features in the economy, privatization is seen as desirable for these 
reasons, it is also framed as the inevitable, almost obligatory, thing in order to 
integrate with the rest of the world. The developments in the socialist block, hence 
the discourse of the 'triumph' of capitalism, strengthen the pro-privatization 
discourse with the emphasis of 'all the world is doing the same'. The statism 
principle of Kemalism is criticised while globalization is stressed. In fact, the idea 
of integration with the global world is already consistent with the general target of 
Kemalism to reach the modern and civilised level. Thus, the popular and desirable 
discourses such as modernization and globalization are used together to advocate 
the change in the capitalist development through privatization. 
There is a linear development in the pro-privatization editorials and columns: 
firstly privatization, then democracy and integration with the EU. In other words, 
free market, liberal democracy and integration with the global market. 
The more critical accounts, which mainly take place in Cumhuriyet question the 
discourse on the SEEs by focusing on the policies of the government concerning 
SEEs. They do not say that they are against privatization. This can be understood 
to some extent since being against privatization brings all negative definitions such 
as being old fashioned, statist, anti-democratic, closed to the world, anti-European, 
anti-progress. Nevertheless, the critical accounts restrict themselves and mostly 
talk about the issues or the agenda which were already set up by the pro-
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privatization arguments. When they reply to these ideas, mainly that SEEs should 
be eliminated, they argue that these are the outcome of the mistaken or consciously 
wrong policies. Although they show the main reasons for the situation of the SEEs, 
they do not offer solutions or voice others' solutions for the reform of the SEEs. 
They consider democracy differently from above. They do not consider it as the 
outcome of privatization, but they see democracy as something to balance the 
inadequacy of privatization. Thus, it happens that privatization is approved of 
silently for democracy. 
These discourses and their significance in the current conditions in Turkey and in 
the world will be elaborated in the next chapter, which concludes the thesis. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Conclusion 
CONCLUSION 
The claim that 'liberalization in economy brings liberalization in politics', which 
was pronounced in the 1980s 'liberal' environment following the military coup, 
has been maintained in the 1990s with the emphasis on privatization and European 
integration. The main aim of this thesis has been to explore the operation of this 
ideological discourse in the contemporary Turkish press by showing how this link 
between liberal economy and democracy has been constituted using broader 
discourses, such as modernization and globalization. 
The thesis traced the dynamics which constitute and spread these discourses on a 
national and global scale. It investigated the structure of the media industries in 
which the meanings are produced, and the news production process, by 
, 
investigating the daily practices of the media professional. By analysing public 
communication, it examined how these discourses are constructed by privileging 
some choices in the political economy; which mechanisms they use to achieve 
hegemony; how the state and market are presented; whether different discourses, 
apart from the liberal one, exist, and if so, in which ways. 
A context for the examination of the discourses was provided by tracing the 
dynamics which generated them. This was carried out by looking at the changes in 
the global political economy and in the Turkish historical context. 
The ideas which consider the development of capitalism as a condition for 
democracy were traced in the fIrst part of the thesis by starting from modernization 
theories and moving to more recent globalization theories. It was argued that the 
globalization theories have many similarities with the early modernization theories 
in terms oftheir assumption that capitalism will bring democracy. The difference is 
that modernization theories held the concept of development as being something 
good, whereas globalization theories expressed the 'victory' of capitalism more 
assertively as inevitable and the only alternative in the global era. In addition to 
criticising their common theme, namely the causal relationship between capitalist 
development and democracy, the thesis also included the ideas which challenge the 
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huge assumption of globalization theorists that the declining nation-state obeys the 
dictates of globalization. 
One of these challenges emphasises the competitive character of the nation-state, 
or the changing competitive strategies of the states. This approach was criticised in 
the thesis as making a dichotomy of the state and market. The second challenge 
was considered more developed since it does not make the mistake of establishing 
dichotomies such as the state and market, or the nation-state and globalization, and 
it stresses the capitalist character of the state by considering it as strong in the 
political sense. 
The modernization and globalization story of Turkey has provided a specific case 
to exemplify the discussions. The principles of Kemalism with a special focus on 
statism, the period of the DP government in which the end of statism was claimed, 
and the military coups, were taken as the major turning points in order to provide a 
background to evaluate the liberalism claims after the 1980s, which were the 
immediate concern of this thesis. The ideas which argue that economic liberalism 
brings political liberalism or autonomization of civil society were questioned. The 
continuing strong character of the state in Turkey after the 1980s when the liberal 
economic policies started to be applied, was pointed out. The continuing 
interference of the military in political life in different ways was also mentioned. 
While the connection made between democracy and liberal economic policies in 
the 1980s exists also in the 1990s, there are new elements, such as privatization of 
the state economic enterprises, membership of the Customs Union, and the 
European Union. In the 1990s, the extension of the liberal economic policies 
including privatization has been seen as essential to the development of 
democracy, which would be a requirement for membership of the European Union. 
These were the issues which were elaborated on through the textual analysis of the 
news, editorials and columns in the Turkish press. 
Before looking at the operation of the ideology in the press, the media industry and 
the news production dynamics in which the meanings are produced were 
investigated. It was found through the interviews with journalists and the editors 
that the daily practices of news making were almost identical in the different 
197 
) 
CHAPTERS CONCLUSION 
newspapers with the same substantive constraints such as editorial control, 
professional socialisation and professional values. Although the first of these 
constraints, the editorial control, is recognised by the journalists, the others operate 
more indirectly, either being taken for granted or remaining unquestioned most of 
the time. In addition to the restraints imposed by the current situation in the media 
industry, particularly as a result of the current concentrated and conglomerated 
structure, the news production process itself adds new restraints and further limits 
to the news coverage. 
It can be seen from the analysis of the news on privatization that the actors in the 
news are mostly politicians, businessmen, or bureaucrats. Only very few of the 
actors in the news oppose privatization, and these are mostly from the parliament. 
The analysis has also shown that most of the news contains supportive statements 
on privatization. The newspapers in the sample contain predominantly negative 
descriptions of the state economic enterprises, for example stressing that they 
'make a loss'. When the state economic enterprises are evaluated positively, their 
, 
profit making is again the focus. So, the issue of loss or profit is the key element to 
assess the state economic enterprises in the news rather than, for example, the 
quality or the price of the goods and services. The reasons for privatization were 
focused on less compared to the issue of the state economic enterprises. 
The media elites have always been influential in Turkish political life as seen in 
chapter four. Their influence started with the contribution to the establishment of 
the Kemalist regime and later the modernization of the country. Their continuing 
influence can be seen in the analysis of the editorials and columns. Most of those 
who support the liberalization of the economy work to assist in enacting the law of 
privatization by addressing the parliament and telling it what to do. After the 
Constitution Court's annulment of the law which gives authority to the government 
to carry out privatization, some media elites have urged a new law to be passed. 
They underline the idea that Turkey is 'wasting time' and that all the world, even 
the ex-socialist countries, are carrying out privatization. They invite the 
government to prepare a law, and the parliament to enact it. Neither the news, nor 
the editorials and columns give as much attention to the issues of what will occur 
after the law has been passed as they did before the law. In fact, some editorials 
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and columns convey the message that privatization is not a magic formula and 
therefore instant dramatic improvements will not occur as a result of it, despite the 
fact that it was represented as a big hope before its enactment. 
Although editorials and columns include more detailed coverage of political 
elements compared to the news, which frames the issue as an economic, 
administrative and technical issue by relying on mostly technical explanations of 
the narrow ranged sources, they exhibit two polarised stances. This polarisation of 
the debates around statism and liberalism in the newspapers which have more than 
half of the aggregate circulation, is of a great importance to this thesis. 
The origin of this polarisation, liberalism versus statism, can be found in Turkish 
history with the Kemalist Republican People's Party, and the so-called liberal 
Democrat Party, and the political system which has developed from their legacies. 
Although the statism of the RPP is real, the liberalism of the DP and the other 
subsequent parties, which were inspired by the DP, such as the TPP, remains 
problematic. As this thesis has tried to show, the statist mentality exists in these 
parties in the political dimension despite the fact that they have recently rejected 
statism in economics. 
The first pole which can be labelled as statist is embodied in Cumhuriyet whereas 
the liberal one is mainly represented by Sabah. Statist discourse tends to maintain 
the status quo without developing anything. The advocates of privatization and a 
liberal economy not only argue for the negation of the negativity such as state 
economic enterprises, which are seen as a burden and have many negative effects, 
but also offer a modern Turkey full of promises. As seen in the analysis of the 
news, and the editorials and columns, the ideal of modern Turkey which is 
integrated with the global world is enriched with other positive outcomes of 
liberalism, such as efficiency, productivity, increased income, profit, economic 
growth, extension of capital to the masses, increased free competition, foreign 
capital and investment, and integration with Europe and democracy. Even though it 
is debatable whether all these developments are positive, at least the liberal 
discourse puts forward suggestions of possible positive outcomes. On the other 
hand, when we look at the statist discourse, it can be seen to remain cautious about 
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privatization, and does not develop a discourse that has a positive target or a 
solution. It focuses on the legal incoherence, possible negative effects of 
privatization, and dwells on how to reduce the dangers of privatization. Some 
statists consider it as an imperialist attack on the Republic by advocating the 
Kemalist state. When they talk about the issues, they mostly respond to the agenda 
which was set up by the pro-liberals. For example, while responding to the ideas 
which argue that SEE's should be eliminated as they cause all the problems in the 
economy, from inflation to budget deficit, the statist discourse argues that these are 
the outcomes of some deliberately wrong policies or a conspiracy, without 
elaborating on the problems of SEE, or the existing economic system 
Predominantly they fail to set up an agenda which questions the main assumptions 
of the liberals. Although they do not consider democracy as the outcome of 
privatization, they see it as something to balance the inadequacy of privatization. 
Thus, privatization is approved of silently for the sake of a few democratic 
amendments. In some ways, the statist discourse contributes to the ideological 
connection of privatization and democracy. 
The liberal discourse considers privatization as inevitable, and as an obligation in 
the 'global' age. The discourse of globalization is strong in itself, especially with 
the declaration of the 'victory" of capitalism and with the discourse of "there is no 
alternative'. However, the 'liberal' editorials and columns do not only rely on the 
strength of this discourse, but they rationalise and give some reasons for 
privatization and a liberal economy in a general sense because of the existing 
statism Therefore, privatization has been advocated not only as an unavoidable 
thing, but also as something desirable because of economic, political and even 
moral reasons including the elimination of the SEEs which are seen as a problem 
for the economy with their loss and inefficiency, and as a source of surplus 
employment, bribes and corruption. Also it has been argued that privatization is a 
tool for achieving integration with Europe and democracy. 
The main weakness of the liberal understanding, according to this thesis, derives 
from i) its assumptions that economic development will bring democracy as an 
extension of the modernization paradigm, ii) its neglect of political statism, and its 
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focus only on economic statism, and iii) the idealisation of the market by 
separating it from the state completely. 
It is true that the conditions for freedom have increased, and the diversity of 
identities have arisen in the centre capitalist countries. However, even there, 
democracy developed from the contradictions of capitalism as a result of popular 
struggles rather than being a natural extension of capitalism The link between 
capitalism and democracy has been maintained more assertively for the peripheral 
countries by some modernization theorists. According to their formulation, the 
issue of democracy is postponed on the understanding that it will appear as a 
natural outcome of the market. Thus, the only way to develop democracy, from this 
perspective, would be to support a liberal economy since it is believed that this will 
naturally and spontaneously produce democratic developments. There are different 
resistances in Turkey with the movements of Kurdish, leftist, women's, 
Islamic ... etc. groups. However, they do not exist and operate comfortably as 
extensions of liberalism They are in conflict with the state in different ways; some 
have to work illegally since there is little chance to work legally due to the 
violence ofthe state. 
The challenging of Kemalism by liberalism is restricted to the economic role of the 
state; it does not include the political role. Liberals criticise statism when the state 
restricts the economy. Democracy is seen to appear as the outcome of the 
development of the market. It is not the first or even the main target. If not seen as 
an extension of the economic changes in the final stage, democracy here is 
construed as a pragmatic tool for facilitating the operation of the market rather than 
as a project which counters the political pressure of the state. In fact, many of the 
editorials and columns analysed supported the development of democracy in order 
to correct Turkey's record on human rights in order to prevent it being an obstacle 
for the integration of Turkey into the global market via the Customs Union and the 
European Community. 
The editorials and columns which endorse liberalism consider the market not only 
as the source of economic development, with increased efficiency, profit, and so 
on, but also as the source of pure and clean politics, democracy and integration 
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with Europe. In fact, this idealisation of the market derives from the separation of 
the market and the state, which is the main fault with this polarisation. These two, 
liberalism or statism, or market or state, are not separate from each other. Although 
there is a general transformation from national development to integration with the 
global world, it is not the state versus globalization; the state is still at work. This 
was discussed in detail in the section on the role of the state against globalization 
along with the claims of the withering state in chapter two. 
To claim the separation ofthe state and market becomes more difficult in Turkey's 
case. Firstly, it is hard to make that claim in the political economic circumstances 
of the country, particularly because of the peculiar condition of the bourgeoisie. In 
fact, the bourgeoisie was created in the 1920s and supported in the 1930s by the 
state through encouraging regulations .and policies and other devices. Secondly, 
even the liberal discourse, which is linked with the globalization discourse, has a 
Kemalist statist character which is already consistent with the new global 
discourse. Initially, it may appear rather contradictory since one of the principles of 
Kemalism is statism, and this principle is challenged by privatization and other 
economic changes in the global era. However, when the overall nature of 
Kemalism, namely the aims of modernization and civilisation are considered, it can 
be seen that the new global discourse which discredits statism in an economic 
sense still has the same target of Kemalisrn. In this thesis, the existence of the same 
elements or common patterns in the discourse of liberals has been noted. It is 
essential to emphasise this continuity of the statist mentality for creating different 
projects. 
The market is not a guarantee of developing all democratic, anti-statist elements. It 
can contain elements that have negative effects on democracy, as has been seen 
very clearly with the examples provided by the recent actions of the big media 
groups. As seen in chapter four, big media groups get hidden payments from the 
Prime Minister in addition to the common economic support mechanisms like 
official advertisements, the advertisements of state institutions, using credit from 
state banks, and investment promotions. The return for these payments can be seen 
as support for: the government; economic stabilisation policies; political party or 
political candidates; and embracing the government's policy or even the military 
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view when the issue is of national interests. The private media can threaten 
democracy with their concentrated and conglomerated structure. Media owners 
being involved in other businesses and at the same time the holdings owners being 
involved in the media sector lead them to promote their other businesses by using 
the media; limiting the issues that would be news, or distorting them as a result of 
their commercial interests. The media bosses aggregate their power for maximising 
their commercial profit through advertisements, and other strategies for 
competition, as can be seen from the examples given previously. 
Attributing all positive and democratising characteristics to the private sector by 
representing the issue as the dichotomy of the state and the media in Turkey has 
been a strategy used frequently by the private media in recent times. The large 
media groups have used the discourse of press freedom even when their economic 
profits are under threat as a result of the regulations of the state. The discourse of 
press freedom is very common and powerful in Turkey in an environment in which 
the citizens can not fully exercise their rights and freedom because of the strong 
state. The state being strong prevents the development of the understandings of 
citizenship and 'public' e.g., public interest, public communication, and in some 
sense contributes to a view of the market as a democratic alternative. The 
popularity of private TV with an illusion of democracy and diversity, is a good 
example of this situation. The private channels which emerged in 1990 have 
declared themselves and have been seen as the voice of diversity in a context 
which was dominated by the state, if not government, broadcasting of TRT. Thus, 
in comparison with the TRT channels, they have been called champions of 
democracy. 
Since it postpones democracy as an outcome of the market or considers it as a tool 
to facilitate the market, in the reality of Turkey today liberalism is far from 
achieving free and equal conditions for the citizens from a strong statism which 
pervades all aspects of life. It seems that the liberal project designed for Turkey 
aims to bring about a policy change by eliminating the potential of the state to 
distribute welfare, whilst at the same time not including any proposal to reduce the 
political power of the state over its citizens. 
203 
CHAPTERS CONCLUSION 
This thesis challenges both liberal and statist conceptualisations which limit the 
issue around these two poles. Therefore, it does not suggest supporting state 
against liberal conceptualisation, but instead stresses the need to develop a concept 
of public in Turkey as something different from the state and market. As long as 
the pressure of the state on citizens is reduced and citizenship is revealed initially 
by removing the legal restrictions, democracy can be strengthened, not through 
privatization, or for the sake of integration with Europe. This will focus on 
citizenship and democracy as an end rather than as an extension of capitalist 
economic development or as a tool to increase economic profits, or achieve 
integration with global capital. The media as a key holder in the political 
communication process can work in the direction of developing citizenship and 
democracy by providing a broader range of information to the public. 
Suggestions for Further Research 
As seen throughout the thesis, for the examination of the discourses, this research 
mainly relied on the newspapers as the medium of public communication. Since 
communication is not only limited to the newspapers, but includes magazines, 
radio, television, the internet etc, there are many other areas eo be examined in 
future research. In particular, the news coverage on TV channels merits further 
research especially in view of the present popularity of television. This could not 
be included in this research due to bureaucratic difficulties in accessing the 
archives of the state channel TRT, and the lack of archiving in the private TV 
channels during the period in which the research was conducted. 
This study considered the political economic context with global and local 
dimensions, the media structure, the working practices of media professionals and 
the newspaper text, but did not include the readers of the newspapers, mainly 
because of the insufficient literature on readers and the time constraints in 
developing a framework for such a study. How the newspaper readers and TV 
audiences interpret meanings deserves special attention in further studies since they 
are a constituent part of the communication process. 
The textual analysis in this study focused on the investigation of meaning through 
the examination of themes, actors, and political arguments. Textual analysis can be 
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used in further research to investigate the formal characteristics of text such as 
grammatical features through linguistic methods. The closer focus on the sentence 
structures, use of tenses and narrative can be made by taking each item, e.g. the 
news, editorial, or column, as a whole from the beginning to the end rather than 
giving extracts from some parts. However, the number of the items analysed will 
be reduced in this way, and it will be difficult to draw out more general 
characteristics. 
This research has dealt with a large quantity of data, especially in terms of the 
news, editorials and columns, but it is based on a case study. Although it gives 
clues to understanding the triangular relationship between the state, market and 
media, with concrete examples, further studies which search different dimensions 
and use different techniques are needed in order to understand and explain this 
triangle further, and to develop the theories of political communication. 
I have focused on the investigation of the mainstream discourses. Further research 
could investigate the radical, alternative or marginal voices through their media. 
Or, if they do not have their own media, the way in which these groups contact, 
and use the mainstream media to transmit their ideas, could be investigated. This 
can be done through interviews conducted with the representatives and members of 
the pressure groups. Also, the relationship between these groups and the media can 
be investigated in the media institutions themselves. For this investigation, the 
technique should be different from the one used in the current research, since 
obtaining information through interviews on this issue would be difficult and 
insufficient. A participant observation in the media institutions would provide 
more information on the relationship between pressure groups and the media. 
However, this technique does not work retrospectively, therefore cannot be used 
for the specific issues or events which have passed. 
The participant observation technique could better explain the operation of the 
media institutions. It can also tell more about the autonomy and resistance of media 
professionals, which merits further research in order to lead to some change in the 
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exploitation of their labour and to empower them in the increasingly powerful and 
concentrated media institutions. 
Despite all the limitations of a case study in explaining the wider phenomenon, it is 
hoped that by investigating how ideology is used to limit the economic policies by 
asserting that capitalism is the only way, this thesis makes a contribution to the 
ideas which focus on the development of democracy in Turkey and the creation of 
a just society and of alternative ways of living. 
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Appendix 1 
Thlas Group 
IHLASGROUP 
IIHLAS HOLDING I 
I MEDIA INDUSTRY I 
I 8110ADCASTINQ I ......... , 1 1 ELECTRONIC 
I FOOD I 
1 
TORTTV 
11 ~~.TV J 11 . "" H ..... '"' . 1 H..AS HOMn ~ 1 rHlAs&TARSAN I 11 IHLASfOOoa 11 KAlSTALUClI.IT I CO.P. TURm! '00" !LECTAONIC PACKAGE FOOD 
I I INS.t.HlKAINAT H , .... ! I IHWTAP( r -1 .... "".""'" 1 ...... ,.""'" MEDENlya FACTORY 
1 
T!XTIl.U, H KONRKSN'ON I TEXTILE I I CHEMICAL I TEKHlK aTEKNLK 
1 
TURI." Y ........ I COCUK 
1 
fU.AS TEXTII..!i ~ 1 IHU.IE .... " I IItLASCEMlCAL IhOSol I NEWSPAP!'R PUlUStINO 
1 
.1 
IHLAlTOASAN ~ 
1 
TU"""" JI TU"'''' 1 1 """KA' 1 TllllKI'I' 1 N!WSPAPSI NEWSPA~ _ ....... CALENOI&A 
I ~"" 
.......EHT 
I TRADE&SERVE FINANCE I 
1 
"'''-TOO 11 """. 11 ''''''a! 1 : :us """'" "'" ""'" ..... MOTOR 
EO'''''' 
-~:::A~ ~""""" ..... PRO","", "'"00 
-~,. ~MW IHLAS FAIR 
....... "" 
0"""",_ 
INfBlNATIOfW. r- IHWIlklTOR - IIUSTOIIISM 
HOSPITAL .. VU. 
MIIOIIOTIII 
..... """""'" ~~COALPfIClOIXT 
-IHLASDI!KERASYOH 
- ALl1NCAM SlMJCOMP. MW ...... ___ 
:~=:::-
_ YAYSATDI!IrFUIfT1OH 
I CHARITY INSURANCE I 
I 
-!f'A$V.&IQ'I IIHLASINSURAHCE I 
_V'NEAOAEH 
""" _ EIlAUoTl!KNOLO.I 
_ fLU Plll/ATE SCOOL 
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Erol Aksoy Group 
EROLAKSOY 
SHOW GROUP 
EUROPE&AMERICA 
HOLDING 
FINANCE I I 
FACTOFINANCE f.. ATLAS FINANCE RENT RENT 
IKTISAT 
-I- IKTISA T BANK FINANCE RENT 
M.S.M 
-'-
2 BANKS 
MALlYECOM. in France and U.S.A. 
MEDIA I I 
TOURISM 
EDATUR 
: INSURANCE 
AKSTV 
-I- CINE 5 FILM EMEK f..- EMEK HAYAT PRODUCTION INSURANCE INSURANCE 
ALO-SHOW EKSEN 
PUBH.DIST. 
MEPAS MEDIA UNIVERSAL 
MARKETING PUBLISHING 
ULUSLARARASI 
MODA PUBLISHING -'-
SHOW TV 
I 
MARIE 
CLAIRE 
SHOW RADIO 
-
CHARITY I MARKETING 
EROLAKSOY SHOW-PA 
VAKFI 
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UzanGroup 
UZAN GROUP 
UZAN GROUP 
RUMELI 
HOLDING 
FINANCE INDUSTRY 
IMAR BANK 
--
ADABANK CUKUROVA r - KEPEZ ELECTRIC ELECTRIC 
RUMELI I- - RUMELI ELECTRIC CEMENT 
TRABZON r - LADIK CEMENT CEMENT 
S.URFA I- - CESTAS CEMENT INC 
ELTEMTEK TELSIM 
-INC. 
MEDIA· BUILDING 
STAR TV 
- -
KRAL TV YAPI r- STANDART PRODUCTION TRADE BUILDING COM. 
KRALFM 
-RADIO 
ISTANBUL SPOR 
CLUB 
*They are preparing to publish a daily newspaper currently 
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Appendix 2 
Coding Schedule for the Content Analysis of the News 
I. Number 
I I I I 
D. Newspaper 
1.) Sabah 
2.) HUmyet 
3.) Milliyet 
4.) Cumhuriyet 
5.) Zaman 
6.) DUnya 
ill. Date 
01.) 23-29 May 
02.) 6-12 June 
03.) 20-26 June 
04.) 4-10 July 
05.) IS-24 July 
06.) 1-7 August 
07.) 15-21 August 
OS.) 24 August-4 September 
09.) 12-IS September 
10.) 26 September-2 October 
11.) 10-16 October 
12.) 24-30 October 
13.) 7-13 November 
14.) 21-27 November 
IS.) 5-11 December 
16.) 19-25 December 
17.) 2-S January 
IS.) 16-22 January 
19.) 30 January-5 February 
20.) 13-19 February 
21.) 27 February-5 March 
22.) 13-19 March 
23.) 27 March-2 April 
24.) 10-16 April 
25.) 24-30 April 
26.) S -14 May 
27.) 22-2S May 
IV. Stage in the process: 
1.) Pre-privatization 
2.) After privatization 
3.) Cancellation of privatization 
9.) Unspecified 
v. Sectors: 
01.) Airline 
02.) Automotive 
03.) Banking and insurance 
04.) Catering 
05.) Cement 
06.) Education 
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07.) Electricity 
OS.) Electronics 
09.) Energy 
10.) Forestry 
11.) Health 
12.) Housing 
13.) Meat-fish 
14.) Metal 
IS.) Mining 
16.) Petrochemical 
17.) Petroleum marketing 
IS.) Petroleum refineries 
19.) Sea freight 
20.) Social security 
21.) Supermarket chain 
22.) Steel 
23.) Telecommunication 
24.) Textile 
25.) Tourism 
26.) Trade 
27.) Tyre 
2S.) Farming 
9S.) Other 
99.) Unclear 
00.) Not any sector. 
VI. Actors Main Secondary 
Pro-privatization Anti-privatization 
People 
01.) President 
02.) Prime minister 
03.) Deputy prime minister 
04.) Miimtaz Soysal (member of the SDP) 
05.) Yekta Giing!)r Ozden (The Head of the Constitution Court) 
06.) TPP members 
07.) SDP members 
OS.) MP members 
09.) WP members 
to.) RPP members 
11.) DLP members 
12.) Heads or spokesman of the administrative bodies of privatization 
13.) Managers of SEEs 
14.) Business people/companies 
IS.) Economists 
16.) International finance experts 
17.) Academics 
IS.) Heads or spokesman of occupational associations 
19.) Officers of local government 
20.) Heads or spokesman of trade unions 
21.) Workers 
22.) International businessman 
23.) Treasury experts 
24.) Technicians 
25.) Ministers 
Neutral 
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Institutions 
26.) Parliament 
27.) Administrative bodies of privatization 
28.) Business organisations 
29.) International finance institutions 
30.) Universities 
31.) Constitution Court 
32.) KIGEM (The Centre for Developing Public Enterprising) 
33.) Trade unions 
34.) Occupation associations 
35.) Other government institutions 
98) Other 
99) Unclear 
00) Not anybody or any institutions 
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VU. Themes of the news: Main Secondary 
Reasons! Aims of privatization 
01.) To end the SEEs burden on budget deficit 
02.) To end the SEEs other negative effects on economy 
03.) To obtain income 
04.) To increase profit 
05.) To increase efficiency and productivity 
06.) To increase economic growth 
07.) To develop infrastructural investments and technology 
OS.) To increase social justice by extending capital to people 
09.) To bring better quality of products and services for the consumers 
10.) To bring cheaper products and services for the consumers 
11.) To provide new employment opportunities 
12.) To bring free competition, liberal economy by decentralising the state power in economy 
13.) To decentralise the state power over the citizens in the political area by bringing 
democratisation as a complementary element of liberal democracy 
14.) To decrease inflation 
15.) To fasten foreign capital and foreign investments 
16.) To integrate with Europe economically 
17.) To bring European values of democracy 
IS.) SEEs should not be privatized 
19.) SEEs should be privatized because of the interests of workers 
9S.) Other 
99.) Unclear 
00.) Not any reason or aim. 
State Economic Enterprises (SEEs) 
01.) SEEs making loss 
02.) Incompetent managers of SEEs 
03.) Old technology of SEEs 
04.) Stopped investments of SEEs 
05.) Expensive products and services of SEEs 
06.) Low quality products and services of SEEs 
07.) Interference of the government or politicians in the operation of SEEs by leading to excess 
employment for the political interests 
OS.) Interference in SEEs by the government or politicians through frequent changing of the 
managers and staff 
09.) Interference of the government or politicians on the operation of SEEs by controlling SEEs 
budget and using it in other areas 
10.) Corruption SEEs 
11.) Too high wages of SEE workers 
12.) The laziness of SEE workers 
13.) Deprivation from state credits 
14.) Debt 
15.) Cheap product and services of SEEs 
16.) High quality product and services of SEEs 
17.) Investments of SEEs 
IS.) Making profits of SEEs 
19.) Privatization of SEEs should have happened sooner 
20.) Valuable fields of SEEs 
21.) Inefficiency and unproductivity of SEEs 
22.) The slowness of the privatization of SEEs 
23.) Efficiency and productivity of SEEs 
24.) Their becoming burden for the economy 
9S.) Other 
99.) Unclear 
00.) Nothing about SEEs 
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Effects of privatization 
01.) Selling cheaper than its value and obtaining less income with privatization 
02.) Too high expenses for the organisation and the announcement of the privatization 
03.) Legal errors in sales 
04.) Administrative mistakes done in organisation) 
05.) Malpractices and disorders in the sales 
06.) The mistakes about the priorities of the SEEs to be privatized 
07.) The mistakes of sale of the SEEs which make profit 
OS.) The sectoral unsuitability of privatizing some SEEs in terms of national interests 
09.) The sectoral unsuitability of privatizing some SEEs in terms of market's incapability. 
10.) Inconsistency with the principles of social state 
11.) Unemployment of workers 
12.) Reduction in wages 
13.) Workers losing their unions 
14.) Early retirement of workers) 
15.) Decrease in efficiency 
16.) Increase in injustice 
17.) Low quality products and services) 
IS.) More expensive products and services 
19.) Decline in production and efficiency 
20.) Production cessation in the privatized SEEs 
21.) Decrease in investments and technology 
22.) Decrease in economic growth 
23.) Monopolisation and cartelisation tendencies 
24.) Expansion ofimperialism . 
25.) Insufficient flow of foreign capital and investments 
26.) Obtaining income from the sales 
27.) Increase in profit 
2S.) Increase in efficiency and productivity 
29.) Increase in economic growth 
30.) Increase in investment-technology 
31.) Speeding up the flow offoreign capital and investment 
32.) Increase of better quality of products and services 
33.) Increase in social justice 
34.) Increase in cheaper products and services 
35.) Economic integration with Europe 
36.) Increase in employment 
37.) Trade union's losing becoming owner of the SEEs 
3S.) Monopolization of foreign companies 
39.) Trade union's losing their function after their ownership 
40.) Privatized SEEs making loss 
41.) That buyers do not follow their responsibilities 
42.) Extension of capital to people 
43.) Development of free market and competition 
98.) Other 
99.) Unclear 
00.) Nothing as effects of privatization 
Legal Issues 
1.) The abolition of the authority law 
2.) The abolition of the legal manifestos 
3.) Bill 
4.) Law 
5.) Changes in the law 
6.) Special arrangements for some SEEs 
7.) Legal cases of the cancelled sales 
98.) Other 
99.) Unclear 
00.) Nothing about legal issues 
229 
APPENDIX 
Appendix 3 
CODING SHEET 
CASE NUMBER NEWSPAPER DATE 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
FIRST ACTOR 
PRO ANTI NEUTRAL 
11 12 13 14 15 16 
THEMES 
REASON SEE 
MAIN SECONDARY MAIN SECONDARY 
23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
STAGE SECTORS 
7 8 9 10 
SECOND ACTOR 
PRO ANTI NEUTRAL 
17 18 19 20 21 22 
' EFFECT LEGAL I 
MAIN i SECONDARY MAIN SECONDARY 
I i J 
31 32 33 134 35 36 
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